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This work addresses three policy-relevant empirical issues. First, how do
banking crises affect financial reforms? It turns out that banking crises pro-
duce a variety of reform patterns in the financial sector over time. Second,
do countries which reform their financial, product, and labor markets grow
similarly? The results suggest that some countries benefit more from market-
oriented reforms than others. Third, if some countries benefit more, could it
be because various economies have markedly different firm-size distributions,
and firms of different size grow differently after identical reforms? If firms
of different size indeed grow differently after identical reforms, this could
produce diverse growth outcomes across countries after similar reforms.
The first study has been motivated by the fact that a number of coun-
tries have gone through banking crises since the early 1970s. It links those
episodes with the patterns of various financial reforms within those countries.
As banking crises are endogenous, crisis exposures to major trading partners
help identify the causality between crises and reforms. Consistent with the
previous literature, the results of this work demonstrate that systemic bank-
ing crises reverse most financial reforms. However, they do so with various
lags, whereas the impact of non-systemic crises is largely insignificant. The
main results remain unaffected after numerous robustness checks. The main
contribution of this work is to study financial reforms in a dynamic empirical
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framework with endogenously determined banking crises. A rich set of pol-
icy implications is discussed which could help establish a growth-enhancing
financial regulatory framework after banking crises.
The second study analyzes the influence of credit-, labor-, and product
market deregulation policies on economic growth in more than 60 economies
over a period of 40 years since 1970. By combining a difference-in-difference
strategy with an IV approach to the endogeneity of the reform timing, this
work finds that deregulation contributed to the per capita GDP levels of the
early and consistent reformers relatively more than to the ones of the late
reformers. The paper also finds a significant growth acceleration effect from
market-oriented reforms over shorter periods of time. However, the growth
acceleration effects dissipate over longer periods. A number of robustness
checks support these conclusions.
The third study uses large firm-level data to search for the reasons sim-
ilar market-oriented reforms can produce different growth outcomes across
countries. It combines two observations. On the one hand, economies have
markedly different firm size distributions. On the other hand, firms of dif-
ferent size grow differently after identical financial- and product-market lib-
eralization reforms. Thus, identical reforms can produce different growth
outcomes across countries. This result is reached by exploring firm-level
data on sales and sales per worker across 135 developing and post-transition
economies between 2000-2010. It helps explain the remarkable variation
in the vast development literature studying the effects of various market-
oriented reforms across countries and over time.
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Introduction (Czech version)
Tato práce se zaměřuje na tři empirická témata relevantní pro veřejné poli-
tiky. Zaprvé, jak bankovní krize ovlivňují finanční reformy? Data ukazují,
že bankovní krize produkují v průběhu času řadu reformních vzorců ve fi-
nančním sektoru. Za druhé, rostou země, které provedli reformu finančních
trhů, trhů s produkty a trhů práce, podobně? Výsledky naznačují, že na něk-
teré země mají tržně orientované reformy pozitivnější vliv než na země jiné.
Za třetí, pokud některé země opravdu těží víc z takovýchto reforem, může být
důvodem to, že různé země mají výrazně odlišné rozložení firem z hlediska
velikosti a že různě velké firmy rostou rozdílnou rychlostí po identických re-
formách? Pokud firmy různých velikostí opravdu rostou různou rychlostí po
stejných reformách, mohlo by to vést k různým růstovým zkušenostem napříč
zeměmi procházejícími obdobnými reformami.
První studie byla motivována skutečností, že řada zemí prošla od počátku
sedmdesátých let minulého století bankovními krizemi. Tato práce spojuje
tyto epizody se schématy různých finančních reforem v rámci těchto zemí.
Protože bankovní krize jsou endogenní, vystavování se velkým obchodním
partnerům během krize pomáhá identifikovat kauzalitu mezi krizemi a re-
formou. Výsledky této práce jsou konzistentní s předchozí literaturou a
ukazují, že systémové bankovní krize zvrátí většinu finančních reforem. Děje
se tak však se zpožděním různé délky, zatímco dopad nesystémových krizí
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je do značné míry nevýznamný. Výsledky se nemění po mnoha zkouškách
robustnosti. Práce diskutuje širokou škálu možných důsledků pro veřejné
politiky, které by mohly vytvořit růst-posilující finanční regulační rámec po
bankovních krizích.
Druhá studie analyzuje vliv deregulace úvěrového, pracovního a produk-
tového trhu na hospodářský růst ve více než 60 ekonomikách po dobu 30 let.
Studie pomocí kombinace rozdílových strategií a přístupem instrumentálních
proměnných, tak aby adresovala problém endogenity načasování reforem,
dochází k závěru, že deregulace přispěly k úrovni HDP na hlavu dřívějších
reformátorů relativně více než k úrovním pozdějších reformátorů. Práce také
poukazuje na signifikantní zrychlení ekonomického růstu v důsledku tržně-
orientovaných reforem, které nicméně trvá po relativně kratší dobu. Tento
efekt se však v delším časovém horizontu z dat vytrácí. Závěry práce jsou
podpořeny několika zkouškami robustnosti.
Třetí studie používá data na úrovni jednotlivých firem, aby odpověděla
na otázku proč podobné, tržně orientované reformy mohou vést k různému
ekonomickému růstu v různých zemích. Za tímto účelem kombinuje dva
postřehy. Zaprvé, mezi ekonomikami existují výrazné rozdíly v distribuci ve-
likosti firem. Zadruhé, různě velké firmy rostou různou rychlostí po identick-
ých liberalizačních reformách finančních trhů a trhů s produkty. Z tohoto
důvodu identické reformy můžou vést k různému ekonomickému růstu různých
ekonomik. Toto je potvrzeno pomocí analýzy firemních dat o tržbách a
tržbách na zaměstnance ze 135 rozvojových zemí a zemí po ekonomické trans-
formaci. Tento výsledek pomáhá objasnit pozoruhodnou variaci v obsáhlé
rozvojové literatuře, která se zabývá efektem různých tržně-orientovaných
reforem v různých zemích a časových horizontech.
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Chapter 1
Banking Crises and Reversals in
Financial Reforms1




Despite the rich history of both systemic and non-systemic banking crises in
many countries, and the variety of policy responses to them, the financial
reforms literature contains relatively little information on the specific ex-post
financial reform patterns. It is still unclear which reform areas are more
likely to be affected than others, how long it typically takes regulators to
enact reforms in a given area, is the forcefulness of reforms related to the
severity of crises, and whether a banking crisis concurrent with a recession
induces faster reforms. To address those questions, economists need to look
at many banking crises across a large number of countries over long periods
of time. However, to date, the literature is scarce on panel data studies in
this line of research.
One notable exception is the work by Abiad and Mody (2005). They
study how banking crises affect the overall pattern of financial reforms across
countries by using an ordered logit model. Implicitly, however, their model
assumes banking crises are random events, which is arguably not the case.
Banking crises are most likely determined endogenously and three channels
for their incidence seem evident. First, Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2008),
among others, conclude that banking system performance, hence its fragility,
may be affected by banking regulations but leave empirical work in this di-
rection for the future.2 Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) also find that
financial liberalization may positively influence the likelihood of a banking
crisis, especially in countries with weaker banking supervision and judicial
institutions. In a supporting argument, Demetriades and Hook Law (2006)
2In fact, Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) have already done some of this work on a
cross-section of countries by using the data they collected in Barth, Caprio, and Levine
(2001).
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argue that financial development has larger effects on GDP per capita when
the financial system is embedded within a sound institutional framework,
while Rousseau and Wachtel (2011) state that the weakening of the finan-
cial development-growth link may also be a result of widespread financial
liberalizations in the late 1980s and early 1990s in countries that lacked the
legal or regulatory infrastructure to exploit financial development success-
fully. Therefore, any empirical study of financial reforms is prone to reverse
causality issues between crises and reforms. Demetriades and Hussein (1996)
are among the first to point this out. However, reverse causality is the first
among many reasons to consider banking crises endogenous.
Second, it has been shown that banking crises in a given country i can
occur through numerous endogenous channels on both the assets and the
liabilities sides of the bank balance sheet. Crises occurring on both sides
have been studied by Allen and Gale (1998, 2000). In their earlier paper, an
economic downturn in the real sector reduces the returns on bank assets. As
a result, depositors put pressure on the banking sector by liquidating bank
liabilities. In their latter work, banks in region i liquidate claims on banks in
region j when there is an excess demand for liquidity in region i. However,
the liquidity may not be readily available in region j, which in turn causes
banks in region j to contribute to the excess demand for liquidity, which
drives contagion. Then, these two papers suggest that a banking crisis could
not only originate in the real sector but it could also propagate across regions
for reasons within both the financial and the real sector.
Third, the empirical literature adds cross-country trade and financial
flows as contagion mechanisms. For example, Balakrishnan, Danninger,
Elekdag, and Tytell (2011) suggest that deeper financial links are a key fac-
tor for the increased financial distress running from developed to developing
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economies. Trade linkages are examined as an additional factor that may
drive contagion in Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) and in Gorod-
nichenko, Mendoza, and Tesar (2012). The work by Gorodnichenko et al.
(2012) is one example of how trade linkages between the former Soviet Union
and Finland might have caused the Finnish output collapse in the early 1990s
which was followed by a banking crisis. At the same time, the financial re-
forms in Finland had little to do with the origin of its trade collapse in Russia.
Therefore, an output collapse or a banking crisis in a trading partner could
trigger a banking crisis in a given country, without necessarily being related
to the financial reforms in that country. This intuition helps identify the
causality running from banking crises to financial reforms.
The identification is done by constructing banking crisis exposures for
each country and period of time. The crisis exposure reveals how a banking
crisis in a given trading partner j affects the likelihood of a banking crisis
in a given economy i, without directly affecting i’s financial reforms. Thus,
the paper identifies at least some part of the exogenous impact of banking
crises on financial reforms and addresses one of the long-standing issues in the
empirical literature of financial reforms: the implicit assumption of randomly
occurring crises. This is the first contribution of this work.
Its second contribution is to acknowledge and incorporate the inherent
dynamics of the reform process. The intuition supporting the inclusion of
the reform dynamics is simple. First, if a country’s financial system has not
been liberalized at all, this may indicate high resistance to reform or a strong
status quo bias, as in Abiad and Mody (2005). Thus, previous low levels of
financial liberalization may also predict low levels in the current period. At
the same time, however, high levels of financial liberalization in the past may
mean that there is not much left to reform, even if the incumbent government
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is reform-oriented. Hence, at high levels of financial liberalization we may
see slow reforms as well. This is a path-dependent non-linear relationship
which calls for inclusion of both linear and quadratic terms of lagged levels
of reforms in any empirical model of reform dependence on banking crises.
However, financial reforms may occur and may also be delayed for reasons
other than banking crises and reform dynamics. Past recessions and exchange
rate fluctuations may well interfere with policy decisions on reforming the
financial sector. Also, once countries become more open and gain from trade,
they might be more likely to reduce their bias in favor of keeping the status
quo and open up to financial liberalization, as in Rajan and Zingales (2003).
In addition, the status quo bias against financial reforms may change at
various stages of the business cycle, which would surface as a higher likelihood
of opening up or re-regulating some parts of the financial system at various
stages of the cycle.
There are also potential differences in how various countries respond to
banking crises due to legal origin or geography, if they react at all. Morck and
Yeung (2009) bring up legal origin, early land distribution, language, religion
and culture as other possible fixed effects on a regulatory reform. Further,
major events in a group of countries in a given period such as the economic
transformation in Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s, the banking
crises in Latin America, Asia and Eastern Europe in the late 1990s, and the
current fiscal crisis in the Eurozone, may shape financial reforms as well.
Those regional events which occur at a given point in time need to be taken
into account in a study of any financial reform.
Based on the intuition above, the following section presents an empiri-
cal model to study financial reforms in a dynamic empirical framework with
endogenously determined banking crises. The data and the results are pre-
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sented next. Since some econometric concerns may arise over how the dy-
namic model was constructed, necessary robustness checks are presented after
the discussion of the results. Those robustness checks validate the baseline
results. The conclusions point to specific areas in which governments could
focus financial reforms in the wake of banking crises.
1.2 Methodology
1.2.1 Baseline Model
To address the impact of a financial crisis on the ex-post financial reforms, I
estimate the following model in differences:











it−1β + fi + frft + εmit,
where Rmit is the reform measure m in country i in period t changing after
a systemic banking crisis (SBC) or a non-systemic banking crisis (NBC)
occurs in the same country in the current or previous two periods, and Z ′it is
a vector of other controls. The measure Rmit is an index reflecting how the
overall pattern of financial reforms or any of the specific financial reforms
monitored by Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2010), changes over time.
The other controls include: a) lagged log-levels of per capita GDP and log-
level of the exchange rate against the US dollar; b) the openness of the
economy measured by the share of foreign trade in GDP; c) the reform gap:
the difference between the highest level of the reform within the same region
in year t and the country’s level of reform in the manner of Abiad and Mody
(2005), as well as an interaction of the reform gap with GDP and the exchange
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rate;3 and d) political system variables.
The optimal lag-length s∗ was determined by using a procedure suggested
in Babecký et al. (2013) and developed by Love and Zicchino (2006). Sim-
ilarly to Babecký et al. (2013), I use a panel vector autoregression (PVAR)
technique to generate impulse-response functions (IRFs) of each financial re-
form to an SBC or an NBC shock. The optimal lag s∗ is then determined
at the point at which an IRF of a particular reform to a shock reaches its
maximum (in the case of a positive response) or minimum (in the case of
a negative response). To illustrate the process of lag selection, Figure 1.1
presents the impulse-response pairs (Rmit; SBC) and (Rmit; NBC) for the
overall reform. The lag selection process for the rest of the pairs is identi-
cal. For most reforms, including the overall reform pattern, the number of
optimal lags after an SBC is 2. That is why I choose s∗ = 2.
The panel OLS model above has two issues which may bias the results
and possibly even produce inconsistent estimates. The first issue is the en-
dogeneity of crises which, apart from being evident in the literature, is also
noticeable in the IRFs of crises to reform shocks. The second issue is the
serial correlation in the presence of reform dynamics. The first issue is ad-
dressed by using an instrumental variable (IV) approach, combined with the
above fixed effects panel data estimations. The second issue is addressed by
using a difference GMM model in the spirit of Arellano and Bond (1991),
which leads to consistent estimates even in the presence of serial correlation
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2005, p.764-765).
3Often, financial reforms within a country are a product of global or regional reform
trends, even in the absence of local banking crises. If the regional leaders in reforms are
thought of as the reform trend-setters, then the reform gap would capture not only some
of the local reform idiosyncrasies but also the regional simultaneity of reforms which may
or may not be due to a banking crisis.
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1.2.2 Instrumental Variable Estimation
If a financial crisis is modeled as a purely random event occurring as a self-
fulfilling prophecy, then the panel OLS approach to estimate the effect of a
crisis would suffice for unbiased and consistent estimation. However, for rea-
sons detailed above, a crisis is determined endogenously. Acknowledging the
plethora of ways in which banking crises can spread across countries and over
time, this work considers trade linkages to be a viable propagation mecha-
nism of financial distress, as in Rose and Spiegel (2009) and Gorodnichenko
et al. (2012). A crisis in country i will be more likely if it trades with country
j, which happens to be in a crisis. If country j is in a crisis, it will likely
demand less imports from country i. This will reduce exports from country
i, which may induce a recession in an open economy and shrink assets in its
banking sector, which in turn raises the likelihood of an asset crisis, with a
certain lag. A crisis in country i will be all the more likely if more than one
trading partner experiences an episode of financial distress at the same time,
or if its export share to a country in crisis is large, or both. Based on this
premise, I construct a crisis exposure variable for each country and year. In
its simplest form, the crisis exposure is an export-weighted crisis occurrence




CjtSijt ∈ [0; 1], (1.2)
where CrExpit is the crisis exposure of country i in period t, Cjt is a dummy
equal to 1 if a banking crisis occurs in country j in period t, and Sijt is the
share of i’s exports to j in period t. Since Cjt is either 0 or 1, and
∑
j Sijt = 1,
then the crisis exposure varies between 0 and 1.
At first glance, the crisis exposure is prone to a weakness. Even if it
identifies i ’s exposure to a shock coming from j, it appears to assume the
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crisis in j to be exogenous. But the crisis in j is not exogenous, as j is
exposed to other economies through its own trade.4 However, note that
the crisis exposure is constructed in a way that captures also j ’s exposure.
Therefore, j ’s crisis is also identified, as well as its own partners’ crises down
to the ultimate originator.
Depending on the type of crisis occurring in country j, two instrumen-
tal variables can come from the crisis exposure variable simultaneously – a
systemic banking crisis exposure, and a non-systemic banking crisis expo-
sure. It is also important to note that a non-systemic crisis in a large trading
partner may bring a disproportionately large effect in a small open economy.
Therefore, both are used as instruments for the SBC and NBC in country
i in the first stage of the 2SLS estimations.
1.2.3 Correcting for Serial Correlation
Standard panel data literature suggests that if the data contains a large time
dimension, then fixed effects estimation may render consistent results even
in a dynamic panel (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005, p.764). However, in some
cases the linked data on banking crises and financial reforms contains just
a few years of data. In fact, the maximum number of years in my sample
is just below 30, which cannot be considered a large number. Therefore,
the way to consistently estimate the parameters of interest in the presence
of dynamics is to use a difference GMM method (Arellano & Bond, 1991).
Apart from instrumenting with the lagged levels of the variables, the crisis
exposures are kept as additional regressors in the first estimation stage. The
4It is also exposed through its financial linkages but longitudinal data on bilateral
financial flows is still proprietary, and the Bank for International Settlements is yet to
publish it: see the CGFS (2012, p.4-5) report.
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first pass at estimating equation (1.1) is a one-step difference GMM with
robust standard errors to both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, in
which the crisis exposures are treated as strictly exogenous.
As a standard procedure, the Sargan and Hansen tests of the overidein-
tification restrictions are also done. As Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2003)
note, the Sargan statistic is not valid in the presence of heteroskedastic-
ity. Therefore, a significant difference between the Sargan test and the
heteroskedasticity-robust Hansen test could be expected. However, even the
robust Hansen test is prone to weaknesses in the presence of many instru-
ments. Hence, a robustness check on the GMM method is required, which
reduces the number of instruments significantly. The robustness checks on
the GMM method are also discussed below.
1.3 Data
The data used here to feed the models above are a combination of four
data sets. The first one is a data set constructed by Caprio and Klingebiel
(2003). It features the timing of 117 episodes of systemic banking crises in
93 countries since the early 1970s and of 51 borderline systemic and non-
systemic crises, thereby enabling this work to qualify which crises lead to the
variety of financial reforms studied here.
The Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) data is supplemented by the newer
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) work, which dates further episodes of banking
crises after 2002. In addition, the Reinhart and Rogoff data set eliminates
some of the dating ambiguities in the former data set, especially the ones re-
lated to the end dates of some of the crises, and thus represents an important
addition to it.
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The third data set was assembled by Abiad et al. (2010). It has moni-
tored seven financial reforms annually from 1973 till 2005 across 91 countries.
The reforms include imposition of credit controls, interest rate controls, entry
barriers, restrictions on private ownership and banking privatization, secu-
rities and banking supervision regulations, and capital account restrictions.
Each particular financial reform is coded into a discrete index i ∈ [0; 3].5 In
addition, Abiad et al. construct an overall index of financial reforms for each
country and year, being equivalent to the sum of indices of each particular
reform, and normalize it to 1. In each set of regressions – fixed effects, 2SLS,
and difference GMM – I take the change in each of the normalized reform
indices as the dependent variable. An increase in the reform index means a
more liberalized financial system, with the exception of banking supervision
reform, where stricter supervisory powers are associated with an increase in
the index.
The fourth data set consists of the systemic and the non-systemic crises
exposures for each country. To construct this data, I use the Caprio and
Klingebiel (2003) crises data and interact each crisis episode in country j in
year t with the shares of exports from country i to country j in year t. If
there is no crisis in any country j in a given year, then the crisis exposure
in country i is 0. If there is a crisis in country j, then the crisis exposure is
the share of exports of i going to country j. A crisis exposure for country i
increases with the number of trading partners in crisis, and with the share of
exports to a given partner in crisis. To construct a panel of bilateral export
shares, I need a longitudinal bilateral trade data. Such data are available
5For each of the 7 policy reforms, Abiad et al. code the current situation as 0 if the
policy is most restrictive, and 3 if the policy is most liberalized. I normalize these indices
to 1.
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for 1970-2000 in Feenstra, Lipsey, Deng, Ma, and Mo (2005). An alternative
source of bilateral trade data for 1948-2000 is Gleditsch (2002). Despite
having a longer time coverage, the Gleditsch (2002) data has an identical
matchable span to the Feenstra et al. data. Therefore, I use the Feenstra et
al. data only.
The additional controls are taken from the Penn World Table 7.0. pro-
duced by Heston, Summers, and Aten (2011) and from the Database of Polit-
ical Institutions prepared by Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, and Walsh (2001).6
The GDP is the log-level of per-capita GDP; the exchange rate (XR) is the
log of the exchange rate against the US dollar and its increase means an ex-
change rate depreciation; the openness is the share of foreign trade in GDP.
The model is then estimated after differencing all the variables, including the
interaction terms. The results from these estimations are presented below.
1.4 Results
Table 1.1 presents the results from estimating equation (1.1) in differences
by fixed effect panel data OLS with clustered standard errors. The table
reveals several policy response patterns to financial crises, taken from the
experience of more than 70 countries, spanning roughly 30 years. Column
(1) demonstrates the effect of banking crises on the overall pattern of financial
reforms. The expected significant non-linearities in the reform dynamics are
indeed present. They are indicated by a negative and significant coefficient
on Reform2t−1. The sign also contributes evidence to an inverted U-shape
of overall reform dynamics, which was found to be significant by Abiad and
Mody (2005) and later by Campos and Coricelli (2012). This means countries
6The most recent update of the Beck et al. (2001) database was in December, 2010.
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which reversed their financial liberalization in the past are less likely to reform
and that those who reformed most in the previous period are also less likely
to undertake further reforms.
The inverted U-shape of reforms is also consistent with recent findings
in the literature about a more nuanced relationship between finance and
growth. Arcand, Berkes, and Panizza (2012) suggest that financial depth
starts having a negative effect on output growth when credit to the private
sector reaches 100% of GDP. Cecchetti, Mohanty, and Zampolli (2011) and
Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) confirm the existence of debt thresholds for
the government, the private sector and the household sector, beyond which
debt can be damaging for growth, while Rousseau and Wachtel (2002) con-
clude that there is an inflation threshold for the finance-growth relationship
beyond which finance is no longer supporting growth.
The overall response pattern is also affected by the severity of the crisis.
Whereas non-systemic banking crises do not exert significant influence on the
overall financial reforms, systemic banking crises reverse reforms, although
with a certain lag of about two years. Given the complexity of changing
financial regulations, and the likelihood of a strong lobbying process affecting
the financial regulatory process, it is well within expectations that financial
reforms will be delayed after systemic banking crises. An example of an
overall lag is the adoption of the Dodd-Frank act, which was passed about
two years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 and introduced a
swathe of new financial regulations in the entire U.S. financial industry.7
Similar to the overall reform patterns, credit controls are one of the areas
of financial regulation in which an inverted U-shape of reform dynamics is
observed. This is evident in column (2) of Table 1.1. Higher government
7See Krainer (2012) for a broad review of the Dodd-Frank Act.
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intervention in the allocation of credit, indicated by higher required reserves
and more directed credit to given industries, is also evident after systemic
banking crises. However, both interest rate controls and entry barriers in the
financial industry seem unaffected by either systemic or non-systemic banking
crises, by recessions, by reform dynamics or by a status quo bias. This is
evident in columns (3) and (4) of Table 1.1. There, most of the parameter
estimates are insignificant. The one notable exception is the significantly
higher government intervention related to setting the market interest rates
after an exchange rate appreciation. Intuitively, if exchange rate appreciation
constrains local production by making it more expensive internationally, then
intervening in the credit market by lowering deposit or lending rates would
help restore competitiveness. It should be noted, though, that the effect
is significant only at the 10% level, and disappears in the difference GMM
estimations presented in Table 1.3.
The results in column (4) of Table 1.3 also demonstrate that systemic
banking crises lead to tightening of the entry regulations in the banking
industry. However, the more stringent entry policies are implemented with
a sizable time lag, and the effect is significant only at the 10% level. On the
one hand, this reform is rational. Limiting the number of participants in the
sector, especially in combination with improved supervision on the incumbent
banks, which is also evident in column (5), may impose higher costs on future
risk taking, thereby reducing the probability of future crises, as implied by
Thakor (2012). On the other hand, abundant theory and evidence suggests
that limiting entry into the banking sector is also associated with higher loan
interest rates and lower deposit rates, which hampers investment.8
8For a theoretical argument, see Besanko and Thakor (1992). Evidence for both deposit
and loan interest rates is available for Turkey (Denizer, 1997), Portugal (de Pinho, 2000),
Philippines (Unite & Sullivan, 2003), China (Fu & Heffernan, 2009), Kyrgyzstan (Brown,
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It may be the case that banking supervision was improved in both Eu-
rope and the US after the latest financial crisis. The results in column (5)
of both Table 1.1 and Table 1.2 reveal, however, that banking crises between
the early 1970s and early 2000s did little to improve banking supervision.
When the full set of available instruments for a financial crisis and for regu-
latory dynamics is taken into account in Table 1.3, systemic banking crises
clearly bring more government, and other independent regulatory interven-
tion in the financial sector supervision. Still, the effect is significant only
at the 10% level. This extended role of the regulators may include but is
not limited to the adoption of Basel capital requirement rules, establishing a
financial regulatory body which is independent of the incumbent government
or chief executive, and a more comprehensive supervisory coverage, including
a more pronounced role of macroprudential supervision, which is increasingly
necessary in the aftermath of the Great Recession.
After systemic crises, governments intervene in the financial sector through
another tool: ownership. Column (6) in all three tables demonstrates that
the state increases its ownership in the banking sector immediately after or
even during the crisis itself. This is hardly surprising given the ubiquitous
bail-outs during a systemic crisis. Demirgüç-Kunt and Servén (2010, p.98)
describe this trend as a “very common [way] of dealing with systemic bank-
ing crises” and discuss some pros and (more extensively) cons of increased
government ownership in the banking sector. Unlike systemic banking crises,
however, the results here suggest that non-systemic crises rarely induce gov-
ernments to step in to prevent bank failure. In a more normative context, it
should be also noted that if indeed the debt and inflation thresholds found
Maurer, Pak, & Tynaev, 2009), the European Union (Corvoisier & Gropp, 2002), and
for a wide cross-section of countries (Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, & Levine, 2004).
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in the literature9 are working, government intervention should be used with
more caution, especially at high levels of debt. This is so because despite
the short-term gains from preventing bank failures, the government could
actually help break the positive financial development-growth link if goes
significantly above the critical thresholds after crises.
Governments also introduce more restrictions on capital inflows and out-
flows after systemic banking crises. The significant estimates in column (7)
of all three tables on SBCt−s show that systemic crises induce governments
to impose stronger capital restrictions. Those might involve introducing a
special exchange rate regime, e.g. a currency board, limiting the amount
of claims that foreign banks can have on local ones, or enacting restrictions
on capital outflows. The results in Table 1.3 also suggest that governments
impose capital flows restrictions with a significant time lag.
This lag implies that capital controls may be adopted for all the wrong
reasons: rather than containing a looming exchange rate crisis and limiting
the risk of a subsequent banking crisis, capital controls are sometimes im-
posed long after the peak of the crisis. This implementation lag may limit
the effectiveness of the policy and may also limit capital inflows in the af-
termath of a crisis when they are needed most. Demirgüç-Kunt and Servén
(2010) provide an excellent review of the drawbacks of using extensive capital
account restrictions to deter a crisis.
The last dimension of financial reforms that can be analyzed with the
data from Abiad et al. (2010) is the securities markets policies, regulations
and governing institutions. Those policies and regulations demonstrate the
willingness of the incumbent government to actively support the development
9See Cecchetti et al. (2011), Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) and Rousseau and Wachtel
(2002).
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of securities markets within a given country. An example of such government
support could be establishing a bonds market with various maturities on it,
setting up a securities and exchange supervisory body, enacting bonds, stocks
and derivatives trade laws, and allowing foreign entry into the securities
markets. The results in column (8) demonstrate that, as with most financial
policies, securities markets policies experience reform reversals after systemic
crises. Those reversals may stall the development of a securities market or
introduce more limitations on foreign participation in the stock market.
It has been shown that systemic banking crises significantly influence fi-
nancial regulations, and do so more strongly than non-systemic crises. In
addition, this study has found an inherent financial regulatory dynamic ad-
justment process, in which the degree of current reforms is affected by how
much was reformed in the immediate past, with the majority of the reforms
exhibiting an inverted U-shape. This regulatory dynamic process implies that
countries are gradually moving towards two plausible regulatory equilibria:
a fully liberalized financial system or a fully repressed financial system, with
neither system consisting of zero or of an infinite burden of financial regu-
lations. Naturally, other factors also play a significant role in establishing
the new financial regulatory realm after banking crises. Their impact can be
seen in all tables.
One of the additional factors affecting financial reforms after banking
crises is the business cycle. When the economy is in a recession, governments
respond to it is by implementing financial liberalization reforms. This overall
pattern is indicated in Column (1) of Table 1.3, and is intuitive if governments
are assumed to be rationally targeting financial development and growth. At
a deeper level, three particular reform areas are affected most by a recession.
They include liberalization of credit controls, improving banking supervision
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and reducing the ownership control over the banking sector.
First, a rational government would reduce credit controls in a recession
by limiting the direct allocation of resources to favored sectors, and the mon-
etary authorities would reduce the required reserves in the banking system
to support credit activity. Second, improving banking supervision after re-
cessions also makes sense – it could limit the riskier banking activities that
likely caused the recession in the first place. Third, governments often reduce
their ownership in the banking sector after a recession which may happen for
two reasons. On the one hand, a recession makes losses in the banking sector
more likely. If the government anticipates the losses, then it is rational to
reduce its ownership in the sector for sure cash now instead of waiting for
lackluster dividend prospects to materialize. On the other hand, privatizing
some part of the banking system can spark competition in the sector, which
can drive down interest rates and catalyze private activity. In addition, more
competition in the banking industry is found to enhance stability (Schaeck,
Cihak, & Wolfe, 2009).
Stimulating private activity through more competition in the financial
industry, however, has a downside. Allen and Gale (2004) argue that com-
petition in the financial sector is sometimes at odds with financial stability –
an argument which perhaps goes as far back as Keeley (1990). At the same
time, Beck (2008) presents considerable differences across studies examining
the competition-stability link, and concludes that their results are ambigu-
ous. In addition, he also finds that in cases where loose competition has
increased fragility, this has been mostly the consequence of regulatory and
supervisory failures, a finding supported by Tarr (2010) in the case of the
latest US financial crisis.
Apart from the GDP dynamics, regional competition for capital inflows
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and policy learning also play a role in shaping financial reforms. These
competition and policy learning effects, which Abiad and Mody (2005) in-
troduced into the financial reforms literature, is evident from three variables:
the reform gap, and the interaction of the gap with the GDP and with the
exchange rate. The higher the gap between the regional reform leaders and
a given country, the more the country is lagging behind the regional leaders
in financial reforms. Therefore, closing the gap also positions the country
more favorably for attracting foreign investment. Based on the evidence in
Abiad and Mody (2005, p.80), one would expect the gap to be significant in
shaping overall reform patterns, as well as many specific financial reforms.
However, interestingly, the results in Table 1.3 demonstrate that reducing
the reform gap does not play a significant role in shaping overall reform pat-
terns.10 Zooming in on particular reforms, the reform gap affects only two
of them: credit controls, and securities market policies and regulations. In
those two reforms, reducing the gap increases the likelihood of pursuing fur-
ther financial liberalization. This learning effect is significant at the 5% level
for credit controls, and at 1% level for the securities policies.
In the reform of credit controls and in the reform of securities markets,
the gap also plays a different role at various stages of the business cycle.
Countries closer to the regional reform leaders in terms of financial liber-
alization tend to shed their credit controls more in recessions, and pursue
more favorable policies to develop the securities markets than countries lag-
ging behind with liberalization. This is indicated by the positive and signif-
10In fact, in one of the robustness checks on the overall reform pattern, the reform
gap becomes significant at the 5% level when the political factors are taken into account.
However, the gap has the unexpected positive sign which demonstrates that, rather than
building up a reform momentum, closing in on the regional leaders reduces the overall
reform drive.
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icant parameter estimates on the interaction term between the reform gap
and the GDP dynamics. The positive estimates imply that governments do
learn to pursue growth-enhancing policies in recessions, particularly related
to developing their financial markets and to enhancing competition in the
real sector by reducing direct allocation of resources to favored industries. In
times of economic growth, however, rather than pursuing further liberaliza-
tion, governments closer to the reform frontier seem to extend favors for some
industries more than the lagging countries do. This is perhaps only natu-
ral, since governments are also expected to have higher revenues in the good
times. Hence, they have a stronger ability to allocate resources to particular
industries during the growth phase.
In addition, an exchange rate appreciation would encourage countries
closer to the regional reform leaders to pursue a more extensive capital ac-
count liberalization than the backward countries. This is seen from the pos-
itive and significant sign on Gap∗XRt−1, where reducing the gap is seen as
closing in on the regional reform leaders, whereas reducing the XR repre-
sents an exchange rate appreciation. To interpret this finding, we need to
consider a dynamic trade-off between long-term benefits and short-term costs
for the local economy. On the one hand, an exchange rate appreciation low-
ers the international competitiveness of the domestic firms in the short run
and creates an incentive for the central bank to sterilize the appreciation, or
for the government to impose capital inflow restrictions. On the other hand,
attracting new foreign capital and encouraging greenfield investment could
boost potential GDP more than slowing an exchange rate appreciation.
Further research would determine whether that is indeed the proper trade-
off to consider in the context of capital control liberalization. Further research
is also needed to find out why the reform gap is insignificant for other financial
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reforms, why systemic banking crises affect different financial reforms with
a different lag, and why interest rate controls do not depend on systemic
crises, although it is quite intuitive to expect a more pronounced government
intervention in directing pricing in the deposits and lending markets.11
1.5 Robustness Checks
1.5.1 Robustness of the GMM Results
Although the GMM estimations in this work deliver new insights into the
policy-making process after banking crises, they also require implicit assump-
tions when employing any given version of the GMM method.12 Therefore, it
would be useful to know if the GMM estimation results remain robust when
some of the main traits of the model here are altered. The baseline specifica-
tion included a one-step robust difference GMM with a full set of instruments
in which the crisis exposures are treated as strictly exogenous. The robust-
ness checks are done along the following lines: 1) a two-step robust difference
GMM with full set of instruments; 2) a two-step robust system GMM with
full set of instruments; 3) a one-step robust difference GMM with a collapsed
set of instruments; and 4) a one-step robust difference GMM with a collapsed
set of instruments in which the crisis exposures are treated as possibly en-
dogenous rather than strictly exogenous.
The first robustness check is driven by the expected increase in efficiency
that a two-step estimation creates, at least in theory. If indeed the two-step
11In fact, when the political factors are taken into account in one of the robustness
checks, systemic banking crises become significant at the 10% level, while non-systemic
crises retain their insignificance.
12Roodman (2009) is a useful source on both the strengths and the pitfalls of the GMM
method.
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estimation is more efficient, then the significance of the baseline results here
is not artificially inflated. Alternatively, if the two-step GMM estimations are
less significant than the one-step estimations, then the reason is perhaps the
existence of a small sample bias of the two-step GMM discussed in Cameron
and Trivedi (2005, p.177). The second robustness check is needed to see
if there is an additional gain from using the system GMM rather than the
original Arellano-Bond type regression. The third robustness check is needed
because both the difference and the system GMM create many instruments
and could deliver Sargan/Hansen P-values that are suspiciously high. Thus,
limiting the number of instruments may also increase the information value
of the validity tests. Finally, endogenizing the crisis exposures is intuitive. If
a banking crisis in a given economy influences the risk of a crisis in another
economy, then that risk would feed back into the first economy, especially
if there is a large trade and financial exposure between the two. If that is
indeed the case, then the crisis exposures can no longer be treated as strictly
exogenous. Therefore, I endogenize them in the last robustness check on the
GMM method.
The results from the first and second robustness checks yield lower sig-
nificance of the parameter estimates. This refers back to the possible small
sample bias of the two-step GMM. A sample of approximately 1600 observa-
tions is not particularly small per se. However, the number of clusters is only
76, which cannot be considered a large number. Therefore, a small sample
bias may well be among the reasons for the lower significance of crises for
financial reforms.
The third robustness check confirms the magnitude and the significance
of the baseline results. In this robustness check, the number of instruments
is collapsed to about 300 from about 1400, with minor variations in the
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number of instruments across models. Collapsing the number of instruments
is expected to weaken the robust Hansen overidentification test. However,
the Hansen p-value remains unchanged in all cases, which suggests that the
instruments remain valid. Further, the still implausibly high Hansen p-value
calls for a further reduction of the number of instruments by removing some
of the lags. I continue to collapse the number of instruments but further limit
the number of lags to 4 to accommodate most electoral cycles. This leads
to a Hansen p-value of 0.387 for the overall reform model, and to similar
p-values for the other reforms, with the number of instruments down to 61,
which is less than the number of clusters. At the same time, the magnitude
and the significance of the results remain almost exactly the same. Thus,
the main results remain robust to the drastic reduction of the number of
instruments, while the Hansen J-test acquires plausible values and increases
the credibility of the results.
The final robustness check is to endogenize the crisis exposure variables.
This corroborates the baseline results. Specifically, the reform dynamics play
an identical role as before, and banking crises exert a very similar influence on
the reform process, with some of the reforms affected more by the crises than
the main results suggest. This final robustness check of the GMM method
supports the conclusion that the main results are rather conservative and that
banking crises may exert an even stronger role on various financial reforms
than previously thought.
For completeness, in one of the robustness checks I also include the po-
litical orientation of the incumbent government and of the chief executive,
political system dummies, and whether the government holds a majority in
both chambers of parliament and if it is in office during the first year of
its mandate. The results remained almost identical, and some of the main
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variables gained significance, while most of the political variables were found
insignificant, consistent with the previous results in the literature.
1.5.2 Dating of Crises
Even a superficial look at the Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) data would suffice
to understand that the data needs a considerable judgement on the end dates
of the crises. Initially, the data by Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) seems sufficient
to resolve some of the dating ambiguities. However, Babecký et al. (2012,
p.11) point out a considerable remaining disagreement over the duration and
the end dates of many systemic and non-systemic banking crises. Therefore,
I do a robustness check on that front. I replace the crisis incidences from the
Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) and the Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) data with
the latest data by Laeven and Valencia (2013). The robustness checks are
done by performing identical estimations to the ones in Table 1.1, Table 1.2,
and Table 1.3, and are presented in Table 1.8, Table 1.9, and Table 1.10.
The results come even stronger with the Laeven and Valencia (2013)
data. In the Panel OLS estimations, 14 coefficients gained significance, while
only 4 lost significance. Similarly, in the GMM estimations, 14 coefficients
gained significance, while 5 lost it. The evidence in the 2SLS estimations
is less strong, with 4 coefficients gaining significance, and 10 others losing
it. Despite the considerable disagreement over the dating of the crises, the
evidence here points to a more pronounced influence of both systemic and
non-systemic crises on financial reforms than the main results demonstrate.
That is why I consider the core results a rather conservative estimate of the
effects of banking crises on financial reforms.
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1.5.3 Recession Exposures
One of the possible drawbacks of the crisis exposure instruments is that they
depend crucially on banking crisis occurrences in trading partners. Although
crises in trading partners are arguably successful in predicting a crisis in the
home country, they are hardly the only driver of those crises. An additional
factor, which is perhaps not less important, is a recession in a trading partner.
A recession in a trading partner brings a negative export demand shock
to the home country. In turn, this may deliver negative shocks on both the
assets and the liabilities side of the home country’s banking system. Either
way, after a recession in a trading partner the likelihood of a crisis in the
home country increases.
At the same time, a recession in a trading partner is not necessarily related
to the home country’s financial reform pattern. Therefore, it is related to
the occurrence of a crisis in the home country but is not directly associated
with its financial reforms. This logic leads me to construct an additional
instrument for the incidence of crises: the recession exposure.
For each country, the recession exposures are constructed identically to
the crisis exposures. The difference between them is that the recession dum-
mies in a trading partner substitute for the banking crisis dummies. There-
fore, a recession exposure of country i in time t is i ’s export-weighted sum of
recession occurrences in all trading partners j in time t. The recessions data
is taken from the Penn World Table 7.1., and the annual data on bilateral
trade for 1970–2000 is taken from Feenstra et al. (2005).
The results from including the recession exposures at the first stage of the
2SLS and difference GMM estimations are presented in Table 1.11 and Table
1.12. The 2SLS estimates experience minor changes relative to the baseline
results. Specifically, 5 parameters gain significance, while 6 of them lose it. At
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the same time, signs are the same, while magnitudes remain approximately
the same. The GMM estimates are virtually unchanged. No estimates gain or
lose any significance and the magnitudes are almost identical to the baseline
results. Therefore, it can be concluded that the recession exposures do not
change significantly the way crises affect financial reforms. The rest of the
conclusions are presented below.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper uses the rich history of systemic and non-systemic banking crises
since the early 1970s to identify the patterns of overall financial reforms, as
well as reforms in seven broad areas: credit controls, interest rate controls,
entry barriers, banking supervision, state ownership in the banking sector,
capital controls and securities markets policies. To arrive at arguably efficient
and consistent estimates, I use fixed effects panel OLS, as well as 2SLS and
GMM estimations. By constructing a crisis exposure for each country and
year, this work adopts a more realistic propagation mechanism of crises across
countries than previous literature on financial reforms. The crisis exposure
is at the heart of identifying the causal effect of banking crises on financial
reforms. Thus, this work analyzes financial reforms in a dynamic empirical
framework with endogenous financial crises, which is its core methodological
contribution to the literature.
The results demonstrate that systemic banking crises reverse the overall
pattern of financial reforms. They also reverse most of the other particu-
lar financial reforms, although with a varying reaction lag. For example,
governments allocate favors and impose more entry barriers in the financial
industry, which may reduce competition and ultimately impede growth of
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the incumbent firms. Further, systemic crises induce more state ownership
in the banking sector. This is also intuitive given the importance of not let-
ting systemically important financial institutions fail. However, in the more
recent environment of aversion to fiscal expansion, whether there are other
potentially more efficient mechanisms to save or dismantle those institutions
could be investigated.
Systemic crises also lead to more capital inflow and outflow controls. This
may be an efficient way to stem a looming crisis, but the evidence in this work
points to the fact that more often than not governments implement capital
account restrictions as a reaction to a crisis, rather than as a means to prevent
it. In addition, systemic crises slow down the creation and development
of securities markets. Finally, systemic banking crises end up in improved
banking supervision, which is perhaps a natural policy reaction to a crisis
occurring in the banking sector and need not be considered a policy reversal.
Non-systemic banking crises, however, exert a much weaker influence on
financial policies and regulations. Whenever some evidence of a policy reac-
tion emerges, it is only marginally significant.
Whereas some financial crises reverse reforms, recessions tend to induce
financial liberalizations. After recessions, governments reduce their direct
allocation of resources to particular industries, and reduce their ownership
in the banking sector. Further, if a recession occurs, the countries closer to
the regional reform leaders create a growth-enhancing financial regulatory
framework faster. This is especially valid for credit controls and for secu-
rities markets policies and reforms. A recession, however, makes banking
supervision less independent from the incumbent government.
Exchange rate movements rarely play a significant role in shaping most
financial reforms, except for capital controls. Further, in times of exchange
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rate appreciation, the countries which are closer to the regional reform leaders
reduce their capital controls relatively more than the backward countries.
Finally, the results here suggest financial reforms tend to move to one of
two states: a fully liberalized financial system or a fully repressed financial
system. This is indicated by the inverted U-shape of the reform dynamics,
and remains robust to various tweaks in the GMM method. The results
remain robust to changing the source of crises data as well.
Naturally, this study has its limitations. Particularly, considering only
seven areas of financial regulation and supervision in a myriad of proposed
policy measures within each country is a low level of specificity. The paper
also cannot say if financial reforms are moving towards a given regulatory
optimum after crises. Perhaps, as the results in the other two essays suggest,
the optimal reforms would be different across countries and would ultimately
be determined by the within-country political economy. Until better panel
data sets are available to measure reforms and crisis exposures – especially
longitudinal bilateral financial flows data – this is as far as this research can
go. Therefore, this work identifies the regulatory policy patterns after crises
rather than entering the debate on the optimal regulatory measures to deal
with the consequences of a banking crisis. This debate is bound to liven up
in the aftermath of the Great Recession.
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Table 1.1: Crises and Financial Reforms: Panel OLS Estimations
Overall CrC IRC EB BS Pr CaC SM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Reformt−1 .115 -.006 -.083 -.053 -.133∗∗∗ -.047 .027 -.095
(.227) (.067) (.114) (.077) (.042) (.063) (.100) (.058)
Reform2t−1 -.248∗∗∗ -.142∗∗∗ -.032 -.073 -.027 -.085 -.144∗ -.016
(.072) (.053) (.099) (.055) (.039) (.052) (.079) (.044)
SBCt -.005 .013 -.014 -.007 -.004 -.033∗∗ .027 -.015
(.006) (.012) (.016) (.015) (.011) (.013) (.020) (.010)
SBCt−1 -.006 .010 -.008 .009 -.010 -.035∗∗ .006 -.006
(.006) (.014) (.019) (.015) (.011) (.017) (.016) (.010)
SBCt−2 -.022∗∗∗ -.036∗ -.033 -.019 .016 -.011 -.050∗∗∗ -.011
(.006) (.018) (.022) (.018) (.011) (.015) (.019) (.014)
NBCt -.002 .001 -.022 .024∗ -.003 -.020 .005 .008
(.005) (.017) (.020) (.012) (.012) (.013) (.012) (.012)
NBCt−1 -.010 -.007 -.018 .011 .016 -.054∗∗ -.017 -.001
(.008) (.013) (.021) (.021) (.025) (.021) (.012) (.008)
NBCt−2 -.005 -.002 -.000 .007 -.000 -.016 -.021 .002
(.008) (.017) (.015) (.010) (.016) (.015) (.029) (.019)
GDP/c.t−1 -.065 -.103 -.100 -.032 -.096 -.098 -.053 -.057
(.041) (.072) (.138) (.084) (.061) (.078) (.086) (.071)
XRt−1 .002 -.006 .038∗ .001 -.003 -.019∗ .003 -.004
(.006) (.010) (.023) (.009) (.004) (.011) (.016) (.011)
Opennesst−1 .000 -.000 .001 .001 .000 .000 .000 -.001
(.000) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Gapt−1 .000 .451 -1.108 -.620 .187 -.713 -.303 -.196
(.) (.600) (.670) (.674) (.393) (.474) (.650) (.360)
Gap∗GDPt−1 -.015 -.076 .120 .038 -.022 .057 .019 .000
(.028) (.070) (.073) (.078) (.047) (.051) (.074) (.042)
Gap∗XRt−1 -.004 .005 -.025 -.001 .001 .003 .009 .004
(.007) (.006) (.021) (.007) (.003) (.007) (.008) (.007)
Const. .002 .032 .075 .014 .003 -.017 .059 .010
(.015) (.021) (.069) (.026) (.010) (.032) (.039) (.013)
N 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589
adj. R2 .116 .049 .052 .040 .059 .061 .048 .052
No. countries 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76
Notes: The table presents estimates from equation (1.1) by fixed-effects OLS, as explained
in the text. The time period covered is 1973–2000. Standard errors are clustered by
country, and are presented in parentheses. All estimations include country and region-
time fixed effects. Dependent variables are: an overall index of financial reforms, as well as
specific reforms, including credit controls (CrC), interest rate controls (IRC), entry barriers
and pro-competition measures in the banking system (EB), banking supervision (BS),
banking privatization (Pr), capital controls (CaC), policies on the securities markets (SM).
The variables Reformt−1 and Reform2t−1 represent the lags of the respective dependent
variables. SBC and NBC stand for systemic and non-systemic banking crises. The rest
of the explanatory variables are detailed in the methodology section. Symbols: ∗ p < .10,
∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
34
Table 1.2: Crises and Financial Reforms: 2SLS Panel Estimations
Overall CrC IRC EB BS Pr CaC SM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Reformt−1 .264∗∗∗ .001 -.040 -.010 -.143∗∗∗ -.035 .016 -.070
(.074) (.062) (.096) (.060) (.047) (.065) (.079) (.056)
Reform2t−1 -.218∗∗∗ -.145∗∗∗ -.048 -.095∗∗ -.004 -.084 -.136∗ -.029
(.072) (.053) (.080) (.046) (.058) (.060) (.072) (.042)
SBCt -.041∗∗ -.019 -.035 -.024 .014 -.074∗ -.078∗ -.061∗∗
(.016) (.039) (.040) (.035) (.029) (.043) (.046) (.028)
SBCt−1 -.016 .033 -.080 .042 .014 -.041 -.044 -.025
(.018) (.054) (.052) (.034) (.033) (.048) (.046) (.025)
SBCt−2 -.014 .071∗ -.069∗ .015 .001 -.040 -.028 -.044
(.014) (.039) (.037) (.035) (.035) (.033) (.045) (.032)
NBCt .027 .140∗∗ .159∗∗ .013 -.064 -.006 .013 -.063
(.025) (.067) (.078) (.062) (.062) (.057) (.080) (.050)
NBCt−1 .051∗∗ .121∗∗ .137 -.031 .043 .012 .106 .018
(.026) (.060) (.085) (.070) (.056) (.073) (.067) (.046)
NBCt−2 .008 .028 .027 .069 .101∗ -.068 .039 -.035
(.025) (.064) (.077) (.053) (.054) (.067) (.076) (.050)
GDP/c.t−1 -.061∗ .004 -.143 .101 -.060 -.087 .002 -.072
(.035) (.094) (.119) (.079) (.058) (.080) (.094) (.068)
XRt−1 .007 -.001 .058∗∗∗ .001 -.009∗ -.008 .009 .003
(.005) (.009) (.022) (.008) (.005) (.011) (.012) (.008)
Opennesst−1 .000 -.000 .001 .001∗∗ .000 .000 .000 -.001
(.000) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.000) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Gapt−1 .052 .430 -.496 -.236 .084 -.329 .247 .115
(.200) (.522) (.553) (.460) (.301) (.411) (.427) (.308)
Gap ∗GDPt−1 -.006 -.078 .056 -.002 -.011 .019 -.048 -.033
(.025) (.062) (.064) (.056) (.037) (.048) (.051) (.037)
Gap ∗XRt−1 -.001 .005 -.022 -.002 .001 .002 .013∗ .005
(.005) (.008) (.022) (.006) (.003) (.005) (.007) (.006)
N 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589
No. countries 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76
Hansen P .010 .915 .900 .958 .845 .983 .304 .710
Notes: The table presents estimates of equation (1.1) by panel 2SLS. The time period
covered is 1973–2000. Standard errors are robust and are presented in parentheses. All es-
timations include country and region-time fixed effects. Dependent variables are: an over-
all index of financial reforms, as well as specific reforms, including credit controls (CrC),
interest rate controls (IRC), entry barriers and pro-competition measures in the bank-
ing system (EB), banking supervision (BS), banking privatization (Pr), capital controls
(CaC), policies on the securities markets (SM). The variables Reformt−1 and Reform2t−1
represent the lags of the respective dependent variables. SBC and NBC stand for sys-
temic and non-systemic banking crises. The rest of the explanatory variables are detailed
in the methodology section. Symbols: ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 1.3: Crises and Financial Reforms: Difference GMM
Overall CrC IRC EB BS Pr CaC SM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Reformt−1 .973∗∗∗ .943∗∗∗ 1.013∗∗∗ .886∗∗∗ .769∗∗∗ .887∗∗∗ .787∗∗∗ .756∗∗∗
(.035) (.058) (.082) (.049) (.038) (.045) (.073) (.040)
Reform2t−1 -.180∗∗∗ -.153∗∗∗ -.240∗∗∗ -.108∗∗∗ -.001 -.084∗ -.059 .013
(.033) (.050) (.078) (.036) (.032) (.044) (.062) (.033)
SBCt -.013∗∗ .001 -.011 -.009 -.003 -.041∗∗ .003 -.020∗∗
(.006) (.012) (.018) (.015) (.010) (.016) (.018) (.009)
SBCt−1 -.003 .002 .001 .018 -.014 -.012 -.017 .009
(.008) (.019) (.020) (.019) (.014) (.019) (.019) (.011)
SBCt−2 -.009 -.030∗∗ -.006 -.025∗ .019∗ .019 -.029∗∗ -.006
(.006) (.013) (.019) (.013) (.010) (.014) (.013) (.012)
NBCt .002 .011 -.009 .023∗ .006 -.013 .018 .004
(.005) (.016) (.020) (.013) (.013) (.013) (.013) (.012)
NBCt−1 -.004 .001 .003 -.009 .027 -.033 -.006 -.002
(.008) (.014) (.026) (.017) (.025) (.021) (.013) (.008)
NBCt−2 .010∗ .013 .001 -.007 .022 .033 .016 .005
(.006) (.014) (.020) (.017) (.017) (.021) (.017) (.011)
Gapt−1 .100 -.435∗∗ -.347 .053 .122 -.100 .029 -.564∗∗∗
(.103) (.206) (.311) (.178) (.157) (.174) (.216) (.163)
Gap∗GDPt−1 -.016 .040∗ .042 -.016 -.021 -.002 -.012 .059∗∗∗
(.012) (.023) (.035) (.020) (.019) (.021) (.026) (.019)
Gap∗XRt−1 -.001 .002 -.009 .001 .000 .004 .011∗∗∗ .004
(.003) (.004) (.013) (.004) (.002) (.003) (.003) (.004)
GDP/c.t−1 -.027∗∗ -.105∗∗∗ -.043 -.032 .060∗∗ -.140∗∗∗ .040 -.015
(.012) (.030) (.057) (.030) (.028) (.037) (.045) (.027)
XRt−1 .001 -.000 .006 .001 .001 .000 .001 .004
(.001) (.002) (.004) (.002) (.001) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Opennesst−1 .000 -.001∗∗ .000 -.000∗∗ .000 .000 -.000 -.000
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
N 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589
No. countries 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76
No. instr. 1409 1408 1402 1404 1372 1391 1406 1408
Hansen P 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Sargan P .000 .004 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Notes: The table presents estimates from equation (1.1) by Arellano-Bond (1991) one-
step difference GMM with full set of instruments. The time period covered is 1973–
2000. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. All estimations include time
fixed effects. Dependent variables are: an overall index of financial reforms, as well as
specific reforms, including credit controls (CrC), interest rate controls (IRC), entry barriers
and pro-competition measures in the banking system (EB), banking supervision (BS),
banking privatization (Pr), capital controls (CaC), policies on the securities markets (SM).
The variables Reformt−1 and Reform2t−1 represent the lags of the respective dependent
variables. SBC and NBC stand for systemic and non-systemic banking crises. The rest
of the explanatory variables are detailed in the methodology section. Symbols: ∗ p < .10,
∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 1.4: Crises and Financial Reforms: Two-Step Robust Difference GMM
Overall CrC IRC EB BS Pr CaC SM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Reformt−1 .513 .678 .391 .737∗ .248 .949∗∗∗ .471∗ .658
(.328) (.522) (.489) (.400) (.356) (.159) (.282) (.445)
Reform2t−1 .092 -.154 .160 -.111 .249 -.086 .088 -.145
(.265) (.450) (.440) (.247) (.329) (.188) (.396) (.402)
SBCt -.004 .037 .090 -.071 -.062 -.020 -.027 -.018
(.028) (.058) (.131) (.050) (.054) (.052) (.066) (.037)
SBCt−1 -.011 -.064 .007 -.014 -.068 .020 .020 -.037
(.029) (.068) (.089) (.062) (.057) (.055) (.083) (.049)
SBCt−2 -.036 -.049 -.014 -.147∗ .052 .051 -.038 .024
(.028) (.092) (.113) (.081) (.055) (.061) (.085) (.066)
NBCt -.008 .036 .051 .165 .019 -.060 .031 .081
(.026) (.059) (.143) (.115) (.057) (.051) (.077) (.074)
NBCt−1 -.009 .179∗ .040 .264∗∗ .059 -.098 -.103 -.048
(.053) (.098) (.160) (.109) (.089) (.077) (.125) (.109)
NBCt−2 -.062 -.073 .140 -.080∗ -.075 .033 -.013 -.100
(.049) (.126) (.131) (.048) (.090) (.063) (.097) (.068)
Gapt−1 -1.665∗ .461 -4.286∗∗ .930 -1.661 -.754 -1.236 -.432
(.957) (1.794) (1.807) (1.930) (1.957) (1.970) (2.018) (2.013)
Gap∗GDPt−1 .218∗ -.065 .586∗∗∗ -.080 .211 .066 .164 .022
(.118) (.213) (.215) (.230) (.245) (.241) (.251) (.244)
Gap∗XRt−1 .009 .003 .015 .098 -.051 .062 .091 -.001
(.028) (.013) (.054) (.072) (.081) (.040) (.074) (.029)
GDP/c.t−1 -.196∗ .028 -.269 -.598∗ .149 -.099 .270 -.145
(.114) (.331) (.329) (.310) (.293) (.248) (.407) (.319)
XRt−1 .000 -.014 .009 -.065 .046 -.003 -.031 .026
(.018) (.024) (.047) (.056) (.051) (.021) (.054) (.035)
Opennesst−1 .000 -.005 .001 .001 .000 .002 -.000 .002
(.001) (.003) (.003) (.002) (.001) (.002) (.002) (.002)
N 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589
No. countries 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76
No. instr. 1409 1408 1402 1404 1372 1391 1406 1408
Hansen P 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Sargan P .000 .004 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
The table presents estimates from equation (1.1) by a two-step robust difference GMMwith
full set of instruments. The time period covered is 1973–2000. Robust standard errors are
presented in parentheses. All estimations include time fixed effects. Dependent variables
are: an overall index of financial reforms, as well as specific reforms, including credit
controls (CrC), interest rate controls (IRC), entry barriers and pro-competition measures
in the banking system (EB), banking supervision (BS), banking privatization (Pr), capital
controls (CaC), policies on the securities markets (SM). The variables Reformt−1 and
Reform2t−1 represent the lags of the respective dependent variables. SBC and NBC
stand for systemic and non-systemic banking crises. The rest of the explanatory variables
are detailed in the methodology section. Symbols: ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 1.5: Crises and Financial Reforms: Two-Step Robust System GMM
Overall CrC IRC EB BS Pr CaC SM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Reformt−1 1.156∗∗∗ 1.382∗ .287 .985∗∗ .765∗∗ .843∗∗ .351 .542
(.422) (.761) (.559) (.412) (.322) (.342) (.350) (.390)
Reform2t−1 -.586∗ -.538 .249 -.172 -.012 .029 .143 -.036
(.339) (.619) (.461) (.287) (.361) (.422) (.311) (.319)
SBCt -.010 .017 -.097 -.004 .005 -.025 .015 -.006
(.029) (.060) (.099) (.060) (.060) (.050) (.066) (.042)
SBCt−1 .010 .025 .073 .046 -.023 -.018 .053 -.044
(.023) (.087) (.086) (.060) (.066) (.064) (.117) (.055)
SBCt−2 .003 -.052 .054 -.091 .047 -.018 -.050 .018
(.029) (.072) (.122) (.081) (.069) (.061) (.085) (.054)
NBCt -.006 .066 .044 .050 .044 -.032 -.011 .039
(.036) (.050) (.095) (.149) (.080) (.055) (.126) (.081)
NBCt−1 .015 .186∗ -.010 .069 .023 .009 -.043 .044
(.044) (.097) (.175) (.158) (.163) (.073) (.174) (.119)
NBCt−2 .007 .048 .126 .067 -.027 -.025 -.057 -.100
(.034) (.073) (.110) (.097) (.087) (.048) (.106) (.065)
Gapt−1 .694 .696 -1.326 -.332 -.399 .485 -2.031 -.735
(1.158) (2.071) (2.891) (1.509) (1.718) (1.302) (2.295) (1.471)
Gap∗GDPt−1 -.082 -.093 .145 .062 .049 -.041 .250 .084
(.135) (.248) (.354) (.200) (.218) (.165) (.295) (.183)
Gap∗XRt−1 -.007 -.005 -.038 .028 .003 .035 .059 .029
(.027) (.011) (.088) (.056) (.063) (.045) (.065) (.055)
GDP/c.t−1 -.027 -.090 -.466 -.328 -.102 .034 -.005 -.087
(.205) (.294) (.421) (.337) (.292) (.083) (.419) (.284)
XRt−1 .008 -.014 -.006 -.010 -.002 .013 -.029 -.000
(.019) (.019) (.048) (.037) (.031) (.026) (.047) (.035)
Opennesst−1 .000 -.000 .003 .002 .001 -.001 -.001 -.001
(.002) (.003) (.004) (.003) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
N 1673 1673 1673 1673 1673 1673 1673 1673
No. countries 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76
No. instr. 1493 1492 1486 1488 1456 1475 149 1492
Hansen P 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Sargan P .000 .007 .006 .001 .000 .000 .001 .001
The table presents estimates from equation (1.1) by two-step system GMM with full
set of instruments. The time period covered is 1973–2000. Robust standard errors are
presented in parentheses. All estimations include time fixed effects. Dependent variables
are: an overall index of financial reforms, as well as specific reforms, including credit
controls (CrC), interest rate controls (IRC), entry barriers and pro-competition measures
in the banking system (EB), banking supervision (BS), banking privatization (Pr), capital
controls (CaC), policies on the securities markets (SM). The variables Reformt−1 and
Reform2t−1 represent the lags of the respective dependent variables. SBC and NBC
stand for systemic and non-systemic banking crises. The rest of the explanatory variables
are detailed in the methodology section. Symbols: ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 1.6: Crises and Financial Reforms: Difference GMM with a Collapsed
Number of Instruments
Overall CrC IRC EB BS Pr CaC SM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Reformt−1 1.018∗∗∗ 1.056∗∗∗ 1.257∗∗∗ .951∗∗∗ .892∗∗∗ 1.012∗∗∗ .756∗∗∗ .702∗∗∗
(.050) (.115) (.158) (.077) (.068) (.111) (.111) (.094)
Reform2t−1 -.171∗∗∗ -.258∗∗∗ -.427∗∗∗ -.152∗∗ -.122∗ -.266∗∗ .004 .047
(.048) (.092) (.148) (.059) (.064) (.107) (.108) (.085)
SBCt -.015∗ .007 -.037 -.001 .043∗ -.071∗∗∗ -.002 -.020
(.009) (.030) (.024) (.020) (.022) (.024) (.027) (.015)
SBCt−1 .002 .014 .013 -.004 -.055∗∗ .008 -.013 .006
(.008) (.026) (.023) (.019) (.023) (.024) (.021) (.015)
SBCt−2 -.005 -.015 -.000 -.031∗∗ .021∗ .011 -.040∗∗ -.011
(.007) (.015) (.022) (.014) (.012) (.015) (.016) (.013)
NBCt .003 .027 -.059 .024 .001 -.011 -.021 .031
(.015) (.055) (.043) (.030) (.039) (.026) (.032) (.025)
NBCt−1 -.005 -.025 .050 -.012 .033 -.031 .013 -.024
(.013) (.035) (.043) (.022) (.035) (.029) (.025) (.017)
NBCt−2 .012∗ .006 .020 -.013 .024 .037∗ .007 -.003
(.006) (.014) (.024) (.016) (.018) (.019) (.018) (.011)
Gapt−1 .075 -.971∗∗ .408 .631 .553 .345 -.446 -.651∗
(.160) (.415) (.520) (.400) (.340) (.393) (.524) (.387)
Gap∗GDPt−1 -.008 .104∗∗ -.041 -.081∗ -.059 -.046 .031 .061
(.019) (.047) (.057) (.044) (.039) (.045) (.058) (.044)
Gap∗XRt−1 -.001 -.003 -.016 .008 .005 .005 .006 -.002
(.005) (.008) (.018) (.008) (.005) (.006) (.008) (.006)
GDP/c.t−1 .026 -.006 .172 -.052 .182∗∗ -.026 -.018 -.020
(.048) (.082) (.171) (.101) (.081) (.110) (.130) (.108)
XRt−1 .004∗ .003 .015 -.004 .003 .004 .002 .005
(.002) (.004) (.009) (.005) (.003) (.004) (.006) (.005)
Opennesst−1 .001 -.001 .002 -.001 .001 -.002∗ -.001 -.002∗
(.000) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
N 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589
No. countries 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76
No. instr. 289 289 289 289 28 289 289 289
Hansen P 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Sargan P .000 .285 .715 .158 .000 .000 .001 .290
The table presents estimates from equation (1.1) by one-step robust difference GMMwith a
collapsed number of instruments. The time period covered is 1973–2000. Robust standard
errors are presented in parentheses. All estimations include time fixed effects. Dependent
variables are: an overall index of financial reforms, as well as specific reforms, including
credit controls (CrC), interest rate controls (IRC), entry barriers and pro-competition mea-
sures in the banking system (EB), banking supervision (BS), banking privatization (Pr),
capital controls (CaC), policies on the securities markets (SM). The variables Reformt−1
and Reform2t−1 represent the lags of the respective dependent variables. SBC and NBC
stand for systemic and non-systemic banking crises. The rest of the explanatory variables
are detailed in the methodology section. Symbols: ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 1.7: Crises and Financial Reforms: Difference GMM with Endogenized
Crisis Exposures
Overall CrC IRC EB BS Pr CaC SM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Reformt−1 1.000∗∗∗ 1.025∗∗∗ 1.260∗∗∗ .953∗∗∗ .855∗∗∗ 1.004∗∗∗ .770∗∗∗ .696∗∗∗
(.046) (.111) (.155) (.076) (.068) (.103) (.104) (.084)
Reform2t−1 -.174∗∗∗ -.260∗∗∗ -.436∗∗∗ -.149∗∗ -.123∗ -.249∗∗ -.022 .038
(.042) (.089) (.144) (.058) (.066) (.101) (.098) (.076)
SBCt -.018∗∗ .006 -.030 -.002 .038∗ -.069∗∗∗ -.007 -.026∗
(.008) (.023) (.024) (.018) (.020) (.022) (.024) (.014)
SBCt−1 .002 .012 .010 .005 -.051∗∗ .007 -.014 .012
(.008) (.021) (.022) (.018) (.021) (.021) (.019) (.014)
SBCt−2 -.006 -.021 -.000 -.028∗ .021∗ .011 -.040∗∗ -.010
(.007) (.015) (.021) (.014) (.011) (.015) (.015) (.013)
NBCt .008 .024 -.064∗ .029 .019 .003 -.008 .026
(.014) (.052) (.037) (.033) (.039) (.028) (.032) (.024)
NBCt−1 -.007 -.021 .054 -.017 .019 -.039 .007 -.019
(.012) (.034) (.042) (.023) (.033) (.029) (.024) (.016)
NBCt−2 .012∗ .006 .020 -.012 .023 .038∗∗ .012 .001
(.006) (.014) (.023) (.016) (.017) (.019) (.017) (.011)
Gapt−1 .067 -.970∗∗ .454 .580 .711∗∗ .192 -.353 -.650∗
(.155) (.398) (.526) (.358) (.321) (.375) (.482) (.385)
Gap∗GDPt−1 -.010 .098∗∗ -.048 -.072∗ -.078∗∗ -.031 .022 .062
(.018) (.044) (.057) (.038) (.037) (.044) (.054) (.043)
Gap∗XRt−1 -.001 -.002 -.019 .005 .006 .004 .009 -.002
(.005) (.008) (.018) (.006) (.005) (.006) (.008) (.005)
GDP/c.t−1 .007 -.050 .184 .012 .160∗∗ -.059 -.008 .009
(.039) (.083) (.151) (.084) (.080) (.085) (.097) (.103)
XRt−1 .003∗ .001 .016∗∗ -.001 .001 .003 .001 .006
(.002) (.004) (.008) (.004) (.003) (.003) (.004) (.005)
Opennesst−1 .000 -.001 .002 -.001 .001 -.001 -.001 -.002∗
(.000) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
N 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589
No. countries 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76
No. instr. 335 335 335 335 326 335 335 335
Hansen P 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Sargan P .000 .076 .883 .054 .000 .000 .002 .150
The table presents estimates from equation (1.1) by one-step robust difference GMM with
a collapsed number of instruments and endogenized crisis exposures. The time period cov-
ered is 1973–2000. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. All estimations
include time fixed effects. Dependent variables are: an overall index of financial reforms, as
well as specific reforms, including credit controls (CrC), interest rate controls (IRC), entry
barriers and pro-competition measures in the banking system (EB), banking supervision
(BS), banking privatization (Pr), capital controls (CaC), policies on the securities mar-
kets (SM). The variables Reformt−1 and Reform2t−1 represent the lags of the respective
dependent variables. SBC and NBC stand for systemic and non-systemic banking crises.
The rest of the explanatory variables are detailed in the methodology section. Symbols:
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 1.8: Crises and Financial Reforms: Panel OLS Estimations with the
Laeven-Valencia Data
Overall CrC IRC EB BS Pr CaC SM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Reformt−1 .167 -.003 -.082 -.050 -.135∗∗∗ -.074 .021 -.098∗
(.226) (.068) (.114) (.077) (.043) (.065) (.098) (.058)
Reform2t−1 -.219∗∗∗ -.143∗∗ -.033 -.078 -.027 -.052 -.144∗ -.013
(.072) (.055) (.099) (.056) (.039) (.052) (.076) (.043)
SBCt -.011∗ -.012 .002 -.024∗∗ .005 -.037∗∗∗ -.003 -.007
(.006) (.015) (.019) (.011) (.012) (.013) (.019) (.012)
SBCt−1 -.003 .008 .022 -.005 .011 -.025 -.022 -.007
(.007) (.011) (.019) (.016) (.016) (.025) (.019) (.011)
SBCt−2 -.020∗∗∗ -.012 -.023 -.027∗ -.002 -.033∗∗ -.043∗∗ .000
(.006) (.013) (.018) (.016) (.010) (.013) (.020) (.012)
NBCt -.014 .068 -.025 -.030∗ -.024 -.081 -.012 .002
(.017) (.042) (.025) (.015) (.024) (.058) (.028) (.013)
NBCt−1 -.039∗∗ -.002 -.047 -.040∗∗ -.088∗∗∗ -.111 -.037 .040
(.019) (.042) (.040) (.020) (.022) (.071) (.035) (.037)
NBCt−2 -.036∗∗∗ -.023 -.032 -.014 -.086∗ -.060∗∗ -.066∗ .023
(.011) (.023) (.028) (.019) (.045) (.026) (.039) (.017)
GDP/c.t−1 -.064 -.089 -.092 -.037 -.101∗ -.105 -.050 -.050
(.039) (.072) (.134) (.083) (.060) (.082) (.085) (.070)
XRt−1 .003 -.005 .038 .002 -.002 -.017∗ .004 -.005
(.006) (.011) (.023) (.009) (.004) (.010) (.016) (.010)
Opennesst−1 .000 -.000 .001 .001 -.000 .000 .000 -.001
(.000) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Gapt−1 .000 .481 -1.152∗ -.642 .128 -.915∗ -.251 -.189
(.) (.583) (.678) (.669) (.390) (.494) (.664) (.350)
Gap∗GDPt−1 -.006 -.080 .125∗ .040 -.015 .081 .011 -.000
(.028) (.068) (.074) (.077) (.046) (.052) (.075) (.040)
Gap∗XRt−1 -.003 .005 -.025 -.000 -.000 .002 .010 .004
(.007) (.007) (.020) (.007) (.003) (.006) (.008) (.007)
Const. .036∗∗∗ .040∗ .082 .003 .009 .023 .055 .049∗
(.012) (.021) (.066) (.021) (.013) (.020) (.039) (.027)
N 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589
adj. R2 .118 .046 .052 .042 .061 .058 .043 .051
No. countries 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76
Notes: The table presents estimates from equation (1.1) by fixed-effects OLS, as explained
in the text. The time period covered is 1973–2000. Standard errors are clustered by
country, and are presented in parentheses. All estimations include country and region-
time fixed effects. Dependent variables are: an overall index of financial reforms, as well as
specific reforms, including credit controls (CrC), interest rate controls (IRC), entry barriers
and pro-competition measures in the banking system (EB), banking supervision (BS),
banking privatization (Pr), capital controls (CaC), policies on the securities markets (SM).
The variables Reformt−1 and Reform2t−1 represent the lags of the respective dependent
variables. SBC and NBC stand for systemic and non-systemic banking crises, as in
Laeven and Valencia (2013). The rest of the explanatory variables are detailed in the
methodology section. Symbols: ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 1.9: Crises and Financial Reforms: 2SLS Panel Estimations with the
Laeven-Valencia Data
Overall CrC IRC EB BS Pr CaC SM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Reformt−1 .246∗∗∗ .067 .016 -.022 -.119∗∗∗ -.008 -.008 -.071
(.076) (.071) (.112) (.061) (.042) (.102) (.077) (.061)
Reform2t−1 -.233∗∗∗ -.215∗∗∗ -.114 -.087∗ -.019 -.082 -.114 -.001
(.072) (.076) (.101) (.045) (.043) (.088) (.071) (.048)
SBCt -.051∗∗ -.079 -.080 .018 .027 -.151∗∗∗ -.078 .030
(.023) (.052) (.070) (.043) (.037) (.058) (.058) (.037)
SBCt−1 -.015 .006 -.058 -.007 .020 -.109∗ -.002 -.094∗∗
(.023) (.058) (.066) (.050) (.036) (.063) (.057) (.039)
SBCt−2 -.016 .031 -.079 -.006 -.045 -.023 .018 .041
(.022) (.048) (.064) (.051) (.041) (.059) (.055) (.045)
NBCt .128 .100 .940∗∗ -.175 -.092 .068 -.034 .088
(.122) (.269) (.473) (.273) (.225) (.299) (.344) (.221)
NBCt−1 .235 .701 .214 .380 .080 .369 -.178 .253
(.163) (.476) (.386) (.342) (.219) (.442) (.403) (.237)
NBCt−2 .016 .414 .019 -.294 -.133 .514 -.297 -.177
(.110) (.311) (.327) (.293) (.195) (.376) (.294) (.223)
GDP/c.t−1 -.049 -.004 -.095 .052 -.123∗∗ -.070 .048 -.066
(.039) (.091) (.129) (.079) (.057) (.089) (.094) (.069)
XRt−1 .005 -.010 .061∗∗ -.003 -.011∗ -.011 .013 .000
(.007) (.014) (.027) (.010) (.006) (.013) (.013) (.009)
Opennesst−1 .000 -.000 .000 .001 -.000 .001 .000 -.001
(.000) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.000) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Gapt−1 -.060 .058 -.676 -.141 .086 -.488 .066 .288
(.197) (.451) (.550) (.454) (.294) (.403) (.409) (.316)
Gap∗GDPt−1 .004 -.036 .072 -.008 -.008 .035 -.027 -.048
(.025) (.055) (.064) (.055) (.036) (.046) (.049) (.038)
Gap∗XRt−1 -.002 .003 -.028 .000 .003 .002 .012∗ .007
(.005) (.009) (.022) (.006) (.003) (.006) (.007) (.006)
N 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589
No. countries 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76
Hansen P .060 .695 .905 .988 .755 .990 .357 .867
Notes: The table presents estimates of equation (1.1) by 2SLS. The time period covered is
1973–2000. Standard errors are robust and are presented in parentheses. All estimations
include country and region-time fixed effects. Dependent variables are: an overall index of
financial reforms, as well as specific reforms, including credit controls (CrC), interest rate
controls (IRC), entry barriers and pro-competition measures in the banking system (EB),
banking supervision (BS), banking privatization (Pr), capital controls (CaC), policies on
the securities markets (SM). The variables Reformt−1 and Reform2t−1 represent the lags
of the respective dependent variables. SBC andNBC stand for systemic and non-systemic
banking crises, as in Laeven and Valencia (2013). The rest of the explanatory variables
are detailed in the methodology section. Symbols: ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 1.10: Crises and Financial Reforms: Difference GMM with the Laeven-
Valencia Data
Overall CrC IRC EB BS Pr CaC SM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Reformt−1 .957∗∗∗ .943∗∗∗ 1.015∗∗∗ .892∗∗∗ .796∗∗∗ .867∗∗∗ .776∗∗∗ .748∗∗∗
(.035) (.056) (.081) (.049) (.036) (.048) (.075) (.040)
Reform2t−1 -.177∗∗∗ -.152∗∗∗ -.244∗∗∗ -.117∗∗∗ -.027 -.072 -.050 .018
(.033) (.049) (.076) (.036) (.029) (.045) (.064) (.033)
SBCt -.022∗∗∗ -.031∗ -.013 -.024∗∗ -.001 -.057∗∗∗ -.021 -.007
(.006) (.016) (.017) (.011) (.013) (.014) (.020) (.013)
SBCt−1 .004 .025 .019 .006 .006 .009 -.018 -.018
(.007) (.017) (.020) (.016) (.016) (.024) (.020) (.014)
SBCt−2 -.017∗∗∗ -.024∗ -.037∗∗ -.021∗ -.014 -.014 -.015 .004
(.006) (.013) (.018) (.012) (.012) (.016) (.018) (.012)
NBCt -.010 .078 -.004 -.007 -.019∗ -.102∗∗ -.021 .022∗∗
(.019) (.061) (.011) (.016) (.010) (.050) (.019) (.010)
NBCt−1 -.024∗∗∗ -.046∗ -.022 -.001 -.041 -.040∗∗∗ -.048∗∗∗ .029
(.006) (.025) (.014) (.008) (.044) (.013) (.014) (.033)
NBCt−2 -.016∗ -.033∗∗∗ -.037∗ -.000 .048 .031 -.094∗∗∗ -.043
(.009) (.012) (.020) (.017) (.036) (.046) (.029) (.029)
Gapt−1 .095 -.417∗∗ -.347 .083 .116 -.134 .046 -.565∗∗∗
(.094) (.204) (.304) (.175) (.161) (.168) (.217) (.163)
Gap∗GDPt−1 -.017 .038 .043 -.019 -.020 .002 -.015 .059∗∗∗
(.011) (.023) (.034) (.019) (.019) (.020) (.026) (.019)
Gap∗XRt−1 -.000 .002 -.009 .001 .000 .003 .012∗∗∗ .005
(.003) (.004) (.013) (.004) (.002) (.003) (.003) (.004)
GDP/c.t−1 -.027∗∗ -.099∗∗∗ -.045 -.032 .052∗ -.149∗∗∗ .052 -.014
(.012) (.029) (.059) (.030) (.029) (.039) (.045) (.027)
XRt−1 .002∗ -.000 .006 .001 .000 .001 .002 .003
(.001) (.002) (.005) (.002) (.001) (.002) (.003) (.002)
Opennesst−1 .000 -.001∗∗ .000 -.001∗∗ .000 .000 -.000 -.000
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
N 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589
No. countries 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76
No. instr. 1402 1401 1394 1396 1364 1382 1399 1402
Hansen P 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Sargan P .000 .003 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
The table presents estimates from equation (1.1) by Arellano-Bond (1991) one-step differ-
ence GMM with full set of instruments. The time period covered is 1973–2000. Robust
standard errors are presented in parentheses. All estimations include time fixed effects.
Dependent variables are: an overall index of financial reforms, as well as specific re-
forms, including credit controls (CrC), interest rate controls (IRC), entry barriers and
pro-competition measures in the banking system (EB), banking supervision (BS), banking
privatization (Pr), capital controls (CaC), policies on the securities markets (SM). The
variables Reformt−1 and Reform2t−1 represent the lags of the respective dependent vari-
ables. SBC and NBC stand for systemic and non-systemic banking crises, as in Laeven
and Valencia (2013). The rest of the explanatory variables are detailed in the methodology
section. Symbols: ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 1.11: Crises and Financial Reforms: 2SLS Panel Estimations with
Recession Exposures
Overall CrC IRC EB BS Pr CaC SM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Reformt−1 .214∗∗∗ -.017 -.056 -.016 -.131∗∗∗ -.044 .001 -.068
(.073) (.065) (.101) (.060) (.050) (.072) (.079) (.051)
Reform2t−1 -.185∗∗∗ -.124∗∗ -.038 -.090∗∗ -.017 -.091 -.120∗ -.026
(.072) (.056) (.084) (.045) (.061) (.066) (.072) (.040)
SBCt -.033∗∗ -.016 -.025 -.004 .006 -.063 -.053 -.044
(.016) (.040) (.037) (.034) (.030) (.044) (.045) (.028)
SBCt−1 -.010 .044 -.086 .052 .022 -.044 -.053 -.024
(.019) (.057) (.053) (.034) (.035) (.054) (.047) (.025)
SBCt−2 -.004 .073∗∗ -.039 -.013 -.020 -.050 -.034 -.059∗
(.015) (.037) (.037) (.029) (.035) (.035) (.048) (.031)
NBCt .035 .140∗∗ .174∗∗ .019 -.069 -.006 .047 -.051
(.026) (.071) (.073) (.056) (.067) (.064) (.078) (.049)
NBCt−1 .061∗∗ .160∗∗∗ .105 .015 .031 -.003 .144∗∗ .017
(.027) (.059) (.081) (.059) (.058) (.074) (.073) (.046)
NBCt−2 .024 .043 .011 .050 .092 -.090 .068 -.030
(.026) (.060) (.078) (.052) (.059) (.072) (.078) (.053)
GDP/c.t−1 -.014 .446∗ .036 .474∗∗ -.052 .215 .139 -.022
(.099) (.229) (.270) (.211) (.144) (.196) (.275) (.160)
XRt−1 .007 .014 .062∗∗∗ .013 -.009 .002 .016 .004
(.006) (.011) (.024) (.010) (.006) (.013) (.014) (.010)
Opennesst−1 .000∗ -.000 .001 .002∗∗∗ .000 .001 .001 -.000
(.000) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.000) (.001) (.001) (.000)
Gapt−1 .079 .928 -.215 .315 .023 .078 .423 .099
(.221) (.598) (.554) (.458) (.320) (.483) (.494) (.366)
Gap ∗GDPt−1 -.011 -.134∗ .024 -.063 -.004 -.028 -.067 -.030
(.029) (.071) (.065) (.057) (.040) (.057) (.060) (.044)
Gap ∗XRt−1 -.001 .002 -.022 -.005 .001 -.001 .012 .004
(.005) (.009) (.022) (.006) (.004) (.005) (.008) (.006)
N 1571 1571 1571 1571 1571 1571 1571 1571
No. countries 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76
Hansen P .032 .940 .906 .977 .809 .940 .382 .835
Notes: Instruments include the recession exposures. The table presents estimates of equa-
tion (1.1) by panel 2SLS. The time period covered is 1973–2000. Standard errors are
robust and are presented in parentheses. All estimations include country and region-time
fixed effects. Dependent variables are: an overall index of financial reforms, as well as
specific reforms, including credit controls (CrC), interest rate controls (IRC), entry barri-
ers and pro-competition measures in the banking system (EB), banking supervision (BS),
banking privatization (Pr), capital controls (CaC), policies on the securities markets (SM).
The variables Reformt−1 and Reform2t−1 represent the lags of the respective dependent
variables. SBC and NBC stand for systemic and non-systemic banking crises. The rest
of the explanatory variables are detailed in the methodology section. Symbols: ∗ p < .10,
∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 1.12: Crises and Financial Reforms: Difference GMM with Recession
Exposures
Overall CrC IRC EB BS Pr CaC SM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Reformt−1 .966∗∗∗ .941∗∗∗ 1.003∗∗∗ .888∗∗∗ .771∗∗∗ .887∗∗∗ .784∗∗∗ .747∗∗∗
(.035) (.058) (.082) (.049) (.039) (.045) (.073) (.039)
Reform2t−1 -.175∗∗∗ -.154∗∗∗ -.235∗∗∗ -.112∗∗∗ -.006 -.084∗ -.058 .019
(.033) (.051) (.078) (.036) (.033) (.044) (.062) (.033)
SBCt -.013∗∗ .001 -.011 -.009 -.003 -.041∗∗ .003 -.020∗∗
(.006) (.012) (.018) (.015) (.010) (.016) (.018) (.009)
SBCt−1 -.003 .002 .000 .018 -.014 -.012 -.018 .009
(.008) (.019) (.020) (.019) (.014) (.019) (.019) (.011)
SBCt−2 -.009 -.030∗∗ -.007 -.025∗ .019∗ .018 -.029∗∗ -.006
(.006) (.013) (.019) (.013) (.010) (.014) (.013) (.012)
NBCt .002 .011 -.011 .025∗ .005 -.014 .014 .003
(.005) (.016) (.020) (.014) (.013) (.013) (.013) (.012)
NBCt−1 -.004 .000 .002 -.009 .029 -.034 -.004 -.002
(.008) (.015) (.027) (.017) (.025) (.021) (.014) (.008)
NBCt−2 .011∗ .012 -.001 -.006 .023 .035 .015 .004
(.006) (.014) (.021) (.017) (.017) (.022) (.017) (.011)
Gapt−1 .090 -.426∗∗ -.374 .065 .143 -.101 .022 -.585∗∗∗
(.103) (.208) (.314) (.179) (.158) (.175) (.219) (.164)
Gap ∗GDPt−1 -.015 .039∗ .046 -.017 -.024 -.001 -.011 .061∗∗∗
(.012) (.023) (.035) (.020) (.019) (.021) (.026) (.019)
Gap ∗XRt−1 -.000 .002 -.009 .000 -.000 .004 .011∗∗∗ .005
(.003) (.004) (.013) (.004) (.002) (.003) (.004) (.004)
GDP/c.t−1 -.027∗∗ -.104∗∗∗ -.045 -.032 .062∗∗ -.140∗∗∗ .040 -.015
(.012) (.030) (.057) (.031) (.028) (.038) (.045) (.027)
XRt−1 .001 -.000 .005 .001 .001 .000 .001 .003
(.001) (.002) (.004) (.002) (.001) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Opennesst−1 .000 -.000∗∗ .000 -.000∗∗ .000 .000 -.000 -.000
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
N 1574 1574 1574 1574 1574 1574 1574 1574
No. countries 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76
No. instr. 1400 1399 1393 1395 1363 1382 1397 1396
Hansen P 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Notes: Instruments include the recession exposures. The table presents estimates from
equation (1.1) by Arellano-Bond (1991) one-step difference GMM with full set of instru-
ments. The time period covered is 1973–2000. Robust standard errors are presented in
parentheses. All estimations include time fixed effects. Dependent variables are: an over-
all index of financial reforms, as well as specific reforms, including credit controls (CrC),
interest rate controls (IRC), entry barriers and pro-competition measures in the bank-
ing system (EB), banking supervision (BS), banking privatization (Pr), capital controls
(CaC), policies on the securities markets (SM). The variables Reformt−1 and Reform2t−1
represent the lags of the respective dependent variables. SBC and NBC stand for sys-
temic and non-systemic banking crises. The rest of the explanatory variables are detailed
in the methodology section. Symbols: ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 1.13: Episodes of Banking Crises




1977 Israel, Spain -
1978 Israel, Spain Germany, South Africa,
Venezuela
1979 Israel, Spain Germany
1980 Argentina, Israel, Spain -
1981 Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Israel,
Mexico, Spain
-
1982 Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,
Ghana, Israel, Mexico, Spain, Turkey
Hong Kong
1983 Chile, Colombia, Ghana, Israel, Morocco,
Peru, Spain, Thailand
Canada, Hong Kong, Tai-
wan
1984 Chile, Colombia, Ghana, Peru, Spain, Thai-
land, Turkey
Canada, Hong Kong, Tai-
wan, UK, US
1985 Chile, Colombia, Ghana, Peru, Spain, Thai-
land, Turkey
Canada, Hong Kong, US,
Venezuela
1986 Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ghana, Peru,
Thailand
Hong Kong, US, Venezuela
1987 Bangladesh, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Ghana, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Tanza-
nia, Thailand
Denmark, New Zealand, US
Continued on next page
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Table 1.13 – continued from previous page
Year Systemic Crises Non-Systemic Crises
1988 Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Ghana,
Madagascar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Norway,
Senegal, Tanzania
Denmark, New Zealand, US
1989 Argentina, Burkina Faso, El Salvador,
Ghana, Nicaragua, Norway, Senegal, Sri
Lanka, Tanzania
Australia, Denmark, Jor-
dan, New Zealand, South
Africa, US
1990 Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Burkina Faso,





1991 Algeria, Burkina Faso, Finland, Hungary,





1992 Albania, Algeria, Burkina Faso, Estonia,
Finland, Hungary, Japan, Mozambique,




1993 Burkina Faso, Estonia, Finland, Hungary,
Japan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria,
Norway, Poland, Sri Lanka, Sweden
Greece, India, Italy,
Tunisia, Venezuela
1994 Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Ecuador, Esto-
nia, Finland, Hungary, Jamaica, Japan, Kyr-
gyz Republic, Mexico, Mozambique, Nigeria,
Sweden, Uganda
Costa Rica, Ethiopia,
France, Greece, India, Italy,
Tunisia, Turkey
Continued on next page
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Table 1.13 – continued from previous page
Year Systemic Crises Non-Systemic Crises
1995 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Ecuador, Estonia, Hungary, Jamaica, Japan,
Kyrgyz Republic, Mexico, Mozambique,
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Paraguay, Uganda
Costa Rica, Ethiopia,
France, Greece, India, Italy,
Taiwan, Tunisia, UK
1996 Brazil, Bulgaria, Jamaica, Japan, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uganda
Costa Rica, Dominican Re-
public, India
1997 Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Colombia, El Sal-
vador, Jamaica, Japan, South Korea, Mex-
ico, Paraguay, Romania, Taiwan, Thailand,
Ukraine, Vietnam
Costa Rica, Nigeria
1998 Brazil, China, Colombia, Ecuador, El Sal-
vador, Jamaica, South Korea, Paraguay,
Philippines, Romania, Taiwan, Thailand,
Ukraine, Vietnam
Estonia, Hong Kong
1999 Bolivia, Brazil, China, Ecuador, Jamaica,
South Korea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Thailand
-
2000 Jamaica, South Korea, Philippines, Thai-
land, Turkey, Vietnam
-
Notes: The crises episodes, as well as their classification into systemic- or non-systemic
banking crises, are taken from Caprio and Klingebiel (2003). Whenever an ambiguity










After the oil shock of 1973, the developed economies experienced a dramatic
decline in their economic growth (Nordhaus, 1980; Sachs, 1982) and labor
productivity growth (Baily, 1981). Since the mid-1970s, the productivity
decline triggered a wide range of policy responses, including economic dereg-
ulation.2 Deregulation reforms were initiated in the US (Morgan, 2004;
Winston, 1998), followed by the UK and other developed economies in the
early 1980s (Matthews, Minford, Nickell, & Helpman, 1987; Pera, 1989)
and were imitated by the new democracies and many developing countries
in the 1990s with an extensive set of labor-, capital-, and product-market re-
forms. The process continued throughout the early years of the 21st century
(Wölfl, Wanner, Kozluk, & Nicoletti, 2009) until the recent global economic
and financial crisis undermined the efforts to relax economic regulations.
The differences in the deregulation reform timing across countries point
to a natural question: Did the early reformers – those countries reforming
extensively in the 1970s and the 1980s – benefit more than the late reform-
ers in improving their living standards and in accelerating economic growth?
If they did, then the economies that innovated with deregulation enjoyed
growth, while those who imitated best-practice institutions did not always
benefit from deregulation, as some evidence suggests (Rodrik, 2008). An-
swering this question is important at least for two additional reasons. On
the one hand, a substantial bulk of the literature uses the time variation of
various indices of regulation to gauge deregulation reforms. However, using
those directly in a regression equation is problematic because equal changes
in the indices represent unequal policy changes across countries. This work
2Following Winston (1993) the economic deregulation may be interpreted as the state’s
withdrawal of its legal powers to direct pricing, entry, and exit within an industry.
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proposes a way out from this measurement problem by using the time vari-
ation of the reforms across countries and over time. Using the variation of
the indices over time allows for the setting up of a difference-in-difference
estimation which gets around the direct use of reform indices.
On the other hand, few papers account for where the time variation in
the indices comes from in the first place, and if they do, their instruments
are rarely time-varying. This paper uses two time varying indicators for
each country which are arguably both strong and valid in predicting the
timing of the deregulation reform. These indicators are a country’s energy
independence and its natural resource rents. I find that the more energy
independent the country is, and the more natural resources it has, the later
it deregulates its product-, labor- and credit markets.
By combining how the reform timing affects living standards and growth
with the political economy of reform timing, this paper addresses simultane-
ously two of the long-standing problems in the empirical analysis of dereg-
ulation reforms. At the same time, the work supports previous evidence
of a positive impact of reforms on growth. The results also demonstrate
important differences in the reform outcomes across countries. The bene-
fits from deregulation were unequally spread, and the timing of the reform
played an important role in reaping those benefits. Specifically, while early
reformers enjoyed higher living standards, it is the late reformers’ growth
that accelerated most, especially after a credit market deregulation reform.
Thus, despite the evidence that most reforms do not produce growth acceler-
ations (Hausmann, Pritchett, & Rodrik, 2005), credit market reforms seem
to be an exception. Therefore, they require special attention, especially when
the need for faster recovery is coupled with a widespread political drive to
re-regulate the financial sector.
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The paper delivers two main messages. First, deregulation contributed
to growth but its impact was different across countries, and the deregula-
tion reform timing can at least partly explain the cross-country differences in
the outcomes of similar reforms. Second, a large-scale financial re-regulation
could backfire with substantial negative dynamic effects on growth acceler-
ation, which may delay a desired recovery in the aftermath of the Great
Recession.
2.2 Literature Review
The political economy behind the large-scale deregulation reforms initiated
in the late 1970s is two-fold. On the one hand, deregulation reduces the rents
that regulation creates for workers, and for incumbent producers and service
providers. This view has gained a widespread popularity among academics
and policymakers alike ever since the seminal works by Stigler (1971), Posner
(1974) and Peltzman (1976) contributed to the understanding of the politi-
cal economy of regulation. On the other hand, deregulation allows the newly
created competition on the product-, labor- and capital markets to determine
the winner of those rent transfers. Thus, by spurring productivity and effi-
ciency gains (Winston, 1993), economic deregulation ultimately contributes
to the overall increase in economic growth. The additional growth is brought
primarily through increased employment and real wages (Blanchard & Gi-
avazzi, 2003), which affects both production and consumption and through
increased investment (Alesina, Ardagna, Nicoletti, & Schiantarelli, 2005).
However, a more recent take on the efficiency gains from deregulation
in the developing world provides a word of caution. The key contention in
this newer line of literature is that deregulation reforms influence different
economies differently, depending on their position on the technology ladder
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and on the quality of their institutions. For example, Açemoglu, Aghion,
and Zilibotti (2006) claim that certain restrictions on competition may ben-
efit the technologically backward countries, while Estache and Wren-Lewis
(2009) find that the optimal regulatory policies in developed and developing
countries are different because of differences in the overall institutional qual-
ity in those countries. In addition, Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi (2007) use
industry-level data to demonstrate that within each economy, institutional
reforms influence different industries differently, and more specifically, indus-
tries closer to the technology frontier would be affected more by deregulation
and would innovate more than the backward industries in order to prevent
entry. As a result, countries closer to the technology frontier would benefit
more from deregulation. The alleged benefits of economic deregulation in
many industries prompted a debate on the growth effects from specific types
of reforms, such as capital-, labor-, and product-market deregulation.
Although various authors interpret the scope of product-market reg-
ulation (PMR) reforms differently,3 most agree that PMR reforms include
deregulation of at least pricing and entry. As the literature on entry reg-
ulation suggests, stricter and more costly procedures to set up a firm are
associated with lower GDP levels (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, &
Shleifer, 2002). As it is the case with other empirical studies on deregulation
3For example, Wölfl et al. (2009, p.11-12) include direct control of pricing behavior of
private firms, administrative burdens on the setting up of a corporation and a sole propri-
etorship, barriers to trade and foreign investment, among other reforms; Gwartney, Hall,
and Lawson (2012) study price controls, start-up regulations, licensing restrictions, admin-
istrative requirements for businesses, bureaucracy costs and other business regulations; the
World Bank Doing Business reports consider an extensive set of business regulations in
ten different areas, including starting and closing a business; while Kaufmann, Kraay, and
Mastruzzi (2010, p.4) aggregate data on the product market, the financial market, and
the international trade and investment regulations from various underlying sources such
as the Economist Intelligence Unit and the Heritage Foundation which capture the general
“ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that
permit and promote private sector development.”
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reforms, it is tempting to interpret this finding as a policy recipe for growth
because it implies that entry deregulation causes economic growth. Yet it is
obvious that such an interpretation is superficial at least because to be able
to derive growth effects of a given regulatory reform, one needs to focus on
the effects of the changes in regulations over time rather than their levels.4
The conclusions of Djankov et al. (2002) bring about many extensions.5
For example, by using firm-level data Scarpetta, Hemmings, Tressel, and
Woo (2002) find that PMR hampers both total factor productivity and en-
try in OECD countries, while Alesina et al. (2005) build upon those findings
to emphasize a positive causal relationship between deregulation and invest-
ment in seven OECD industries. Further, Barseghyan (2008) supports the
causal relationship with an IV estimation on a sample of between 50 to 95
countries.
However, there are papers that do not find enough evidence that insti-
tutional reforms, including deregulation, matter for economic performance.
Commander and Svejnar (2011) use firm-level data from the Central and
Eastern European countries and the former USSR to find that regulatory
constraints do not affect firm performance. In addition, Babecký and Cam-
pos (2011) summarize results from 46 studies in a detailed meta-analysis of
the impact of reforms on economic growth. They conclude that the institu-
tional impact on growth performance shows “remarkable variation” both in
terms of sign and significance, and Babecký and Havránek (2013) reinforce
the point by expanding the list of papers in a similar meta-study. A simi-
lar, if not even stronger, difference in opinion is found in the debates on the
4Campos and Coricelli (2002) were among the first to suggest that reform changes
rather than their levels might be more appropriate to include in an empirical analysis of
the impact of institutions on growth.
5Djankov (2008) reports that 195 academic articles emerged as a result of this paper
and the subsequent work of the Doing Business team at the World Bank.
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growth impact of labor- and credit-market regulation reforms.
Similarly to PMR, labor-market regulations (LMR) also affect growth
factors. Yet, the literature on the effects of LMR on wages, working hours,
and labor productivity is also not unanimous. For example, severance pay-
ments are found to have no effect on wages because firms make workers
pre-pay them back through the labor contracts (Lazear, 1990; Leonardi &
Pica, 2007). On the other hand, van der Wiel concludes that mandatory
notice worker protection increases wages (van der Wiel, 2010).
The debate on how labor regulations affect labor productivity and em-
ployment is also inconclusive. For example, MacLeod and Nakavachara
(2007) test whether more stringent labor regulations reduce employee turn-
over and lead to a more productive employee-employer relationship for some
types of occupation, especially the high-skilled ones. Acharya, Baghai, and
Subramanian (2010) find support for the hypothesis that stricter labor dis-
missal laws encourage innovation within firms, and therefore, could poten-
tially promote labor productivity and economic growth. The intuition is
that labor laws provide high-skilled innovative staff with a certain degree of
insurance in case of a short-term failure to innovate.
These results contradict the traditional argument that labor regulations
impose costs to firms and thus reduce labor force participation, employment
(Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2004), and invest-
ment as well as value added per worker (Cingano, Leonardi, Messina, & Pica,
2009). Autor, Kerr, and Kugler (2007) present evidence that imposing em-
ployment protection laws increases employment but reduces productivity in
the US. Further, Bassanini, Nunziata, and Venn (2009) extend the latter evi-
dence of a reduction in labor productivity as a result of more worker-friendly
labor laws for a sample of OECD countries. By analyzing firm-level data
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from Italy, Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) are in line with the traditional view
on labor regulations summarized in Cingano et al. (2009) and find strong
support for the conclusion that employment protection reduces productivity.
The long-run effects from labor regulations on economic growth are fur-
ther analyzed in Deakin and Sarkar (2008). Their conclusions support the
“indeterminacy hypothesis”. That is, the effects from labor laws on growth
would ultimately depend on context-specific factors, and therefore, finding
any evidence supporting or confronting the notion that regulation hampers
growth is, perhaps, always tentative and should be interpreted with caution.
The discussion above confirms that whether labor market reforms have
an impact on economic growth is inconclusive (Freeman, 2009).6 The same
can be said for the reform impact of credit market regulation (CMR).
In an excellent review of the state of the debate, Demirgüç-Kunt and
Levine (2008) present the reasons why credit market deregulation may lead
to growth. They claim that financial deregulation, such as equity market
liberalization and allowing foreign bank competition, may spur growth by
improving the allocation of capital and reducing its cost, thereby increasing
overall efficiency. In a similar spirit, Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005)
find that liberalizing the equity market leads to a 1 percentage point increase
in annual economic growth, while Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2004, p.593) con-
6In a separate line of literature, labor regulation has an inconclusive effect on income
inequality. For example, Rosenbloom and Sundstrom (2009) argue that labor market insti-
tutions have a significant impact on the income distribution. They support the conclusions
by Fortin and Lemieux (1997) who find that labor market reforms increase wage inequal-
ity in the US, and side with the cross-country evidence by Freeman (2007) who finds that
more regulated labor markets exhibit lower income inequality. However, in a more recent
take at the issue, Scheve and Stasavage (2009) disagree with this argument, presenting a
time-series evidence encompassing most of the 20th century. They find that income in-
equality in 13 industrialized countries was shrinking even before the stringent labor market
institutions like the centralized wage bargaining were introduced. Thus, they conclude,
there is little support for the cross-sectional evidence that labor market institutions like
centralized wage bargaining influenced significantly the income distribution.
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clude that “tighter regulations on bank entry and bank activities boost the
cost of financial intermediation,” which ultimately hampers growth.
The positive association between banking liberalization and economic
growth is also found in earlier studies.7 Levine (1998, p.598) uses legal origin
as an instrumental variable for banking development on cross-country data
to arrive at a “statistically significant and economically large relationship
between the exogenous component of banking development and the rate of
economic growth.” Earlier, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) apply a difference-
in-difference strategy on US data to find that both output and per capita
income rise after the relaxation of the intra-state bank branching restrictions.
The recent literature on the causes and consequences of the financial
crisis of 2007-2008 revives a lively debate about the impact of credit market
liberalization. For example, Gorton (2008) identifies the innovations in the
financial industry as standing at the heart of the sub-prime crisis of 2007-
2008. Yet, as early as 1995, Edwards and Mishkin (1995) concluded that
financial innovations expose the banking industry to the same risks which
were effectively regulated in the past. Their result suggests that it is not
financial innovation which leads to the crisis.
However, Diamond and Rajan (2009) claim that the US financial sec-
tor mis-allocated resources to the real estate sector by issuing new financial
instruments, while Stiglitz (2010) develops a model in which full financial lib-
eralization may be welfare-decreasing. This conclusion is also in line with the
threshold finance literature reviewed briefly in the previous chapter. In brief,
the literature reveals thresholds beyond which finance no longer plays the ex-
pected positive role for growth and could contribute to financial fragility.8 In-
terestingly enough, increased financial fragility is sometimes associated with
7See Levine (2005a) for an extensive review.
8See Arcand et al. (2012), Cecchetti et al. (2011) and Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012).
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higher macro growth. Rancière, Tornell, and Westermann (2008) suggest
a positive effect of systemic risk on growth, especially in countries lacking
a proper institutional and regulatory environment. In their work, systemic
risk encourages investment which leads to higher growth but also to more
frequent crises.
In addition, Calomiris (2009, p.62) concludes that banking regulations
have “...always been the key additional necessary condition to producing a
propensity for banking distress” and in a more recent essay Levine (2010,
p.3) maintains that “...financial regulations and policies created incentives
for excessive risk and the financial regulatory apparatus maintained these
policies even as information became available about the growing fragility of
the financial system.”9,10 However, Tarr (2010) argues that CMR is unrelated
to the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Instead, political failures stand at its core.
This work extends the literature in the nexus of deregulation and growth
fields in two ways. First, it approaches the measurement of various deregu-
lation reforms in a similar fashion to Estevadeordal and Taylor (2008) who
transform the traditionally used reform indices into dummy variables, thereby
allowing for a difference-in-difference estimation. The advantage of this ap-
proach lies in using the reform indices to construct policy treatment and
control groups rather than using the indices directly to infer the effect of a
unit change of a reform index.
Second, and perhaps even more importantly than dealing with the mea-
surement issue, few empirical papers which clarify the impact of deregulation
9For similar conclusions on the role of financial liberalization in previous crises, most
notably the Japanese banking crisis, see Hoshi and Kashyap (1999).
10The political science literature builds upon the critique of CMR. For example,
Satyanath and Berger (2007) claim that the growth effect of capital control liberaliza-
tion would critically depend on the degree of democracy, implying that the growth effect
hinges on local country-specific political factors which in turn renders the reform outcomes
ex-ante unknown.
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on growth account for where the time variation in the indices comes from.
For example, Alesina et al. (2005) use lagged values of PMR indices as instru-
ments for current regulation for OECD countries only. Further, they study
the impact of the reform timing without taking into account the origin of the
reforms. Barseghyan (2008) uses a number of instruments for entry regula-
tions and property rights, such as geographical latitude, legal origins, settler
mortality, and indigenous population density as early as the 16th century
for a large sample of countries. However, as Barseghyan’s instruments do
not vary over time, they can explain only the cross-sectional variation in the
reform data. As a result, the studies using those instruments fail to explain
the time variation in deregulation reforms.
In contrast, I explore energy independence and natural resource rents
across countries which also vary over time to predict the timing of the dereg-
ulation reforms, and only then study the impact of those reforms on growth.
Beck and Laeven (2006) apply similar logic to a broad aggregate index of in-
stitutional reforms in 24 transition economies. Both the energy independence
and rents indicators, as well as the empirical strategy, are detailed below.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
The literature review points to two methodological issues that need to be
addressed in the analysis of any institutional impact on growth: the measure-
ment of reforms and the endogeneity of the reform timing. In this section, I
present a possible approach to deal with both at the same time in the context
of deregulation. The benchmark model addresses primarily the measurement
issue, while the 2SLS model extends it and addresses the endogeneity issue.
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2.3.1 Benchmark Model
Much in the spirit of Estevadeordal and Taylor (2008), I define reformers
between 1970 and 1990 as countries with an above-median (above-mean)
increase in the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index of regulation
between 1970 and 1990 and non-reformers otherwise. Identically, reformers
between 1990 and 2010 are defined as countries with an above-median (above-
mean) increase in the EFW index of regulation between 1990 and 2010 and
non-reformers otherwise. Thus, four distinct groups of countries emerge: 1)
non-reformers in the first period becoming reformers in the second period
(late reformers); 2) reformers in the first period becoming non-reformers in
the second period (early reformers); 3) reformers in both periods (“marathon”
or consistent reformers); and 4) non-reformers in both periods. The first three
groups are the policy treatment groups in all baseline estimations, while non-
reformers are the control group. Table 2.1 lists the countries in the 1970-2010
sample.
Although the data split may seem arbitrary, it is justified for several rea-
sons. First, the data are such that they allow for two equally long periods to
be constructed in both deregulation reforms and growth performance. Sec-
ond, 1990 marks an important change in economic history with the start
of many market-oriented reforms across a wide range of economies. As the
data description demonstrates, the reforms before 1990 were rather sporadic,
while after 1990 they were widespread but varying in their magnitude, which
presents a suitable opportunity for a difference-in-difference study. Third,
splitting the data into smaller periods would undermine capturing some ef-
fects that materialize over longer periods of time within each economy; it
would also present a challenge in capturing a policy variation in deregula-
tion within a decade or within a shorter span, as many economies might not
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reform at all within shorter periods of time. Finally, the 1990 threshold is
not new to the literature on the impact of deregulation on growth: Alesina
et al. (2005) also use it. Therefore, splitting the data into two relatively long
20-year periods is suitable for this empirical work.
To address how the timing of the reform affected living standards and
growth, I estimate the following benchmark model:
∆yit = β1 + β2ERit + β3LRit + β4MRit + X
′
itβ + ∆εit, (2.1)
where ∆yit is either the difference in the average log-GDP per capita for
country i in period t, ∆Avg. log(GDP )it, to measure the effect of the reform
on the living standards, or the difference in the compound growth rates
between the two periods, denoted by ∆git, to measure the growth acceleration
effect;11 ERit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country was an early
reformer and to 0 otherwise; LRit is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the late
reformers and to 0 otherwise; MRit are the countries that were reformers in
both periods; X
′
it is a vector of country characteristics, such as: i) the initial
level of log-GDP per capita in 1970 to control for growth convergence and
initial conditions, and ii) other institutional reform covariates such as barriers
to trade; and ∆εit is an error term about which I assume, at least for now,
that the standard linear regression assumptions are satisfied. Finally, note
that with only two reform periods – before and after 1990 – the t-dimension
collapses to 1, which effectively means performing a cross-sectional estimation
on differenced data.
11The compound growth rate for country i within each 20-year period t is measured
as git = [(xn/x0)1/20 − 1]∗100, where x0 is the initial level of per capita real GDP, while
xn is the terminal level. Thus, the compound growth rate measures the growth rate of
the economy as if it was growing with the same rate throughout the period. I do not use
the least squares growth rate because its estimation requires a sufficiently large number
of observations over time.
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2.3.2 2SLS Estimation
The above benchmark estimation does not account for the selection process
into the various treatment and control groups. To do that, the following local





itα + ∆εit, (2.2)
whereX ′it is the vector of the observed explanatory variables described above,
and Dit is a vector of treatment indicators (ER, LR and MR) that depend
on the instrumental variables, zit, in a way that D∗it = γ0 + γ1zit + ui is a
latent variable with its observable counterpart Dit generated by:
Dit =
 0 if D
∗
it ≤ 0,
1 if D∗it > 0.
(2.3)
Equation (2.3) means that the reform participation decision Dit is driven
by some unobservable factors D∗it that in turn depend on some predetermined
country characteristics zit which I assume exogenous. These characteristics
are the instrumental variables which vary over time and can arguably predict
the selection into early, late, and marathon reformers. The instruments, zit,
are the energy independence of a country i in period t, and the natural
resource rents of the same country in the same period. In line with the
political economy literature, the more energy abundant the country is and the
more natural resources it possesses, the less incentives its policy makers have
to deregulate at any point in time. Therefore, the more energy independent
the country is, and the more rents it has from natural resources, the lower
the probability of reforming early. At the same time, however, changes in
the resource abundance may also influence political decisions to reform or
12The model is detailed in Cameron and Trivedi (2005, pp.883-884).
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to reverse reforms at any point in time. Therefore, the energy independence




, zit ∈ [−1;∞), (2.4)
where Pit is the production, and Cit is the consumption of energy in a given
year between 1980 and 2009.13 The variable zit also means that the more
production of energy there is in the country, the more energy-independent
the country becomes. For example, if zit = 9, then the country produces 10
times more energy than it consumes.14
Apart from the energy independence, the time variation in reforms may
also come from the natural resource abundance a country enjoys. The re-
source abundance is measured with the natural resource rents as a share of
GDP. For a given natural resource, its rent is the difference between its mar-
ket value and the cost of obtaining it. Then, the sum of the rents for all of
a country’s resources is the total indicator of natural resource rents. Natu-
ral resources for which panel data is readily available include coal, forests,
minerals, natural gas, and oil.
The relationship between the natural resource rents, energy independence
and the likelihood of market-oriented reforms is presented in Figure 2.1.
In line with the political economy expectations, panel 2.1(a) indicates that
the more energy-independent the country is, i.e., the higher the share of its
consumption which could be satisfied from local production, the lower the
probability is of the country being an early reformer. In addition, panel 2.1(b)
demonstrates that energy-rich countries actually have a higher probability of
13Effectively, this means I have a data point for yi and the timing of the reform (ERi,
LRi or MRi) and 30 possible instruments.
14As it includes diverse sub-indicators such as petroleum, natural gas, coal, hydro-
electric power, nuclear electric power, solar, wind, and waste electric power, the energy-
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Figure 2.1: Rents, Energy Independence and Likelihood of Reforms
reforming late. Identical conclusions are reached when the share of natural
resource rents in GDP is used to predict the timing of reforms.
The natural resource underpinning of market-oriented reforms is sup-
ported also by other empirical findings. For example, Levine (2005b) finds
sufficient credibility in the idea that endowments create elites who subse-
quently shape the property rights of a country in their own favor of in favor
of a strong private sector. Further, Beck and Laeven (2006) isolate the ex-
ogenous component of the institutional variation in the transition economies
by using their natural resource abundance to study the institutional im-
pact on economic growth. In addition, Mulligan and Tsui (2008) develop a
theoretical argument justifying why resource abundant countries tend to be
non-democratic, and in a more recent paper, Tsui (2011) finds empirical sup-
port for the model and concludes that oil discoveries significantly reduce the
likelihood of democratic reforms. These findings support the validity of using
the path of resource independence over time as a predictor of the timing of
market-oriented reforms.
There is one major concern when using the time variation in rents and
energy independence as instruments for the timing of reforms: its correlation
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with living standards and growth. It is certainly true that energy produc-
tion and consumption is correlated with both GDP levels and growth within
a period. Within a short given period, higher energy production and con-
sumption and higher resource rents raise GDP and GDP growth. At the
same time, higher rents and energy independence make politicians postpone
reforms. This turns richer and faster growing countries – especially those who
made their fortunes after discovering natural resources – into candidates for
being late reformers. Therefore, if there is a positive correlation between
resources and GDP, and between resources and reforming late or never, then
there should be a positive correlation between being a non-reformer, a late
reformer and GDP. Then, the estimates of being an early or a marathon
reformer would actually be biased downwards in both OLS and the 2SLS
estimations. Further, notice that both the reform variables and GDP cap-
ture 20-year periods, while the instruments are annual observations of rents
and energy independence. Thus, although certainly possible, any short-term
correlation between rents, energy independence and GDP is limited within
a small segment of the reform timeline. Therefore, the biases resulting from
those correlations should not significantly affect the main results, especially
when those results capture the effects from reforms over long periods.
At the same time, the validity of the instrument is justified by the emerg-
ing evidence that rents and energy independence have only a short-term direct
impact on economic growth, if it has any impact at all (Alexeev & Conrad,
2009, 2011; Aliyev, 2011), which justifies using this instrument over longer
periods. Otherwise, applying it as an IV for reforms would not be a valid




The explanatory variables on the changes of the index of regulation and other
reforms are taken from the Gwartney et al. (2012) index of Economic Freedom
of the World (EFW) data, which traces the economic policy development in
144 countries back to 1970 in the following relevant policy areas: 1) Size of
Government: Expenditures, Taxes, and Enterprises; 2) Legal Structure and
Security of Property Rights; 3) Freedom to Trade Internationally; and 4)
Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business. Those indices are transformed
into reform variables, as outlined in the empirical model description. The
main explanatory variable is taken from the changes in the index of Regula-
tion of Credit, Labor, and Business.
Country-level economic growth
One of the most comprehensive sources of country-level GDP and growth
data is the 7.1 version of the Penn World Table (PWT) by Heston, Summers,
and Aten (2012). My main dependent variables are the GDP per capita and
the GDP per worker which are the RGDPCH and the RGDPWOK variables
in the PWT. For every country in the sample, the dependent variables are
constructed as follows: take the average log-level of GDP per capita for the
first period (1971-1990) and difference it from the log-level of GDP per capita
for the second period (1991-2010). Thus, we have a data point for every
country, which indicates the difference in the average log-GDP between the
two periods.
Further, the geometrically averaged compound growth rate is measured
within each 20-year period and for each country. The difference of the two
compound growth rates suggests of a growth acceleration or deceleration
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after 1990. This difference is the second dependent variable used in this
work. The match between non-missing GDP levels and growth rates and the
overall EFW index of regulation over the 1970-2010 period is for 39 countries
only, which is the size of the baseline sample. As there is more abundant data
on credit market regulation (CMR) reforms, the match with the EFW index
of CMR over the 1970-2010 period is for 65 countries. As this is admittedly
a rather small sample, it is further extended in ways explained below in the
robustness checks section.
As a supplementary dataset on growth performance and its factors, I use
the World Development Indicators (WDI) database, which is arguably at
least as precise as the PWT in its ability to measure economic growth and
its factors in a large panel of countries. It contains information on GDP, GDP
per capita and GDP per worker from 214 countries and territories since 1960.
As there are some differences across datasets in the way the growth series
are constructed, which might affect the results of the empirical estimations,15
using both the PWT and the WDI data sets makes it possible to check if the
results hinge on the data source. The natural resources rents data set is also
obtained from the WDI database. It spans across the entire 40-year period
of reforms and growth for 131 countries.
Finally, the data on energy production and consumption, which are needed
to construct the energy independence indicator, are taken from the Energy
Information Administration (EIA) of the US government. The database con-
tains annual observations for 193 countries and territories between 1980 and
2009, the majority of which are also present in the PWT and the EFW data
sets.
15See, for example, Hanousek, Hajkova, and Filer (2008) for a study of how the choice
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Figure 2.2: Overall Deregulation Reforms, 1970-2010
Deregulation and economic growth trends since 1970
This section illustrates graphically how the deregulation policies developed
from 1970 to 2010. The fairly long period of conducting those policies avoids
the risk of having almost no policy change within a shorter span.
Figure 2.2(a) relates the index of overall regulation in 1970 with the same
index 20 years later, and Figure 2.2(b) characterizes the relation for the
period that followed. A variation in the data in both directions is observed for
both periods. Most of the countries are lined around the 45-degree line in the
first period. As a higher index of regulation in the data means less restrictive
regulations, the data demonstrates that most countries did not deregulate
extensively between 1970 and 1990. However, in the second period, most of
the countries stand above the 45-degree line, which indicates improvement
over their 1990 standpoint.
The overall trend in deregulation and in the credit market regulation
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of Deregulation Reforms, 1970-2010
distributions of deregulation policies can be observed. Clearly, there is a
marked difference before and after 1990. Not only did the majority of coun-
tries improve their regulatory environment, which is visible from the shift of
the distribution to the right, but also far more countries were adopting more
radical market-oriented reforms, which is obvious from the increased vari-
ance of the distribution. The next section illustrates whether those extensive
reforms in the 1990s brought an increase in the living standards and growth
of the reforming economies.
2.4 Results
The results from OLS and 2SLS estimations of the benchmark equation (2.1)
in which the reform dummies are predetermined by the country’s own en-
ergy independence are presented in Table 2.2. The table is divided into two
main sections, identifying the two main discrimination criteria between re-
formers and non-reformers: the median and the mean criterion. In the first
four models, the median criterion is being used, while the mean criterion is
applied in the latter four models. Within each criterion, four estimations are
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carried out, two for each level of aggregation of the reform variable. In the
first two models, OLS and 2SLS estimations are presented with the under-
lying explanatory variable being the overall index of regulation for the given
economy. In the second pair of models, the underlying explanatory variable
is the sub-index of financial regulation only.
Table 2.2 demonstrates clearly that late reformers (LR), or those coun-
tries that lagged behind in their deregulation reform in the 1970s and in
the 1980s but accelerated the reform in the 1990s and in the early years of
the 21st century, had lower per capita GDP levels than the early reformers
(ER) and those countries that reformed extensively in both periods – the
“marathon” reformers (MR). Model (1) in Table 2.2 produces an expected
result: ERs increased their per capita GDP about 40% points more than
the LRs, and the MRs increased their living standards by about 20% points.
This means deregulating early and continuously is also associated with sig-
nificantly higher living standards. The result is obtained when controlling for
other institutional variables, such as removing trade barriers, and for initial
per capita GDP levels.
In Model (2) I control for the same variables. At the same time I estimate
the model by 2SLS and instrument with energy independence in each year
between 1980 and 2009. The results not only retain their sign but also
increase both their magnitude and their significance. This confirms that
early and marathon reformers become considerably richer while reforming
their overall labor-, business- and financial regulations. The instruments
pass the Hansen over-identification J-test, which is a good signal about their
validity. The Angrist-Pischke first stage F-test (APF), however, points to a
plausible weakness of the instruments.
The estimates above reveal the effect of an overall deregulation reform.
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Thus, the above results are somewhat loose and difficult to interpret. The
variation in the overall reform variable admittedly captures a wide range of
reforms simultaneously, thereby limiting the chances for formulating specific
deregulation policy implications.
In models (3) and (4), I replace the overall reform variable with an iden-
tically constructed variable, tracking down only one of the three reforms
constituting the overall reform: the deregulation on the credit market. Al-
though the results are not as strong as before in terms of magnitude, the
sign remains indicative of the inherent difference between the three types of
reformers: The levels of per capita GDP of the early reformers and marathon
reformers were significantly higher than those of the late reformers. The same
result holds when the reform is instrumented with energy independence in
the 2SLS model.
The results above do not change if a different criterion for defining the
reformers and non-reformers is applied within each 20-year period. When I
use the mean of reforms across all countries instead of the median to dis-
tinguish the timing of the reform, the ERs still appear better-off than both
the LRs and the non-reformers. The significance is lost for the MRs though
which might indicate that the results are sensitive to how the reformers are
defined. Just as before, the APF tests point to a possible weakness of the
instruments.
Using the compound GDP/c. growth as the explained variable brings ad-
ditional information on the growth effect from the deregulation reforms since
1975. Table 2.3 presents the results obtained from the compound GDP/c.
growth regressions.
While in the previous estimations it was evident that the one-shot growth
effect was different for the various types of reformers, the effect on growth
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acceleration is far less obvious. There is no significant difference between
the various types of reformers in models (1) and (2), which indicates that an
overall deregulation and liberalization of the labor-, product- and credit mar-
kets may not cause growth acceleration over a 20-year period. This is evident
from the insignificant estimates on both the overall reform variables and the
credit market reform variables (ER, LR, MR and CMER, CMLR, CMMR,
respectively). However, there appears to be a large positive and significant
acceleration effect from trade liberalization alone, which adds evidence to the
gains from trade liberalization literature.
It would be naïve to treat the above results as unbiased and consistent
without questioning a few important features of the model and the data.
First, the model uses too few observations. Although data limitations are a
natural weakness of models which go as far back as the 1970s, the number
of observations could be increased significantly. Second, the 2SLS estima-
tions do not use the rents from natural resources and resort to instrumenting
reforms with the energy dependence alone.
Third, the results above also ignore important time-invariant country
characteristics which might affect both living standards and growth prospects
of any of the countries in the sample. Also, 1990 draws a meaningful division
line between early and late reformers due to the fact that the bulk of the
reforms were done after 1990 for most of the countries. However, imposing
1990 on all countries at the same time kills a lot of cross-country heterogeneity
in reform patterns. Therefore, an interesting remaining question is how does
a country’s own deregulation reform pattern – not the relative reform pattern
to the other countries in the distribution of reformers – influence the growth
outcomes. To address these issues, panel data methods could significantly
help.
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Fourth, the above results are produced with the PWT data on GDP
and GDP growth. It would be interesting to see if the results hinge on the
choice of dependent variables data source. Those weaknesses of the model
are addressed in the next section.
2.5 Robustness Checks
To address the weaknesses of the baseline model, the following modifications
are applied. First, the period starting in 1970 is shortened by 5 years. Start-
ing in 1975 allows for more observations to enter into consideration. This is
so, because not all countries were observed in 1970 but were observed in 1975.
Using 1970 instead of 1975 excludes them for the entire period through 2010
because the reform variables cannot be created without knowing the initial
level of regulation. By using the more abundant data which starts in 1975,
the sample size is raised from 39 to 66 observations of overall reforms, and
from 65 to 89 observations of CMR reforms. Table 2.4 lists the countries in
the 1975-2010 sample.
Second, while the initial starting point of the reforms is kept at 1975 to
use the newly available observations, energy independence is dropped and
natural resource rents are used now to predict the timing of reforms in the
first stage of the 2SLS estimations. This allows for checking if the results
crucially depend on the choice of instruments.
Third, four sets of panel data estimations were conducted for both the
GDP and the growth rate of country i in period t. Initially, I use the overall
deregulation reform, the trade reform and the property rights reform indices
Iit directly.16 Then, in the remaining three sets of estimations, I construct
16I did not use the property rights indices in the baseline model because it would have
limited the number of observations even further.
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reform variables in the following way: a) a country is a reformer if Iit > Iit−1,
and a non-reformer otherwise; b) a country is a reformer if Iit > Median(Ii),
and a non-reformer otherwise; c) a country is a reformer if Iit > Mean(Ii),
and a non-reformer otherwise. The advantage of those four methods of con-
structing a reform variable is that all of them avoid relating a country to the
entire distribution of reforms within a period. Rather, a country is consid-
ered a reformer based on its own merit, and its own path of reforms. In case
a), a country is a reformer in a given area if the reform index I in that area
was higher than in the previous period. In case b), the median is taken over
the entire time span of reforms in a given area for that country. When the
country goes over the median of its own reforms, it becomes a reformer. In
case c), the median is substituted with the mean of reforms.
Fourth, the PWT is admittedly one of the most comprehensive sources of
country level panel data. However, one of the criticisms aimed at the different
versions of the PWT dataset is that they lead to a systematic variability of
the levels and the growth estimates.17 Therefore, in the final robustness
check, I repeat the baseline exercise but use the WDI data instead of the
PWT.
2.5.1 Shortening the Time Span
The results from repeating the baseline model on a shorter time span are
given in Table 2.5. Table 2.5 repeats the main message from Table 2.2. Early
and Marathon reformers differ significantly from the rest of the reformers,
and enjoy higher living standards. In addition, the growth acceleration in
Table 2.6 of the ERs and MRs was not significantly higher than the one of
17See for example, Johnson, Larson, Papageorgiou, and Subramanian (2012) about the
differences within the PWT versions and Hanousek et al. (2008) about the differences
stemming from using different sources such as PWT and the World Development Indicators
(WDI).
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the non-reformers, which is still a robust result.
However, two of the results seem unintuitive and hard to reconcile at first
glance. First, why do the overall early and marathon reformers have higher
living standards but insignificantly higher growth acceleration? After all, the
higher living standards have to come from a growth process. Second, why do
late CMR reformers have lower GDP levels but higher growth acceleration?
When reconciling the finding that there is a significant level effect from the
overall deregulation reform without an apparent acceleration effect, we have
to bear in mind that all the results are relative to the non-reformers. The
fact that there is no overall acceleration effect means that the ERs and MRs
are growing at similar rates as the non-reformers. However, a growth of 2%
from a base of 100 produces a different GDP level than that of 2% from a
base of 50. Therefore, ERs and MRs have indeed become relatively richer
than before, while growing at the same rate as the non-reformers. This shows
up as a significant level effect without a significant growth acceleration effect.
Similar logic applies to the second unintuitive result. The LRs were poorer
in the first period, while in the second they grew much faster than the non-
reformers. However, they could not catch up by 2010. This surfaces as a posi-
tive growth acceleration effect without the apparent and intuitive level effect.
Thus, it appears that a large catch up process exists for those economies that
reformed extensively in the 1990s. This can lead to dramatic differences in
GDP per capita levels, when we take into account the long-term dynamic
gains from such a large annual margin in favor of the late reformers. Yet,
the results here should once again be interpreted with caution, since the
first stage APF test points to rather weak instruments, despite their validity
indicated by the Hansen J test.
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2.5.2 Substituting Rents for Energy Independence
Table 2.7 presents the results from the 2SLS estimates of the baseline equa-
tion when rents substitute for the energy independence. The message the
table delivers is that, again, ERs and MRs have higher living standards while
they do not necessarily grow faster than the LRs and the non-reformers. The
results are somewhat stronger in terms of instruments testing as well. While
the Hansen test cannot reject the validity of the instruments in most cases,
the APF test is higher than 10 in more cases than before.
2.5.3 Panel Data Estimation
Tables 2.8 through 2.15 present the results from panel data versions of
the baseline model. The initial panel OLS model is yit = β1 + β2yit−1 +
β3(CM)Rit + β4PRit + β5Tit + X’itβ + εit, where yit is either the Log(GDP)
per capita of country i in period t, or its growth rate over the same period;
(CM)R is either the index of credit market regulation (CMR) or the index of
overall regulation (R); and PR and T are country-specific indices of property
rights and trade policies, respectively. The other controls in the X ′ vector
are the sum of exports and imports in GDP, log of population and log of the
country’s exchange rate to the US dollar, respectivey.
Before running the models, the Harris-Tzavalis panel data unit root test
was conducted. The Harris-Tzavalis test is the appropriate test to use with
the current data due to the proximity of its underlying assumptions to the
traits of the data: large N , and fixed T periods. The test detects a unit root
for the entire panel of the Log(GDP/c.)it series, while it strongly rejects the
non-stationarity of the ∆Log(GDP/c.)it data. Due to the non-stationarity
of most of the underlying data, especially of the per capita GDP series, the
models are estimated in differences, and presented in Tables 2.8 through 2.15.
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In each table, two sets of three estimations each were done. The first
set of three models corresponds to the overall effect from deregulation, while
the second set of models corresponds to the effects from liberalizing credit
markets. Within each set of three models, the following estimations were
conducted: i) Panel OLS with country and time fixed effects (FEs) and
clustered standard errors (SEs); ii) Panel 2SLS with country and time FEs
and clustered SEs, where energy independence instrumented for the change
in the reform index; iii) Panel 2SLS with country and time FEs and clustered
SEs, where rents instrumented for the change in the reform index.
Table 2.8 uses the reform indices directly. In Table 2.9 the indices are
transformed into reform variables by using the country’s own path of reforms
for each of the reforms studied. Specifically, a country i is considered a
reformer in a given area in time t if the index of reforms I in that particular
reform area is higher in time t than in t − 1. In Table 2.10 the indices
are transformed into reform variables by using the country’s own median
of reforms over the entire period, while Table 2.11 uses the country’s own
mean of reforms over the entire period. When a given reform index passes
above its own median/mean, then the country is considered a reformer in
that particular area. Tables 2.8 through 2.11 use the Log(GDP/c.)it as the
dependent variable, while Tables 2.12 through 2.15 repeat the above work
for the compound growth rate git. To accommodate the data availability in
the EFW reform indices, the time interval in each panel data estimation is
set at 5 years.
Most panel data estimations point to a recurrent message: both overall
and CMR reforms are associated with higher living standards. Unlike the
baseline models, however, the panel data estimates add another conclusion:
both the overall and the CMR reforms can accelerate growth. This result
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could be driven by either the more appropriate panel data methods or by
a natural trait of growth accelerations: that they are only temporary, as
Hausmann et al. (2005) suggest. Thus, it is only natural that a reform
could not produce a growth acceleration effect over a 20-year period, since
accelerations happen over shorter horizons. This work adds to their evidence
by slicing the data into 5-year periods and concluding that both overall and
CMR reforms could produce growth accelerations.
In line with the recent evidence of a non-linear relationship between finan-
cial development and growth (Arcand et al., 2012; Cecchetti & Kharroubi,
2012), and the underlying non-linearity of the effects of reforms on growth,
I add a variable that could potentially capture this non-linearity in the final
panel data estimations: the reform gap. Similarly to Chapter 1, the reform
gap in a given area – overall reform or CMR – for country i in period t is
defined as Gapit = Max{Irt} − Iit, i.e., the contemporaneous difference be-
tween the maximum level of an overall or a financial reform in region r and
the level of overall or financial liberalization reform, respectively, within the
given economy i. Both the levels and the squared terms of the reform gap
are included in the panel estimations. It is interesting to note that including
the gap renders some of the baseline reform effects insignificant but whenever
that happens, the gap itself and the squared term of the gap become signif-
icant. The signs of both are negative, which suggests that closing in on the
reform leaders in the region may bring the desired growth effects only up to a
certain point, after which the positive effects of reforming start fading. This
results could be treated as an additional evidence in favor of the recently
discussed non-linear relationship between finance and growth (Arcand et al.,
2012; Cecchetti & Kharroubi, 2012; Cecchetti et al., 2011).
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2.5.4 Transition Bias
Table 2.1 and Table 2.4 allocate the countries across the various types of re-
formers between 1970–2010 and 1975–2010, respectively. They indicate that
6 transition countries are present in the sample: Bulgaria, Czech Repub-
lic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Russia. All of them are either late or
marathon reformers in both the overall reform trends and the credit market
liberalization. At the same time, those countries experienced severe reces-
sions after 1990 which may lead to the expectation that the results presented
here are biased. This check is intended to investigate if the benchmark results
are driven by the presence of transition economies.
By construction, the main results could not have possibly been driven by
the presence of transition economies. This is so because despite the availabil-
ity of data on both the GDP per capita and the overall and credit market
liberalization indices, data on trade indices for all transition countries is
missing. This means FTER, FTLR and FTMR are also missing for the tran-
sition countries. Therefore, the benchmark model is estimated without the
transition countries in the first place.
To make sure transition countries are not causing any biases, a dummy
for transition countries was interacted with a time dummy, and included in
the panel model. The panel model was estimated in differences so including
a dummy for the entire region in the presence of country fixed effects would
hardly make sense. However, there were factors driving the transition period
which affected the entire region at approximately the same time, so a region-
time dummy would make more sense. Yet, as the results remain virtually
identical, I conclude that the benchmark results are not driven by a transition
bias.
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2.5.5 Using the WDI Data
Instead of the PWT data, the last set of robustness checks uses the WDI
data to measure both GDP and growth rates, and repeat the baseline model.
As expected, the results from this check do not significantly differ from the
baseline results. They are robust both in terms of magnitude and significance.
The results from the four broad sets of robustness checks here demonstrate
that there is indeed a robust positive relationship between being early and a
marathon reformer and the levels of per capita GDP. In addition, reforming
credit markets late is associated with lower levels of per capita GDP but with
a faster catch up process emanated in a significant growth acceleration effect
for the late reformers. The panel data methods and using another major
data source on the dependent variable corroborates the baseline findings.
The results in this section are sufficient to conclude this work about the
effect of deregulation on economic growth.
2.6 Conclusion
The effects from deregulation on living standards and on growth vary across
economies and across the timing of the deregulation reform. The countries
that lagged behind in their deregulation reform in the 1970s and the 1980s
but accelerated the reform in the 1990s and early in the new century had
lower per capita GDP levels than the early reformers and those countries
that reformed extensively in both periods – the “marathon” reformers. This
means deregulating early and continuously is also associated with higher
living standards. However, when it comes to growth acceleration, there is
no significant difference between the various types of overall deregulation
reformers. This result suggests that an overall reform does not necessarily
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cause growth accelerations over long periods of time.
In order to analyze the impact of a more specific reform, I consider the
impact of deregulation on the credit markets alone. Although the results are
not as strong as before in terms of magnitude, the sign remains indicative of
the inherent difference between the early and the late reformers: late credit
market deregulation is also associated with being poorer.
There appears to be a large positive and significant effect on both living
standards and on growth rates from both the overall and the credit market
deregulation. This result surfaced from the robustness checks in which the
data was sliced into shorter 5-year time periods, and panel data methods were
applied. The results also lead to the conclusion that growth accelerations
could indeed be only temporary events, as the literature has suggested. The
positive effect from reforms is also supported by the other robustness checks.
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Table 2.2: Deregulation and Average Levels of GDP/c.: 1970-2010
Median criterion Mean criterion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
ER .397∗∗∗ .426∗∗∗ .456∗∗∗ .496∗∗∗
(.135) (.140) (.133) (.142)
LR -.002 -.030 -.047 .006
(.131) (.150) (.105) (.126)
MR .188∗ .267∗∗ .178 .215
(.105) (.120) (.122) (.131)
FTER .095 .092 .034 -.122 -.097 -.164 .010 -.127
(.095) (.113) (.113) (.182) (.105) (.113) (.118) (.178)
FTLR .221 .240 .126 .225 .041 .040 .110 .240
(.329) (.312) (.107) (.228) (.240) (.233) (.107) (.217)
FTMR .326 .308 .137 .218 .412 .554∗ .178 .278
(.345) (.303) (.146) (.252) (.290) (.292) (.161) (.250)
RGDPc’70 .110 .112 .046 .054 .109 .118 .034 .032
(.120) (.108) (.050) (.055) (.110) (.102) (.049) (.051)
CMER .144 .351 .125 .272
(.117) (.220) (.110) (.231)
CMLR -.291∗∗ -.411∗ -.349∗∗ -.484∗∗
(.142) (.217) (.147) (.227)
CMMR -.060 -.099 -.083 -.200
(.141) (.203) (.158) (.228)
Const. -.895 -.928 -.125 -.210 -.720 -.806 .000 -.012
(1.180) (1.062) (.473) (.600) (1.038) (.957) (.474) (.557)
Obs. 39 39 65 65 39 39 65 65
Adj. R2 .184 .145 .325 .150
Hansen J .347 .245 .553 .182
APF-ER 9.289 6.015 16.177 4.945
APF-LR 2.379 6.422 8.306 9.691
APF-MR 4.891 13.716 15.175 7.521
Notes: The estimated OLS equation is ∆Avg. log(GDP )it = β1+β2ERit+β3LRit+β4MRit+β5Xit+
∆εit, where ∆Avg. log(GDP )it is the difference in the average log-levels of per capita GDP. The
variables ER, LR and MR are the Early-, Late-, and Marathon reformers, respectively, as defined in
the text. The variables CM-ER, CM-LR and CM-MR are the early-, late-, and marathon reformers
in the credit market regulation as defined in the text. The variables FT-ER, FT-LR and FT-MR
are the early-, late-, and marathon reformers in the freedom to trade internationally as defined in
the text. RGDPc’70 is the log of real GDP per capita in 1970. Robust standard errors are presented
in parentheses. Hansen J is the P-value on the Hansen overidentification test. APF- is the value of
the Angrist-Pischke first stage F-test on the endogenous variables of interest. Data source: PWT
7.1 data; EFW 2012 index; US EIA data. Symbols: ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 2.3: Deregulation and Compound Economic Growth: 1970-2010
Median criterion Mean criterion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
ER .276 .103 -.321 -.417
(.871) (.761) (.659) (.651)
LR .238 .163 -.208 -.547
(.775) (.646) (.517) (.563)
MR .618 .308 .481 .417
(.827) (.750) (.660) (.572)
FTER -.340 -.259 -.553 .621 .003 .141 -.094 1.473∗∗
(.517) (.510) (.549) (.787) (.460) (.502) (.502) (.715)
FTLR .712 .753 .441 2.285∗∗ .920 1.055 .622 2.018∗
(.926) (.866) (.801) (1.132) (.727) (.677) (.688) (1.038)
FTMR 1.206 .860 .838 2.550∗∗ .704 -.881 .895 2.482∗∗
(1.053) (.987) (.757) (1.215) (.863) (1.906) (.764) (1.241)
RGDPc’70 .181 .176 .065 .361 .219 .186 .152 .392
(.191) (.175) (.225) (.237) (.180) (.170) (.220) (.244)
CMER -.237 .123 -.376 -.428
(.541) (1.129) (.516) (1.095)
CMLR .934 1.325 1.316 1.645
(.811) (.975) (.812) (1.067)
CMMR .064 .379 .428 .752
(.789) (.945) (1.027) (1.085)
Const. -2.521 -2.365 -.977 -4.844∗ -2.656 -2.258 -1.961 -5.080∗
(2.235) (2.061) (2.228) (2.807) (2.015) (1.882) (2.176) (2.769)
Obs. 39 39 65 65 39 39 65 65
Adj. R2 -.097 .067 -.091 .087
Hansen J .264 .174 .340 .249
APF-ER 9.289 6.015 16.177 4.945
APF-LR 2.379 6.422 8.306 9.691
APF-MR 4.891 13.716 15.175 7.521
Notes: The estimated OLS equation is ∆git = β1 + β2ERit + β3LRit + β4MRit + β5Xit + ∆εit,
where ∆git is the difference in the compound growth rate between the two periods. The variables
ER, LR and MR are the Early-, Late-, and Marathon reformers, respectively, as defined in the
text. The variables CM-ER, CM-LR and CM-MR are the early-, late-, and marathon reformers in
the credit market regulation as defined in the text. The variables FT-ER, FT-LR and FT-MR are
the early-, late-, and marathon reformers in the freedom to trade internationally as defined in the
text. RGDPc’70 is the log of real GDP per capita in 1970. Robust standard errors are presented
in parentheses. Hansen J is the P-value on the Hansen overidentification test. APF- is the value of
the Angrist-Pischke first stage F-test on the endogenous variables of interest. Data source: PWT





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.5: Deregulation and Average Levels of GDP/c.: 1975-2010
Median criterion Mean criterion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
ER .340∗∗∗ .459∗∗∗ .346∗∗∗ .430∗∗∗
(.084) (.111) (.082) (.128)
LR .008 .055 -.025 -.153
(.090) (.148) (.104) (.201)
MR .079 .257∗∗ .062 .167
(.063) (.117) (.061) (.119)
FTER -.007 -.038 -.030 -.094 -.028 -.023 .012 -.053
(.079) (.136) (.080) (.162) (.072) (.128) (.082) (.155)
FTLR .038 .084 .086 .123 .001 .084 .078 .094
(.107) (.151) (.096) (.196) (.096) (.159) (.088) (.176)
FTMR .047 .059 .155 -.050 .033 .191 .189∗ .009
(.122) (.162) (.107) (.176) (.110) (.225) (.102) (.194)
RGDPc’75 .084∗∗ .091∗∗ .059∗ .045 .078∗∗ .088∗∗ .039 .017
(.039) (.037) (.033) (.041) (.035) (.035) (.031) (.042)
CMER .075 .049 .073 -.055
(.079) (.170) (.080) (.143)
CMLR -.290∗∗∗ -.276∗∗ -.317∗∗∗ -.375∗∗
(.096) (.140) (.090) (.147)
CMMR -.098 -.171 -.145 -.284
(.094) (.190) (.105) (.230)
Const. -.582 -.725∗ -.231 -.046 -.503 -.649∗ -.069 .228
(.376) (.372) (.317) (.457) (.342) (.371) (.293) (.453)
Obs. 66 66 89 89 66 66 89 89
Adj. R2 .257 .178 .288 .195
Hansen J .385 .428 .512 .516
APF-ER 4.521 3.312 3.827 7.320
APF-LR 5.319 12.488 12.334 8.601
APF-MR 8.479 9.705 11.629 25.924
Notes: The estimated OLS equation is ∆Avg. log(GDP )it = β1+β2ERit+β3LRit+β4MRit+β5Xit+
∆εit, where ∆Avg. log(GDP )it is the difference in the average log-levels of per capita GDP. The
variables ER, LR and MR are the Early-, Late-, and Marathon reformers, respectively, as defined in
the text. The variables CM-ER, CM-LR and CM-MR are the early-, late-, and marathon reformers
in the credit market regulation as defined in the text. The variables FT-ER, FT-LR and FT-MR
are the early-, late-, and marathon reformers in the freedom to trade internationally as defined in
the text. RGDPc’75 is the real GDP per capita in 1975. Robust standard errors are presented in
parentheses. Hansen J is the P-value on the Hansen overidentification test. APF- is the value of
the Angrist-Pischke first stage F-test on the endogenous variables of interest. Data source: PWT
7.1 data; EFW 2012 index; US EIA data. Symbols: ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 2.6: Deregulation and Compound Economic Growth: 1975-2010
Median criterion Mean criterion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
ER -1.132 -2.364∗∗ -1.008 -2.000∗
(.848) (1.162) (.779) (1.118)
LR -.275 -.978 .293 -.260
(1.060) (1.422) (1.093) (1.063)
MR -.487 -1.494 -.295 -.897
(.750) (1.056) (.653) (.799)
FTER -.393 .216 -.238 .472 -.138 .286 -.073 1.071
(.524) (1.165) (.545) (1.418) (.505) (1.013) (.528) (1.272)
FTLR .403 2.546∗∗ .293 1.102 .903 2.930∗∗ .801 2.383
(1.158) (1.274) (.792) (1.432) (1.179) (1.330) (.847) (1.690)
FTMR .977 2.168 .469 1.803 1.372 2.325 .912 2.444∗
(.841) (1.549) (.762) (1.340) (.898) (1.557) (.821) (1.371)
RGDPc’75 -.263 -.064 .018 .271 -.228 -.024 .111 .489
(.246) (.253) (.269) (.335) (.270) (.256) (.279) (.343)
CMER .073 1.235 .264 1.597
(.592) (1.201) (.552) (1.111)
CMLR 1.864∗∗ 4.053∗∗∗ 1.679∗ 3.308∗∗∗
(.917) (1.182) (.877) (1.218)
CMMR 1.218 1.703 1.242 2.141
(.753) (1.624) (.861) (1.882)
Const. 2.852 1.037 -.513 -4.353 2.112 .170 -1.490 -6.646∗
(2.246) (2.551) (2.625) (3.466) (2.466) (2.744) (2.690) (3.664)
Obs. 66 66 89 89 66 66 89 89
Adj. R2 .024 .072 .055 .060
Hansen J .391 .586 .439 .495
APF-ER 4.521 3.312 3.827 7.320
APF-LR 5.319 12.488 12.334 8.601
APF-MR 8.479 9.705 11.629 25.924
Notes: The estimated OLS equation is ∆git = β1 + β2ERit + β3LRit + β4MRit + β5Xit + ∆εit,
where ∆git is the difference in the compound growth rate between the two periods. The variables
ER, LR and MR are the Early-, Late-, and Marathon reformers, respectively, as defined in the
text. The variables CM-ER, CM-LR and CM-MR are the early-, late-, and marathon reformers
in the credit market regulation as defined in the text. The variables FT-ER, FT-LR and FT-MR
are the early-, late-, and marathon reformers in the freedom to trade internationally as defined in
the text. RGDPc’75 is the real GDP per capita in 1975. Robust standard errors are presented in
parentheses. Hansen J is the P-value on the Hansen overidentification test. APF- is the value of
the Angrist-Pischke first stage F-test on the endogenous variables of interest. Data source: PWT
7.1 data; EFW 2012 index; US EIA data. Symbols: ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 2.7: Deregulation and Growth, 1975-2010: Using Rents
Level effect Acceleration effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
ER .498∗∗∗ .474∗∗∗ -1.916 -1.645
(.126) (.119) (1.546) (1.264)
LR .047 -.054 .022 .829
(.123) (.148) (1.798) (1.610)
MR .320∗ .230 1.048 1.223
(.189) (.163) (1.517) (1.173)
FTER -.049 -.088 -.072 .134 -.926 -1.876 -.355 -.665
(.149) (.234) (.125) (.191) (1.190) (2.114) (1.033) (1.401)
FTLR .121 .184 .021 .283∗ 2.498∗ .854 3.123∗∗ 1.904
(.159) (.158) (.132) (.150) (1.488) (1.446) (1.469) (1.377)
FTMR .111 .147 .093 .471∗∗ 1.407 .618 1.998 1.028
(.144) (.172) (.142) (.183) (1.395) (1.717) (1.373) (1.419)
RGDPc’75 .105∗∗ .078∗ .088∗∗∗ .058 -.092 .393 -.065 .347
(.041) (.045) (.034) (.037) (.279) (.410) (.282) (.369)
CMER .230 .184 2.404 1.046
(.207) (.164) (1.578) (1.392)
CMLR -.162 -.377∗∗∗ 3.649∗∗∗ 2.545∗∗
(.125) (.137) (1.208) (1.281)
CMMR -.139 -.290∗ 3.492∗ 2.194
(.237) (.171) (2.101) (1.735)
Const. -.876∗∗ -.467 -.649∗ -.370 1.064 -4.893 .118 -4.167
(.413) (.456) (.350) (.371) (2.881) (4.150) (2.809) (3.912)
Obs. 63 84 63 84 63 84 63 84
Hansen J .423 .070 .292 .176 .400 .651 .261 .332
APF-ER 21.265 5.337 5.345 6.594 21.265 5.337 5.345 6.594
APF-LR 26.397 3.475 24.571 1.240 26.397 3.475 24.571 1.240
APF-MR 2.588 3.543 2.545 28.718 2.588 3.543 2.545 28.718
Notes: The estimated OLS equation is ∆yit = β1 + β2ERit + β3LRit + β4MRit + β5Xit + ∆εit,
where ∆yit is the difference in either log(GDP) or the growth rate between the two periods. The
variables ER, LR and MR are the Early-, Late-, and Marathon reformers, respectively, as defined in
the text. The variables CM-ER, CM-LR and CM-MR are the early-, late-, and marathon reformers
in the credit market regulation as defined in the text. The variables FT-ER, FT-LR and FT-MR
are the early-, late-, and marathon reformers in the freedom to trade internationally as defined in
the text. RGDPc’75 is the real GDP per capita in 1975. Robust standard errors are presented in
parentheses. Hansen J is the P-value on the Hansen overidentification test. APF- is the value of
the Angrist-Pischke first stage F-test on the endogenous variables of interest. Data source: PWT
7.1 data; EFW 2012 index; US EIA data. Symbols: ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 2.8: Reforms and GDP, 1970-2010: Direct Use of Reform Indices
Overall Deregulation Credit Market Liberalization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
∆L(GDPc)t−1 -0.04 0.01 -0.00 -0.03 -0.07 -0.07
(0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05)
∆R 0.02∗∗∗ 0.10 0.08∗
(0.01) (0.10) (0.05)
∆PR 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01 0.01∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.01∗ 0.01∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
∆T 0.01∗∗ 0.00 0.01 0.01∗∗ 0.02∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
∆Open 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆L(Pop) -0.25 0.06 -0.09 -0.10 -0.14 -0.15
(0.44) (0.62) (0.51) (0.44) (0.55) (0.46)
∆L(XRat) -0.04∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)




Obs. 687 545 615 704 549 630
No. countries 139 121 115 139 121 115
Adj. R2 0.169 0.212
Hansen J 0.47 0.07 0.52 0.05
Notes: The estimated Panel OLS equation is ∆Log(GDPc)it = β2∆L(GDPc)it−1 +
β3∆(CM)Rit+β4∆PRit+β5∆Tit+∆X’itβ+∆εit. L(GDPc)t−1 is the lagged Log(GDP)
per capita; R, CMR, PR and T are country-specific indices of overall regulation, credit
market regulation, property rights and trade policies, respectively. The variables Open,
L(Pop) and L(XRat) are the sum of exports and imports in GDP, log of population and
log of the country’s exchange rate to the US dollar, respectively. Clustered standard
errors are presented for the OLS and 2SLS estimations in parentheses. Hansen J is the
P-value on the Hansen overidentification J test. Data source: PWT 7.1 data; EFW 2012
index; US EIA data. Symbols: ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 2.9: Reforms and GDP, 1970-2010: A Country Reformed if Rit > Rit−1
Overall Deregulation Credit Market Liberalization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
∆L(GDPc)t−1 -0.05 0.09 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05
(0.04) (0.16) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
∆R 0.02∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.06
(0.01) (0.20) (0.12)
∆PR 0.02∗∗ 0.04 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.01 0.02∗∗
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
∆T 0.04∗∗∗ -0.04 0.03∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.03∗ 0.03∗∗
(0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
∆Open 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆L(Pop) -0.08 0.96 -0.06 -0.08 0.09 -0.05
(0.45) (0.81) (0.50) (0.45) (0.56) (0.47)
∆L(XRat) -0.03∗∗∗ -0.02 -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)




Obs. 687 545 615 704 549 630
No. countries 139 121 115 139 121 115
Adj. R2 0.189 0.202
Hansen J 0.49 0.05 0.40 0.09
Notes: The estimated Panel OLS equation is ∆Log(GDPc)it = β2∆L(GDPc)it−1 +
β3∆(CM)Rit+β4∆PRit+β5∆Tit+∆X’itβ+∆εit. L(GDPc)t−1 is the lagged Log(GDP)
per capita; R, CMR, PR and T are dummies = 1 if Iit > (Iit−1), where Iit are country-
specific indices of overall regulation, credit market regulation, property rights and trade
policies, respectively. The variables Open, L(Pop) and L(XRat) are the sum of exports
and imports in GDP, log of population and log of the country’s exchange rate to the
US dollar, respectively. Clustered standard errors are presented for the OLS and 2SLS
estimations in parentheses. Hansen J is the P-value on the Hansen overidentification J
test. Data source: PWT 7.1 data; EFW 2012 index; US EIA data. Symbols: ∗ p < .10,
∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 2.10: Reforms and GDP, 1970-2010: A Country Reformed if Rit >
Median(Ri)
Overall Deregulation Credit Market Liberalization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
∆L(GDPc)t−1 -0.08∗∗ -0.11∗ -0.03 -0.08∗∗ -0.10 -0.07
(0.04) (0.07) (0.09) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05)
∆R 0.02 0.23 -0.28
(0.01) (0.16) (0.25)
∆PR 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
∆T 0.04∗∗∗ 0.03 0.08∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.01 0.05∗
(0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
∆Open 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆L(Pop) 0.26 0.13 0.30 0.23 -0.02 0.25
(0.32) (0.37) (0.45) (0.31) (0.39) (0.35)
∆L(XRat) -0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.03∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)




Obs. 782 600 715 793 600 723
No. countries 142 139 132 142 139 132
Adj. R2 0.151 0.163
Hansen J 0.35 0.27 0.22 0.14
Notes: The estimated Panel OLS equation is ∆Log(GDPc)it = β2∆L(GDPc)it−1 +
β3∆(CM)Rit+β4∆PRit+β5∆Tit+∆X’itβ+∆εit. L(GDPc)t−1 is the lagged Log(GDP)
per capita; R, CMR, PR and T are dummies = 1 if Iit > Median(Ii), where It are
country-specific indices of overall regulation, credit market regulation, property rights
and trade policies, respectively. The variables Open, L(Pop) and L(XRat) are the sum
of exports and imports in GDP, log of population and log of the country’s exchange
rate to the US dollar, respectively. Clustered standard errors are presented for the
OLS and 2SLS estimations in parentheses. Hansen J is the P-value on the Hansen
overidentification J test. Data source: PWT 7.1 data; EFW 2012 index; US EIA data.
Symbols: ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 2.11: Reforms and GDP, 1970-2010: A Country Reformed if Rit >
Mean(Ri)
Overall Deregulation Credit Market Liberalization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
∆L(GDPc)t−1 -0.08∗∗ -0.06 -0.08∗ -0.09∗∗ -0.19∗ -0.01
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.11) (0.09)
∆R 0.03∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ -0.08
(0.01) (0.11) (0.17)
∆PR 0.02∗ 0.02 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.00 0.03∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
∆T 0.04∗∗∗ -0.01 0.05 0.03∗∗∗ -0.03 0.07∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03)
∆Open 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆L(Pop) 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.22 -0.03 0.29
(0.32) (0.33) (0.37) (0.31) (0.38) (0.42)
∆L(XRat) -0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.04∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)




Obs. 782 600 715 793 600 723
No. countries 142 139 132 142 139 132
Adj. R2 0.149 0.160
Hansen J 0.11 0.14 0.25 0.23
Notes: The estimated Panel OLS equation is ∆Log(GDPc)it = β2∆L(GDPc)it−1 +
β3∆(CM)Rit+β4∆PRit+β5∆Tit+∆X’itβ+∆εit. L(GDPc)t−1 is the lagged Log(GDP)
per capita; R, CMR, PR and T are dummies = 1 if Iit > Mean(Ii), where It are country-
specific indices of overall regulation, credit market regulation, property rights and trade
policies, respectively. The variables Open, L(Pop) and L(XRat) are the sum of exports
and imports in GDP, log of population and log of the country’s exchange rate to the
US dollar, respectively. Clustered standard errors are presented for the OLS and 2SLS
estimations in parentheses. Hansen J is the P-value on the Hansen overidentification J
test. Data source: PWT 7.1 data; EFW 2012 index; US EIA data. Symbols: ∗ p < .10,
∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 2.12: Reforms and Growth, 1970-2010: Direct Use of Reform Indices
Overall Deregulation Credit Market Liberalization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
∆git−1 -0.43∗∗∗ -0.36∗∗∗ -0.41∗∗∗ -0.43∗∗∗ -0.42∗∗∗ -0.40∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.08) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
∆R 0.79∗∗∗ 7.12∗∗ -0.17
(0.21) (2.86) (2.00)
∆PR 0.28∗∗ 0.12 0.28∗∗ 0.25∗ 0.15 0.30∗∗
(0.13) (0.33) (0.13) (0.13) (0.18) (0.14)
∆T 0.38∗∗∗ -0.43 0.50∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.12 0.64∗∗
(0.13) (0.44) (0.29) (0.14) (0.39) (0.26)
∆Open 0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
∆L(Pop) -9.48 6.46 -2.30 -4.72 2.47 -3.32
(12.70) (19.81) (13.58) (13.61) (17.05) (13.01)
∆L(XRat) -0.52∗∗∗ -0.03 -0.48∗∗∗ -0.41∗∗∗ -0.31 -0.61∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.30) (0.16) (0.10) (0.28) (0.19)




Obs. 634 535 565 645 539 574
No. countries 139 118 111 139 118 111
Adj. R2 0.298 0.344
Hansen J 0.42 0.10 0.33 0.12
Notes: The estimated Panel OLS equation is ∆git = β2∆git−1 + β3∆(CM)Rit +
β4∆PRit + β5∆Tit + ∆X’itβ + ∆εit. git is the country-specific compound growth rate.;
R, CMR, PR and T are country-specific indices of overall regulation, credit market reg-
ulation, property rights and trade policies, respectively. The variables Open, L(Pop)
and L(XRat) are the sum of exports and imports in GDP, log of population and log of
the country’s exchange rate to the US dollar, respectively. Clustered standard errors are
presented for the OLS and 2SLS estimations in parentheses. Hansen J is the P-value on
the Hansen overidentification J test. Data source: PWT 7.1 data; EFW 2012 index; US
EIA data. Symbols: ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 2.13: Reforms and Growth, 1970-2010: A Country Reformed if Rt >
Rt−1
Overall Deregulation Credit Market Liberalization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
∆git−1 -0.43∗∗∗ -0.47∗∗∗ -0.41∗∗∗ -0.43∗∗∗ -0.42∗∗∗ -0.42∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.12) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)
∆R 0.57∗ 20.54∗∗∗ -1.56
(0.33) (4.95) (6.57)
∆PR 0.04 0.81 -0.08 -0.02 -0.33 0.01
(0.24) (1.02) (0.55) (0.26) (0.34) (0.26)
∆T 0.95∗∗∗ -1.39 1.22∗ 0.78∗∗ 0.55 0.79
(0.34) (1.15) (0.69) (0.32) (0.56) (0.50)
∆Open 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.02∗ 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
∆L(Pop) -4.86 26.35 -2.77 -9.77 4.56 -0.77
(13.91) (24.94) (13.42) (12.54) (16.51) (14.14)
∆L(XRat) -0.43∗∗∗ -0.20 -0.47∗∗ -0.49∗∗∗ -0.33∗ -0.33∗
(0.11) (0.46) (0.20) (0.11) (0.18) (0.17)




Obs. 634 535 565 645 539 574
No. countries 139 118 111 139 118 111
Adj. R2 0.314 0.288
Hansen J 0.60 0.07 0.35 0.10
Notes: The estimated Panel OLS equation is ∆git = β2∆git−1 + β3∆(CM)Rit +
β4∆PRit + β5∆Tit + ∆X’itβ + ∆εit. git is the country-specific compound growth rate.;
R, CMR, PR and T are dummies = 1 if It > It−1, where It are country-specific indices
of overall regulation, credit market regulation, property rights and trade policies, respec-
tively. The variables Open, L(Pop) and L(XRat) are the sum of exports and imports
in GDP, log of population and log of the country’s exchange rate to the US dollar, re-
spectively. Clustered standard errors are presented for the OLS and 2SLS estimations
in parentheses. Hansen J is the P-value on the Hansen overidentification J test. Data
source: PWT 7.1 data; EFW 2012 index; US EIA data. Symbols: ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05,
∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 2.14: Reforms and Growth, 1970-2010: A Country Reformed if Rit >
Median(Ri)
Overall Deregulation Credit Market Liberalization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
∆git−1 -0.44∗∗∗ -0.47∗∗∗ -0.39∗∗∗ -0.45∗∗∗ -0.50∗∗∗ -0.44∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.03) (0.07) (0.10)
∆R 0.24 7.48 -10.85
(0.34) (8.03) (8.35)
∆PR 0.02 0.22 -0.13 0.02 0.03 -0.01
(0.28) (0.53) (0.54) (0.29) (0.54) (0.40)
∆T 1.07∗∗∗ 0.68 2.28∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗ 0.32 0.91
(0.29) (0.68) (1.14) (0.32) (0.67) (1.39)
∆Open 0.00 -0.01 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
∆L(Pop) 2.89 -0.12 7.20 2.87 -3.88 3.67
(9.95) (12.29) (14.27) (9.12) (12.58) (11.38)
∆L(XRat) -0.38∗∗∗ -0.06 -1.03∗∗ -0.34∗∗∗ 0.27 -0.29
(0.11) (0.42) (0.49) (0.10) (0.36) (1.08)




Obs. 686 577 617 691 577 620
No. countries 142 130 122 142 130 122
Adj. R2 0.313 0.303
Hansen J 0.43 0.83 0.51 0.14
Notes: The estimated Panel OLS equation is ∆git = β2∆git−1 + β3∆(CM)Rit +
β4∆PRit + β5∆Tit + ∆X’itβ + ∆εit. git is the country-specific compound growth rate.;
R, CMR, PR and T are dummies = 1 if Iit > Median(Ii), where It are country-specific
indices of overall regulation, credit market regulation, property rights and trade policies,
respectively. The variables Open, L(Pop) and L(XRat) are the sum of exports and im-
ports in GDP, log of population and log of the country’s exchange rate to the US dollar,
respectively. Clustered standard errors are presented for the OLS and 2SLS estimations
in parentheses. Hansen J is the P-value on the Hansen overidentification J test. Data
source: PWT 7.1 data; EFW 2012 index; US EIA data. Symbols: ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05,
∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 2.15: Reforms and Growth, 1970-2010: A Country Reformed if Rit >
Mean(Ri)
Overall Deregulation Credit Market Liberalization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
∆git−1 -0.43∗∗∗ -0.42∗∗∗ -0.45∗∗∗ -0.45∗∗∗ -0.55∗∗∗ -0.34∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.10) (0.08)
∆R 0.73∗∗ 6.84 -7.84
(0.36) (5.86) (7.86)
∆PR 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.04 -0.27 0.44
(0.28) (0.39) (0.39) (0.29) (0.58) (0.50)
∆T 0.87∗∗∗ 0.02 2.08∗ 1.03∗∗∗ -1.14 1.91∗∗
(0.31) (0.79) (1.21) (0.33) (1.01) (0.87)
∆Open 0.00 -0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
∆L(Pop) 2.18 2.83 3.32 2.05 -6.63 7.50
(9.88) (9.84) (13.58) (9.14) (12.51) (12.55)
∆L(XRat) -0.35∗∗∗ -0.18 -0.68∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗ 0.26 -0.78∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.24) (0.31) (0.10) (0.39) (0.28)




Obs. 686 577 617 691 577 620
No. countries 142 130 122 142 130 122
Adj. R2 0.313 0.298
Hansen J 0.49 0.41 0.52 0.52
Notes: The estimated Panel OLS equation is ∆git = β2∆git−1 + β3∆(CM)Rit +
β4∆PRit + β5∆Tit + ∆X’itβ + ∆εit. git is the country-specific compound growth rate.;
R, CMR, PR and T are dummies = 1 if Iit > Mean(Ii), where It are country-specific
indices of overall regulation, credit market regulation, property rights and trade policies,
respectively. The variables Open, L(Pop) and L(XRat) are the sum of exports and im-
ports in GDP, log of population and log of the country’s exchange rate to the US dollar,
respectively. Clustered standard errors are presented for the OLS and 2SLS estimations
in parentheses. Hansen J is the P-value on the Hansen overidentification J test. Data
source: PWT 7.1 data; EFW 2012 index; US EIA data. Symbols: ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05,
∗∗∗ p < .01
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Chapter 3
Firm Size, Market Liberalization
and Growth1




Suppose an identical market-oriented reform is adopted simultaneously across
a number of countries. Will the reformers be affected identically? This paper
argues they will not, and looks for the reasons behind an eventual outcome
divergence. The explanation offered here, and the main hypothesis of this
work, is that economic liberalization – i.e., the state’s withdrawal from its
legal powers to direct pricing, entry and exit on a given market (Winston,
1993) – affects firms of different size differently. Then, if two countries go
through identical reforms but their firm size distributions are ex-ante differ-
ent, the two economies will react differently to the reform. Naturally, the
argument extends to more than two economies and to more than one liberal-
ization reform. It also produces a variety of reform outcomes across countries
and possibly over time.
Previous work has shown that, indeed, different economies may benefit
differently from an identical reform. For example, Aghion et al. (2007) use
industry-level data to demonstrate that entry liberalization affects different
industries differently. More specifically, industries closer to the technology
frontier would be affected more by entry liberalization and would innovate
more than backward industries in order to prevent entry. Thus, countries
closer to the world technology frontier benefit more from a liberalization
reform because they have a higher share of innovating industries. As a result,
those countries also grow faster after a reform.
By using firm-level data and linking it with country-level reforms, I find
that although firms closer to the technology frontier do innovate more, they
do not do so as a result of market-oriented reforms. This finding motivates
me to argue that the literature has largely ignored one of the important and
at the same time intuitive determinants of reform outcome divergence across
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countries. In this work, I hypothesize that it is the firm size, among other
factors, which drives the different impact of identical liberalization reforms
on firm growth across countries. I test this hypothesis by using data on sales
and sales per worker of more than 110,000 firm-level observations in 135
developing and post-transition economies, collected between 2000 and 2011.
Firm sales and sales per worker are conditioned on country data on credit
market liberalization reforms, on an overall economic liberalization reform,
as well as on other aggregate and firm-level observables.
The advantage of having firm-level data in this study is that reform im-
pact is studied at a level at which it allegedly matters most for growth, and
where the growth decisions are actually taken: the firm. This work finds
sufficient evidence to conclude that the cross-country variation in firm size
distributions before the reform takes place is one of the drivers behind growth
divergence across countries after similar market-oriented reforms.
The next sections illustrate how the literature around this problem evolved,
including why it could be assumed that the firm-size distribution (FSD) is
exogenous to policy changes in the short run.
3.2 Literature Review
3.2.1 Overall Impact of Market Liberalization on Growth
Since George Stigler and his coworkers pioneered the rigorous study on the
effects of various regulations in the 1960s,2 a vast literature emerged on how
product-, labor- and capital-market liberalization affect entry, exit, employ-
ment, investment and productivity, among other determinants of economic
growth. The literature moved from studying specific regulations (e.g. price
or quantity) within a specific industry (e.g. trucking or airlines) in the 1980s
2See Stigler (1988, p.116-118) for a brief history of that work.
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to broader studies of how regulation affects growth, growth factors or liv-
ing standards across countries. Examples of the latter include Djankov et
al. (2002) and Botero et al. (2004) on regulations of entry and labor, re-
spectively. Along similar lines, Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) investigate the
significant negative effects of hampering entry liberalization on job creation,
while Alesina et al. (2005) establish a positive relationship between product
market liberalization and investment in seven big OECD industries.
The work by Alesina et al. (2005) was extended by using firm-level data
from both developed and developing economies, which include both small and
large firms. In three studies Ardagna and Lusardi (2008, 2009a, 2009b) find
that more cumbersome entry and labor regulations discourage firm entry, and
that the effects are unequal across a number of individual firm characteristics.
Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2006) also show that entry rates by firms are
significantly affected by entry regulations, and further conclude that stricter
entry regulations result in larger entering firms but also slower firm growth
afterwards. In effect, aggregate growth slows down because of slower firm
growth.
More recently, empirical works rely on firm-level data, in which micro
and small firms represent the sample majority, thereby making the results
more credible. Commander and Svejnar (2011) link firm performance from
the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance (BEEPS) data with a
wide range of institutional constraints on firm growth. Contrary to previous
empirical findings, they do not support the hypothesis that institutional con-
straints matter for firm performance in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)
and the former Soviet Union, and find that country fixed effects are per-
haps the main determinant of firm performance in the region. Commander
and Nikoloski (2010) use more countries than Commander and Svejnar and
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also find that the relationship between institutions, as measured in the Do-
ing Business Database, and firm performance, is not robust across countries.
Specifically, firms in countries belonging to different income groups are af-
fected differently by reforms, with the reforms having the expected positive
sign only in high- and upper-middle income groups.
Although Commander and Nikoloski (2010) control for firm size, they do
not use firm size as a factor which, if combined with the effect of the reform,
could determine differences in reform outcomes across countries. There is an
emerging body of empirical evidence of differences in the responses of small
and large firms to various types of liberalization reforms.
3.2.2 The Effect of Economic Liberalization across Firms
of Different Size
Studies in various lines of empirical literature on liberalization – especially
trade and financial liberalization – document a differential effect of reforms
on firms of different size. The differential impact of the trade liberalization
between Turkey and the EU on small and large firms is studied by Erzan and
Filiztekin (1997). Their conclusion is that small firms’ value-added growth
decreased after the introduction of the Customs Union (CU) with the Euro-
pean Union, while the impact on large firms was mostly insignificant.
The reason for different reform outcomes for small and large firms is of-
ten described in the IO literature as “compliance asymmetries.” In particular,
Millimet (2003) argues that smaller firms are disadvantaged in their resources
to investigate and challenge legislative changes. Therefore, economic liberal-
ization may have disproportionate effects on firms of different size. Moreover,
large firms spread the fixed compliance costs attributed to a given regulation
over a larger output which gives them a cost advantage.
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The finance literature also analyses the difference between the effects
of financial regulation on the costs of small and large firms. For example,
Franks, Schaefer, and Staunton (1997) find that the ratio between the direct
and indirect compliance costs of financial regulations tends to decrease with
size. Consequently, larger firms are also less affected by financial regulations.
Contrary to this conclusion, Bena and Jurajda (2007) find little evidence of
a differential effect of financial development across firm size, conditional on
the firms reaching a certain minimum size (in their data it is 100 employees
and 20 million Euro of total assets).
Aghion et al. (2007) provide a strong intuition as to why identical re-
forms may exert a different effect across different economies. The core of
their argument is that firms closer to the technology frontier would benefit
from the easing of industry entry more than the backward firms because they
innovate more to deter entry, and find industry-level evidence for this differ-
ential impact. In a supporting study, Bourlès, Cette, Lopez, Mairesse, and
Nicoletti (2010) find that industries closer to the technology frontier would
benefit more from liberalizing product market regulations, thus extending
the argumentation in Aghion et al. (2007).
However, micro-level evidence presented further in this work suggests that
it is not necessarily the position on the technology ladder that determines the
different reaction of firms to liberalization reform. Rather, it is the size of the
firm. Therefore, it can be argued that if the firm-size distributions across two
economies are different, then an identical reform may have different growth
impacts because firms of different size react differently to liberalization. The
next section illustrates the differences observed in the firm-size distributions
(FSDs) across countries and argues why those differences matter for deliver-
ing different reform outcomes across countries.
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3.3 Firm-size Distributions across Countries
Establishing any evidence of a differential effect of an identical reform across
countries hinges on several important questions. First, are there significant
differences in the firm-size distributions (FSDs) across countries? If the FSDs
are the same, then the reform outcomes across countries would hardly be sig-
nificantly different, even if small and large firms are found to grow differently
after the reform. Second, do reforms influence those distributions? If FSDs
are influenced by the reforms over short periods of time, then the FSDs
themselves would be endogenous to the liberalization reforms. Therefore, it
is important to know whether one can take the FSDs as exogenous at least
in a cross-sectional setting. Third, are the cross-country growth differences
affected by the differences in the FSDs? If they are, then a reform could
not only have a different effect on firms of different size but it could also
bring aggregate reform implications across countries. This part of the paper
addresses each of these questions.
Over recent decades there have been substantial efforts to explain the
statistical regularities behind FSDs both within and across countries, and
over time. Gabaix (2009) reviews the evidence that FSDs in developed coun-
tries are found to have a Zipf distribution, at least in their upper tails.3
However, in some developed countries such as Japan (Kaizoji, Iyetomi, &
Ikeda, 2005), and most notably in the developing world, this regularity in
FSDs is harder to observe, as the data presented here and additional evi-
dence suggests.4 In addition, looking at the figures below, it is obvious that
3Following Gabaix (2009), the Zipf distribution in firm size essentially means that the
probability of a firm size S being greater than x is inversely proportional to x. More
formally, P (S > x) ' kx−α, and in the particular case of Zipf distribution, α ' 1.
4For some differences in the FSDs between the developed and the developing world,
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Figure 3.1: Firm-Size Distributions of Employment and Assets
there are marked differences in FSDs across major regions of the world, espe-
cially in the small-firm segments of the distributions.5 Those differences are
also observed within each of those regions and may be explained by several
theoretical and empirical arguments.
First, many young firms operate in the small-firm segment. Those firms’
growth is more volatile (Alexander, 1949; Samuels & Smyth, 1968). They
grow faster as well but are also more likely to fail (Dunne, Roberts, & Samuel-
son, 1989; Jovanovic, 1982; Mansfield, 1962; Mata, 1994). The snapshots
of FSDs in Figure 3.1(a) and Figure 3.1(b) capture marked differences in the
FSDs across major world regions exactly in the small firms segment [below 20
employees in Figure 3.1(a) and below USD 2.5m in assets in Figure 3.1(b)].
Second, trade theory produces a well-known proposition that different
countries specialize in different industries.6 If there is a different evolution
of FSDs across industries, then the within-country industry specialization
would give rise to divergent evolutions of FSDs across countries depending
on their industrial structure.
5The first and the last percentiles of each tail are removed.
6See Heckscher-Ohlin and Rybczynski theorems.
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Third, significant differences in FSDs across industries within a period
(Rossi-Hansberg & Wright, 2007) and different evolutions of FSDs across
industries have been documented (Lotti & Santarelli, 2004). Lotti and
Santarelli (2004) study FSDs of new entrants in several industries and find
they vary across their minimum-efficient scale and technological require-
ments. Technology is also found to be an important factor generating differ-
ences in FSDs across industries by Marsili (2005). These facts might explain
the differences in FSDs at a point in time across countries.
However, despite the marked cross-country differences in FSDs, and de-
spite the documented underlying evolutionary process towards an equilibrium
FSD within an industry (Hashemi, 2000, 2003), the within-country distribu-
tions are relatively stable, as found by Cabral and Mata (2003) and Henly and
Sánchez (2009). Cabral and Mata (2003) also note that the FSD of a given
cohort of firms changes slowly over time, while Henly and Sánchez (2009)
add that the within-industry FSD changes over long periods of time and the
within-country FSD stays unchanged. Doi and Cowling (1998) assert that in
some countries (e.g., Japan) the share of output and employment across size
classes is relatively constant over long periods of time, while in others (e.g.,
the UK) they change only slowly in favor of smaller firms. Axtell (2001) also
concludes that FSDs are stable over time, at the same time being robust to
the employed definition of firm size. Then, it can be assumed that FSDs
are stable over relatively short periods of time, such as the one examined
in this work, and are not affected by economic liberalization reforms in the
short-run.
Naturally, the above exogeneity assumption does not mean the within-
country and within-industry FSDs evolve independently as mere statistical
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regularities.7 After all, the differences in FSDs across countries came from
an underlying difference in some fundamental factor. Lucas (1978) argues
that FSD is underlined by a distribution of managerial talent. Thus, differ-
ent countries end up having different FSDs depending on the international
allocation of talent. At the same time, countries with lower quality of institu-
tions and enforcement of property rights have a different allocation of talent
into productive and rent-seeking occupations (Murphy, Shleifer, & Vishny,
1991). Thus, it is tempting to explain the observed cross-country differences
in FSDs with different underlying institutions and property rights systems.
Finally, there are emerging implications in the FSD literature that FSDs
are correlated with cross-country income differences (Alfaro et al., 2008;
Gabaix, 2009). This evidence contributes to the understanding that FSDs
are an important determinant of cross-country differences in the growth ef-
fects of reforms.
In a nutshell, both the firm-level data used here and the size distribution
literature point to significant differences in FSDs across countries. However,
policies seem to do little to affect the evolution of FSDs over short periods of
time within a country. Rather, FSDs are more likely to be driven by within-
industry product life cycles that have more to do with fundamentals such as
preferences and factor endowments that affect industry specialization than
with policies. Thus, it is legitimate to assume both the FSD within a country
and the cross-country differences in FSDs as given, at least in a short panel,
and especially in a cross-sectional data setting. However, the variation in
the FSDs also affects the cross-country income differences. Thus, it is very
intuitive to hypothesize that an identical policy would have a different impact
across countries based on its different effect on small and large firms. The
7See Sutton (1997, 2007) for extensive discussions on FSD evolution.
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empirical strategy to test this hypothesis is presented below.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
3.4.1 Confronting Previous Evidence
Does economic liberalization influence firms of different size differently? I
answer the question by considering the papers of Aghion et al. (2007) and
Bourlès et al. (2010) as a starting point, and contribute to their works in
several ways.
First, instead of using industry-level data, this work uses data with more
than 110,000 firm-level observations, which spans a richer set of industries
than the manufacturing data in Aghion et al. (2007) or in Bourlès et al.
(2010). Besides manufacturing, the data set used here includes trade and
other services, although it covers an admittedly lower number of countries
than Aghion et al. (2007). The main advantage of the data set here is that
it is able to reveal the actual decisions about innovation and growth at the
firm level.
Second, I abstain from the definition of distance to the technological
frontier in Aghion et al. (2007), which is more relevant at the industry level.
Instead, I assume that firms have a good knowledge of the level of technology
of their main competitors and of their own technology, and are able to com-
pare them. This also assumes firms optimize based on the decisions of their
nearest rival. If this reasoning is legitimate, three possibilities arise. Specifi-
cally, the firm can have a more advanced, a similar or an inferior technology
to its closest rival. After classifying firms into these three broad categories,
I estimate the following probit model:
P (yi = 1|Xi) = Φ(β0 + β1ADVi + β2LAGi + β4ADViRj +
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+β5LAGiRj + β6Rj + Z
′
iβ + fs + εi), (3.1)
where P (yi = 1|Xi) is the probability of obtaining an ISO certification or of
introducing a significant innovation in the firm’s product line after economic
liberalization. I further condition the firm’s behavior on its relative position
on the technology ladder: ADVi and LAGi are dummy variables indicating
that a given firm has a superior (advanced, ADV ) or inferior (lagging, LAG)
technology compared to its main rivals; Rj is a measure of how liberalized
economic policies in country j are, as measured by Worldwide Governance
Indicators (WGI), by the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) data, and
by Heritage Foundation Data (HFD);8 ADViRj and LAGiRj are interactions
between the technological standpoint of the firm and the liberalization vari-
able to indicate the impact of liberalization on each step of the technology
ladder relative to the firms that have about the same technology as their
main competitor. Finally, the vector Z
′
i includes other firm-level controls
relevant for the innovation process such as the age of the firm, the experience
of top management, sales in the previous period and the size of the firm;
fs are time-invariant sector effects; εi is an error term that I assume to be
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables and the Φ function has a normal
distribution so that the parameter estimates in the above equation represent
the direction of the impact of being a technologically advanced or inferior
firm to the probability of innovation after the reform takes place.
By applying this methodology, this work answers the following question:
Do technologically advanced firms innovate more after an economic liberal-
ization reform? If indeed technologically advanced firms innovate more after
a reform, then the theory by Aghion et al. (2007) would be supported by
stronger firm-level evidence and by an empirical strategy that uses a direct
8See the data description for further details on these.
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comparison with the distance to the frontier from a firm’s point of view.
However, if advanced firms do not innovate more after a reform, then per-
haps an alternative explanation would be needed on why different firms react
differently to economic liberalization.
The firm-level evidence in favor of the above theory is mixed at best. It
is presented in Table 3.1. Indeed, consistent with Aghion et al. (2007) and
with Bourlès et al. (2010), technologically advanced firms innovate more,
and backward firms innovate less than firms whose technology is about the
same as the technology of their main competitors. However, the interaction
between the level of technology and the reform is rarely significant, and if it
is, its significance is not robust across different data sets measuring economic
liberalization. Therefore, there is not enough support at the firm level for the
evidence that the distance to the technological frontier drives the differential
impact of economic reforms across countries, and perhaps a new explanation
is in order. The new explanation is based on the hypothesis that small and
large firms react differently to reforms. The methods to test this hypothesis
are presented below.
3.4.2 Estimation Strategy
To test the hypothesis that firms of different size grow differently after eco-
nomic liberalization, I estimate the following baseline model for the growth
of firm i in country k at time t:
log Yikt = α0 + α1 log Yikt−1 + α2logKikt + α3logLikt +
+α4CMRktSikt + α5RktSikt + α6RoLktSikt +
+α7TktSikt + Z
′
iktα + fst + fkt + εikt,
where log Yikt stands for either sales, logSALikt, or the sales per worker,
logSPWikt, of firm i in country k in period t. In addition, logKikt and
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logLikt are the value of total assets and the labor costs, respectively, to
estimate the impact of the main factors of production;9 CMRkt, Rkt, RoLkt
and Tkt are the indices of credit market regulation, overall regulation, the
rule of law, and international trade policies, respectively, for country k in
period t, taken from EFW indices;10 Sikt is the size of the firm measured by
either the log-number of employees or by the log-value of assets; Z
′
ikt is a
vector of firm observables, including whether the firm has obtained an ISO
certification, to capture some differences in the growth of firms with different
levels of technology and more sophisticated management procedures, legal
structure, age of the firm and top manager experience.
Further, in order to capture common but temporary shocks to firm perfor-
mance within an industry or a country, the model includes industry-specific
and country-specific dummies for each of the years available in the sample.
The interactions of the country dummies with the year dummies would also
capture the overall reform processes happening in the country. That is why
the model does not include liberalization indices as distinct explanatory vari-
ables – they are captured by the country-year dummies. Finally, εikt is the
error term about which it is assumed, at least for now, to be distributed nor-
mally with a zero mean, and to satisfy classic linear regression assumptions.
As the reform indices vary only on the country level, firm-level variation
is introduced by interacting the indices with the log-number of employees or
the log-value of assets of the firm. The interaction captures how differently
small and large firms grow after financial liberalization, after overall eco-
9When sales per worker is the main explained variable, logKikt and logLikt are trans-
formed into capital per worker by dividing total assets by the number of employees.
10An increase in the CMRkt index means financial liberalization, an increase in the
Rkt index means overall economic liberalization on labor, product, and credit markets, an
increase in the RoLkt index means strengthening the rule of law, and an increase in Tkt
means trade liberalization.
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nomic liberalization reforms and after strengthening the rule of law. Thus,
the interaction terms CMRktSikt, RktSikt, RoLktSikt and TktSikt address the
main question of this work, and αi, i ∈ [4; 7] are the parameters of primary
interest. If significant, they would demonstrate that firms of different sizes
react differently to reforms. If the estimates are positive, then larger firms
grow more than smaller firms after a given reform.
If we take the above equation as it is, we will have to assume, at least
implicitly, that Kikt, Likt and the interaction terms are exogenous variables,
which would be a strong assumption. For various reasons, all of the right
hand-side variables in the above equation, except perhaps the size variable
Sikt, are endogenous.11 Therefore, both the identification and estimation of
their parameters would require constructing a system of equations in which
the endogenous variables in the baseline equation are being explained by some
other factors outside of the baseline equation rather than being assumed as
“weakly exogenous.” This system is as follows:
log Yikt = α0 + α1 log Yikt−1 + α2logKikt + α3logLikt +
+α4CMRktSikt + α5RktSikt + α6RoLktSikt +
+α7TktSikt + Z
′
iktα + fst + fkt + ε1ikt (3.2)
log Yikt−1 = ρ0 + ρ1 log Yikt−2 + ρ2logKikt−1 + ρ3logLikt−1 +
+ρ4CMRkt−1Sikt−1 + ρ5Rkt−1Sikt−1 + ρ6RoLkt−1Sikt−1 +
11Naturally, the size Sikt is also endogenous. For the purposes of this work however, I
take it as exogenous. The literature review demonstrates that the size distribution of firms
is changing only slowly, and within a cross-section of data can be taken as independent
from the policy changes. Then, if a given reform is enacted in some countries, it will be the
initial size distribution variation that would determine the differences in the reaction of the
economy, while the second-order effects of the liberalization reform, which run through the
within-country changes of the size distribution, would appear only after a slow adjustment
process. Then, this longer-term margin of adjustment is irrelevant in a cross-section of
firms. Yet, I acknowledge the need to address the issue of endogenous firm-size adjustment




ikt−1ρ+ fst−1 + fkt−1 + ε2ikt−1 (3.3)
logKikt = β0 + β1 logKikt−1 + β2 log rikt + β3 log rikt−1 +
+β4log Yikt−1 + β5Rkt + β6Rkt−1 +
+β7RoLkt + β8RoLkt−1 + ε3ikt (3.4)
logLikt = γ0 + γ1 logLikt−1 + γ2 logwikt + γ3 logwikt−1 +
+γ4log Yikt−1 + γ5Rkt + γ6Rkt−1 +
+γ7RoLkt + γ8RoLkt−1 + ε4ikt (3.5)
CMRktSikt = δ0 + δ1CMRkt−1Sikt−1 + δ2CMRkt−2Sikt−2 +
+δ3Ckt + ε5ikt (3.6)
RktSikt = η0 + η1Rkt−1Sikt−1 + η2Rkt−2Sikt−2 +
+η3Ckt + ε6ikt (3.7)
RoLktSikt = θ0 + θ1RoLkt−1Sikt−1 + θ2RoLkt−2Sikt−2 +
+θ3Ckt + ε7ikt (3.8)
TktSikt = µ0 + µ1Tkt−1Sikt−1 + µ2Tkt−2Sikt−2 +
+µ3Ckt + ε8ikt, (3.9)
where the demand for production factors depends on present and lagged val-
ues of the exogenously determined factor prices, on the levels of the employed
factors and on the output in previous periods, and on the policy determi-
nants of the firm growth; the endogenous interaction terms depend on the
past levels thereof, as well as on some country characteristic Ckt.
The reasons for building such a system are based on theory and intuition.
First of all, basic economic intuition suggests that labor and capital demand
would depend on prices. In addition, the input prices from the previous
periods are included because the change in relative prices between labor
and capital in the past may also influence the factor demand decisions in
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the current period. Further, the past values of the inputs are included as
exogenous variables. It is not unreasonable to assume that if the firm overshot
its labor demand in the last period, it may downsize in the current period, or
if the managers of the firm had too few fixed assets in the last period, they
may want to invest more this period. Also, if a firm had a good year, it may
wish to expand by buying more capital and labor services the following year.
This is the intuition to include also the previous values of sales or sales per
worker in the factor demand decisions.
Finally, the decisions of the government on how much to liberalize depend
on how much regulation there is in the first place. For example, if a country
has liberalized extensively in the past periods and now the level of the overall
regulatory burden is low, it may not need to reform much further. Also, the
decision on how much to liberalize depends on some purely country-specific
characteristic such as the political orientation of the incumbent government,
the legal origin, the history of regional conflicts, or the resource endowments.
This system has its limitations as well. Its design is intended to capture
a rather short-term effect of reforms on the growth of firms, or, alternatively,
use a cross-country variation in reforms to answer an inherently dynamic
question. Also, some reforms take much longer to affect hiring and investment
decisions. Therefore, the system may miss any reform benefits for the firm
that materialize over a longer term. A much longer panel of firms may
address the longer-term effect of reforms more properly. In this case, it is
data limitations affecting the decision to include only one lag of reforms:
there is only one lag in the data spanning over 3 years for all firms. To
capture any reform effect over the growth of firms within that period, I also
estimate the above system in differences. The results are much stronger than
estimating equation (3.2) in levels, and are discussed below. However, the
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cost of differencing is a massive loss of observations as fewer firms have lagged
data on sales, assets, labor costs and number of workers.
Differencing the firm-level performance indicators has another advantage
over estimating the model in levels. When the model is run in levels, non-
stationary variables like sales and sales per worker remain on both sides of
the equation. This could lead to potentially spurious results indicated by
a very high R2 and a high statistical significance of most estimates. If the
underlying data was a long panel, the solution would be to run panel unit root
tests, log-difference the data, and then estimate the model in differences with
individual fixed effects. With the current data, however, it is not possible to
credibly do the panel unit root testing because the maximum number of lags
in the data is just one, and most of the firms are observed in one period only
which further impedes testing. Therefore, checking for potential stationarity
in the data had to be done in an indirect way. To do that, I ran the model in
levels, and inquired if some of the typical issues with the estimation results in
the presence of unit roots have surfaced. Indeed, the high significance of most
parameters, as well as the very high R2 in the level estimation, flag the above
concerns. That is why my preferred estimation is the one in differences.
Since the primary interest of this work is in the best possible estimation
of equation (3.2), constructing the above system has the sole purpose of
identifying αi, i ∈ [4; 7], by finding possible instruments for the endogenous
interaction terms. In the 2SLS estimations, the exogenous variables in the
rest of the system of equations are used as instruments, where the crucial role
is played by the lagged values of the interaction term. I estimate equation
(3.2) by both OLS and 2SLS, in both levels and differences. The results from
estimating the model in levels are presented in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3, and
in differences – in Table 3.4 and Table 3.5. A more detailed description of
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the data which feeds the model is given below.
3.5 Data
3.5.1 Country-level Data on Reforms
There is more than one source of country-level data on the variables used in
equation (3.1). One of the widely used data sets is Worldwide Governance
Indicators (WGI) for 1996-2010, constructed by Kaufmann et al. (2010).
The WGI dataset is constructed biannually for 1996-2002 and annually since
2003 in 6 areas: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, Government
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption.
For the purposes of this work, the most relevant indicator of economic lib-
eralization is the regulatory quality. The other data set used here is the
Heritage Foundation Data (HFD) reported in Miller, Holmes, and Feulner
(2013). It contains information on 10 broad reform areas across 181 coun-
tries. Among those reform areas are business freedom, investment freedom
and labor freedom. I average those three freedoms to arrive at an index of
overall liberalization that I further use in equation (3.1). The final data set
I use in equation (3.1) and in equation (3.2) is the Economic Freedom of the
World (EFW) data set.
The EFW data set, constructed by Gwartney et al. (2012), was used as
the main source of economic liberalization data. The EFW data contain
information on both the overall country patterns of economic and property
rights reforms but also on more specific patterns of credit market liberaliza-
tion. The database contains annual indices of economic freedom in 5 areas:
Size of Government, Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights, Ac-
cess to Sound Money, Freedom to Trade Internationally and the Regulation
of Credit, Labor, and Business. The last area in the database is the most
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relevant to the estimation of equation (3.2).
A positive feature of the EFW database is that it dates back well before
the firm performance measures were obtained. Thus, I can construct instru-
ments for both the overall and the specific market liberalization reforms, and
for the rule of law. Those instruments are the indices of CMRkt, Rkt, RoLkt
and Tkt in 1990 and in 1995, interacted with the size of the firm 3 years before
the dependent variable was measured. Thus, endogeneity issues behind the
interaction terms are allegedly mitigated.
3.5.2 Firm-level Data
The Enterprise Surveys (ES) firm-level data are collected by the Enterprise
Analysis Unit (EAU) of the World Bank in various periods. The data set en-
compasses two broad periods: 2000-2005 and 2005-2011 in various countries.
The first data set has more than 53,000 firm-level observations across more
than 90 countries and the second one has more than 60,000 firm-level obser-
vations from more than 70 countries. Both data sets consist of a wide range
of firm-level performance indicators. I stack them together so that I have a
large cross-country data set spanning from 2000 to 2011 that I can further
merge with the country-level data. Further, to reduce the number of empty
industry-country cells, I drop any industry with less than 1000 observations,
and any country with less than 100 observations.
The EAU data is perhaps the largest publicly available firm-level data set
with relevance to the main hypothesis of this work. The results from testing
it are presented below.
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3.6 Results
By using industry-level data, Aghion et al. (2007) and later Bourlès et al.
(2010) reveal some reasons why product market liberalization reforms might
benefit advanced economies – or those economies with a higher share of
advanced firms – more than economies with a higher share of backward firms.
However, it was shown in Table 3.1 that firm-level evidence in support of their
theory is weak. Therefore, a new hypothesis may explain why some economies
benefit from liberalization reforms while others do not. I hypothesize that
firms of different sizes react differently to deregulation. Thus, based on the
notable differences in the size distribution of firms across countries, various
economies would react differently to identical economic liberalization reforms.
To test the hypothesis, I use both OLS and 2SLS estimation of equation
(3.2) in which the instruments for the endogenous variables are found in
the rest of the system of equations. The results from these estimations are
presented in Tables 3.2 and 3.3.
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 present the estimates of equation (3.2) by OLS and
2SLS. Within each table, two sets of estimations are conducted. The first set
uses the number of employees as a proxy for firm size, whereas the second set
of estimations uses the value of assets as a proxy for size. Within each set
of estimations, four columns are presented. The first two columns present
the estimates from equation (3.2) without the country-year effects and the
second two columns present the estimates with the country-year effects. The
reason to present both estimates was that time-varying and time-invariant
country characteristics may turn out to be among the crucial determinants
of the variation in the responses to reforms within each country, as already
suggested by Commander and Svejnar (2011).
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 present evidence that liberalization reforms have dif-
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ferent impacts on both sales and sales per worker of firms of different size.
Table 3.2 demonstrates that credit market liberalization helps increase the
sales per worker of larger firms more than the sales per worker of smaller
firms. This result supports the different impact of financial regulations on
small and large firms discussed by Franks et al. (1997). However, reforming
product and labor markets affects smaller firms more. This is indicated by
the negative sign on some of the estimates of R∗Size. Strengthening the rule
of law and trade liberalization also seems to improve the sales per worker of
larger firms more. This is indicated by the parameter estimates on the in-
teraction terms. Interestingly, the result concerning trade liberalization does
not hold across different measures of firm size, that is, when size is changed
from number of employees to value of assets. Further, firm controls such as
managerial experience and age of the firm do not appear to increase sales
per worker, conditioned on the other controls. In addition, including both
time-varying and time-invariant country effects in the estimated equation
does not change the above result.
The above evidence suggests that larger firms benefit more from liber-
alizing credit markets, from strengthening the rule of law and from trade
liberalization. At the same time, smaller firms benefit more from an overall
reform that, apart from credit market liberalization, includes also labor- and
product-market reforms.
There is a reason the results here are presented both with and without
country fixed and time-varying effects. The reason is that the current lit-
erature seems to be still looking for conclusive evidence on the effects of
various reforms on economic growth. Cross-country studies á la Djankov et
al. (2002) and Botero et al. (2004) imply a positive impact of reforms. How-
ever, firm-level studies, e.g., Commander and Svejnar (2011), offer a more
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nuanced explanation of the growth impact of market-oriented reforms. The
results here offer one of the possible explanations for the dissent analyzed
well in Babecký and Campos (2011).
Babecký and Campos (2011) and later Babecký and Havránek (2013),
however, also find that external liberalization had a robust positive effect on
growth in the transition economies. One of the reasons for this robust effect
was perhaps the fact that the initial phase of transition period was character-
ized by higher share of large firms than the subsequent phases. The results
here point to the fact that those firms benefit more from liberalizing credit
markets and trade. Consequently, the results here offer an intuitive expla-
nation of why those CEE countries which liberalized their external sectors
earlier also benefited more from the initial reforms in their external sectors.
The result that small and large firms grow differently after similar reforms
is much stronger in Table 3.4 and Table 3.5. At the cost of a massive loss of
observations, the estimations presented in those two tables gain insight into
the growth of sales per worker and the growth of sales of firms of different
size after various market-oriented reforms. The baseline equation is now
estimated in differences. It tells a much more consistent story on the growth
impact of various reforms across firms of different size. The messages from
Table 3.2 still stand.
Without going into too much detail, bigger firms grow more than smaller
firms after liberalizing credit markets, after improving the rule of law, and
after trade liberalization. Unlike bigger firms, their smaller competitors ben-
efit more from reforms in labor and product markets. The results are also
robust to including country effects. With or without the country effects, the
main result emerging from this analysis stands: The growth of firms of dif-
ferent size after market liberalization and property rights reforms is different.
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As a result, aggregate growth would also be affected by the within-country
firm size distribution. Given the cross-country differences in the FSDs, it
is intuitive why some countries benefit from market-oriented reforms, while
others do not.
3.7 Robustness Checks and Tests of Instruments
The results above would have causal interpretations only if the the error
terms are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, and if the instru-
ments in the 2SLS estimations are valid and strong. To ensure that some
unobserved firm-level effect is not driving the growth of the firms instead of
the included explanatory variables, I employ two separate procedures. First,
I store the residuals from each estimation and then regress the residuals on
the observed firm-level explanatory variables. In all of those estimations of
the error term, I find that the included explanatory variables have no effect
on the unobservable firm-level effects. These conclusions are also supported
by the residual plots against the observables included.
Second, I do a RESET test. The test rejects the hypothesis that there
are no omitted variables in almost all models. These omitted variables could
be either the power terms of the included explanatory variables or the firm
fixed effects. Re-running the model and repeating the RESET test with
the squared and higher-power terms still leads to a detection of omitted
variables and the magnitude of the F-test does not decrease, so the issue is
not mitigated by the additional variables. Given the cross-sectional data, I
have no way of controlling for the firm-specific fixed effects that I suspect are
causing the specification issue.
Therefore, I presume that the unexplained parts of the variations in sales
and sales per worker are driven by either the firm fixed effects or some random
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factor that is not causing an omitted variable bias (OVB). Moreover, the
explanatory power of most models is large enough so I expect any OVB to
be relatively small. Despite the small OVB, the core message still persists
across all models.
However, the OVB is not the ultimate concern with these estimations. An
additional issue arises with the Hansen J-test because it rejects the null of the
validity of instruments in some of the estimations. This could be because the
instruments are invalid or because of misspecification (Cameron & Trivedi,
2005, p.277). In either way, the significant Hansen J-test calls for caution in
interpreting the 2SLS estimates. The positive news about the instruments
is that they are strong. This is indicated by the Angrist-Pischke first-stage
F-test (APF) whose value is more than 10 in most cases and which is more
conservative than the standard first-stage F-test.
Assuming the Hansen test does not undermine the main message of the
paper, I perform several robustness checks. First, I add more instruments. I
interact the values of the reform variables in the year 2000 with the size of the
firm, and add the resulting variable to the list of instruments. Unlike 1995
and 1990 that were used to interact with size so far, the year 2000 is closer
to the sample. I expect the inclusion of this instrument to add strength to
the instruments. The results are presented in Table 3.6 and are robust to the
ones presented in the main tables. I repeat the estimations with the higher
number of instruments for sales and get similar conclusions.
Second, instead of using the EFW indices of reforms throughout this
study, I plug the Abiad et al. (2010) overall index of financial reforms for the
CMR index in the main estimations. The goal is to see if the results are robust
to a certain change in the data source of reforms. The results are presented
in Table 3.7 and are roughly robust, with minor exceptions. An important
124
exception is that firm sales per worker do not behave consistently better
for larger firms after a CMR reform, or consistently better for smaller firms
after an overall reform. The results are robust in another way though: firms
of different size do not grow identically after various market liberalization
reforms.
Third, because of multicollinearity concerns over the correlations of CMR
and the overall index of regulation R, I drop R from the main estimations,
and stick with the CMR index offered by Abiad et al. (2010). The downside
of this approach is that it introduces an OVB. Still, the results are roughly
consistent. Overall, the robustness checks confirm the broad conclusions of
this study.
Fourth, I investigate if the results are driven by the Great Recession. The
reason to expect an impact of the Recession on the results of the paper is
that many firms ceased their existence in 2008-2011. Perhaps the effect was
more pronounced for the smaller firms. This could have affected the firm-size
distribution in that period and, hence, the results of the paper. Since the
data features about 6200 firms monitored after 2007, it is natural to see if
the results with and without those firms are similar. There is one caveat to
dropping data after 2007, however: No data on the lagged values of assets
was collected after 2004. Effectively, this means that by construction the
results will remain virtually identical even after the drop. Therefore, I have
to resort to an alternative method to analyze if the Great Recession alters
the results.
To check if the Recession alters the results significantly, I drop the lagged
values of assets as an explanatory variable from all models. The advantage is
that I can utilize the data after 2004 which does not have records of the lagged
values of assets but has all the remaining explanatory variables. Admittedly,
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this produces biased estimates because of an omitted relevant variable. Yet,
the results will be consistently biased in the same direction because the same
variable is missing from all models. That is why the omitted variable bias
is of lesser concern here. The more important concern is how the Great
Recession changes the results, if it changes them at all. The results after
dropping the value of assets are presented in Table 3.8 and Table 3.9.
It turns out the Recession changes somewhat the main results and adds
an additional angle on the performance differences after a reform is enacted
between small and large firms. When the estimations are done on the re-
stricted sample before 2008, the results come out a notch stronger than the
ones obtained from the full sample but not for all reforms. This means the
performance differences of small and large firms after market oriented reforms
were slightly more evident during the boom years before the Great Reces-
sion. With a bit of an overreach, this conclusion could serve as a guidance
to further pursuits of a more general effect of crises on the impact of reforms
across firms of different size. Specifically, one could expect the different ef-
fect of market oriented reforms across firms of different size to be stronger
in good times, and weaker in times of recessions. This particular avenue for
research, however, is left for the future. The other conclusions from this work
are presented below.
3.8 Conclusion
By using firm-level data from a large number of developing and post-transition
countries, it was shown that firms of different size grow differently after simi-
lar reforms. This could bring sizable aggregate implications for cross-country
differences in the outcomes of many market-oriented reforms. Those differ-
ences could be determined, among other factors, by the notable variation in
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FSDs across countries.
In a policy context, the success of reforms depends on the share of firms
with relative gains after the reform. If an economy has a larger share of
smaller firms, then liberalizing product and labor markets would benefit this
economy more than an economy populated by larger firms. Bigger firms seem
to grow slower after those reforms. However, improving property rights, lib-
eralizing trade and liberalizing the financial system would make an economy
with a higher share of large firms grow faster than the economy populated
by small firms.
The results here also partly explain why a given set of reforms might affect
a number of countries differently, despite the similarity in those reforms. For
example, a rich history of similar market-oriented reforms in Central and
Eastern Europe has led to remarkably different reform outcomes. Offering
an explanation for this and other growth divergences that occurred after a
similar set of reforms could be considered the main contribution of this work
to the development literature.
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Table 3.2: Reforms and Log(SPW) across Firms of Different Size
Size: Log(No. of employees) Size: Log(Value of assets)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Log(SPW)t−1 .71∗∗∗ .98∗∗∗ .62∗∗∗ .38∗∗ .71∗∗∗ .04 .62∗∗∗ .78∗∗∗
(.01) (.06) (.01) (.18) (.01) (.11) (.01) (.10)
Log(KPW) .15∗∗∗ .01 .11∗∗∗ .19∗∗∗ .11∗∗∗ .41∗∗∗ .09∗∗∗ .18∗∗∗
(.01) (.03) (.01) (.05) (.01) (.05) (.01) (.04)
CMR*Size .00∗ .00 .01 .02 -.00 .01 .00 .05∗∗∗
(.00) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.00) (.01) (.00) (.01)
R*Size -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.00 -.02∗ -.02∗∗ -.11∗∗∗
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.03) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.02)
RoL*Size .02∗∗∗ .01 -.01∗ -.01 .01∗∗∗ .02∗∗∗ .01∗∗ .02∗∗∗
(.00) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.01)
T*Size -.01∗∗∗ .01∗ .01∗∗ .00 -.00 .02∗∗∗ .01∗∗∗ .02∗∗∗
(.00) (.00) (.01) (.02) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.01)
Mgr. Exp. .00 -.00 -.00 -.00 .00 .00 -.00 .00
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Firm Age .00 -.00 .00 -.00 .00 -.00 .00 -.00
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Const. .79∗∗∗ -.39 2.45∗∗∗ 4.27∗∗∗ .85∗∗∗ 4.02∗∗∗ 2.47∗∗∗ 2.48∗∗∗
(.11) (.39) (.13) (1.38) (.11) (.41) (.14) (.36)
C’try Eff’s No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Obs. 16686 14383 16686 14383 16686 3133 16686 3133
Adj. R2 .825 .795 .845 .832 .826 .679 .845 .839
Hansen J .02 .03 .55 .03
APF CMRS 110.9 15.46 451.1 42.40
APF RS 68.59 11.82 162.5 16.05
APF RLS 333.1 47.77 4158 109.1
APF TS 399.8 46.69 342.3 90.40
Notes: The table presents results from OLS and 2SLS estimations of Log(Sales per worker)
on lagged Log(SPW), Log(Capital per worker) and other observables from the firm-level
data of the Enterprise Analysis Unit at the World Bank, and reform data, measured with
Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) Indices, as well as on their interaction with firm
size measured by either Log(No. of employees) or Log(Value of assets). All estimations
include the age of the firm, its legal status, an indicator of a quality certificate and industry-
year effects. Some estimations include country-year effects. The Hansen J-test and the
first-stage Angrist-Pischke F-tests are given for each of the endogenous variables. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. Symbols: ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
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Table 3.3: Reforms and Log(Sales) across Firms of Different Size
Size: Log(No. of employees) Size: Log(Value of assets)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Log(Sal)t−1 .60∗∗∗ .89∗∗∗ .59∗∗∗ .50∗∗ .61∗∗∗ .35∗∗∗ .61∗∗∗ .23∗∗∗
(.01) (.31) (.01) (.25) (.01) (.07) (.01) (.09)
Log(K) .09∗∗∗ .01 .08∗∗∗ .10∗ .09∗∗∗ .34∗∗∗ .19∗∗∗ .70∗∗∗
(.01) (.08) (.01) (.05) (.01) (.07) (.03) (.16)
Log(L) .28∗∗∗ .14 .23∗∗∗ .32∗∗∗ .30∗∗∗ .21∗∗∗ .29∗∗∗ .29∗∗∗
(.01) (.19) (.01) (.11) (.01) (.03) (.01) (.04)
CMR*Size -.00 -.00 .00 .01 -.00 .01 -.00 .02
(.00) (.02) (.01) (.02) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.02)
R*Size -.00 .01 -.01 -.02 .00 -.02 -.01 -.04
(.00) (.03) (.01) (.03) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.03)
RoL.*Size .02∗∗∗ .00 -.00 .01 .00∗∗∗ .01∗∗∗ .00 .02
(.00) (.01) (.00) (.02) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.01)
T*Size .00 -.01 .03∗∗∗ .01 -.00∗∗∗ .01 -.01 -.04∗
(.00) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.01) (.00) (.02)
Mgr. Exp. .00 -.00 -.00 -.00 .00 .00∗∗∗ -.00 .00∗∗
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Firm Age -.00∗∗∗ -.00∗∗∗ -.00∗∗∗ -.00∗∗ -.00∗∗∗ -.00∗ -.00∗∗∗ -.00
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Const. 3.09∗∗∗ .00 1.16∗∗∗ 1.41 2.97∗∗∗ 1.68∗∗∗ 3.03∗∗∗ 1.88∗∗∗
(.16) (.82) (.14) (1.12) (.16) (.22) (.20) (.25)
C’try Eff’s No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Obs. 17207 13713 17207 13713 17207 3286 17207 3286
Adj. R2 .927 .912 .932 .932 .927 .932 .930 .921
Hansen J .65 .04 .00 .46
APF CMRS 9.80 25.16 4512 213.0
APF RS 8.32 13.10 1703 84.76
APF RLS 536.8 29.66 32359 577.4
APF TS 106.8 53.60 43461 2166
Notes: The table presents results from OLS and 2SLS estimations of Log(Sales) on lagged
Log(SAL), Log(Capital), Log(Labor costs) and other observables from the firm-level data
of the Enterprise Analysis Unit at the World Bank, and on reform data, measured with
Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) Indices, as well as on their interaction with
the firm size measured by either Log(No. of employees) or Log(Value of assets). All
estimations include the age of the firm, its legal status, an indicator of a quality certificate
and industry-year effects. Some estimations include country-year effects. The Hansen
J-test and the first-stage Angrist-Pischke F-tests are given for each of the endogenous
variables. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Symbols: ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗
p < .01.
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Table 3.4: Reforms and ∆ Log(SPW) across Firms of Different Size
Size: Log(No. of employees) Size: Log(Value of assets)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
∆ LogKPW .46∗∗∗ .44∗∗∗ .44∗∗∗ .43∗∗∗ .45∗∗∗ .44∗∗∗ .45∗∗∗ .43∗∗∗
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.05) (.04) (.05)
CMR*Size .03∗∗∗ .05∗∗∗ .04∗∗∗ .04∗∗ .01∗∗∗ .02∗∗∗ .02∗∗∗ .05∗∗∗
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.01)
R*Size -.06∗∗∗ -.08∗∗∗ -.11∗∗∗ -.09∗∗∗ -.02∗∗ -.03∗∗∗ -.06∗∗∗ -.11∗∗∗
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02)
RoL*Size .02∗∗∗ .02∗∗∗ .03∗∗∗ .02 .00∗∗∗ .01∗∗∗ .01∗∗ .02∗∗
(.00) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.01)
T*Size -.00 .01 .02∗∗∗ .03∗∗∗ -.00 .00 .02∗∗ .02∗∗∗
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.01)
Mgr. Exp. .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Firm Age -.00∗ -.00∗∗∗ -.00∗ -.00∗∗∗ -.00 -.00∗∗ -.00 -.00∗∗
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Const. .51∗∗∗ .47∗∗∗ .66∗∗∗ .56∗∗∗ .53∗∗∗ .55∗∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗ 1.41∗∗∗
(.14) (.15) (.15) (.16) (.17) (.17) (.26) (.28)
C’try Eff’s No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Obs. 3840 3133 3840 3133 3840 3133 3840 3133
Adj. R2 .275 .294 .283 .305 .274 .292 .283 .304
Hansen J .00 .00 .00 .00
APF CMRS 106.2 49.77 573.3 63.05
APF RS 32.84 16.97 217.3 33.84
APF RLS 1637 144.4 9861 178.0
APF TS 284.8 104.3 185.6 268.2
Notes: The table presents results from OLS and 2SLS estimations of the change in
Log(Sales per worker) on the change in Log(Capital per worker) and other observables
from the firm-level data of the Enterprise Analysis Unit at the World Bank and reform
data, measured with Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) Indices, as well as on their
interaction with the firm size measured by either Log(No. of employees) or Log(Value
of assets). All estimations include the age of the firm, its legal status, an indicator of
a quality certificate and industry-year effects. Some estimations include country-year ef-
fects. The Hansen J-test and the first-stage Angrist-Pischke F-tests are given for each of
the endogenous variables. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Symbols: ∗ p < .10,
∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
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Table 3.5: Reforms and ∆ Log(Sales) across Firms of Different Size
Size: Log(No. of employees) Size: Log(Value of assets)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
∆ Log(K) .36∗∗∗ .37∗∗∗ .34∗∗∗ .35∗∗∗ .35∗∗∗ .36∗∗∗ .34∗∗∗ .35∗∗∗
(.04) (.05) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.05) (.04) (.05)
∆ Log(L) .30∗∗∗ .31∗∗∗ .31∗∗∗ .32∗∗∗ .31∗∗∗ .32∗∗∗ .32∗∗∗ .33∗∗∗
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04)
CMR*Size .04∗∗∗ .05∗∗∗ .05∗∗∗ .04∗∗ .01∗∗∗ .02∗∗∗ .03∗∗∗ .05∗∗∗
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.01)
R*Size -.06∗∗∗ -.08∗∗∗ -.12∗∗∗ -.10∗∗∗ -.02∗∗ -.03∗∗∗ -.06∗∗∗ -.11∗∗∗
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02)
RoL.*Size .02∗∗∗ .02∗∗∗ .03∗∗∗ .02 .01∗∗∗ .01∗∗∗ .01∗∗∗ .03∗∗∗
(.00) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.01)
T*Size .00 .01 .03∗∗∗ .03∗∗∗ .00 .00 .02∗∗ .02∗∗∗
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.01)
Mgr. Exp. .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Firm Age -.00∗∗∗ -.00∗∗∗ -.00∗∗∗ -.00∗∗∗ -.00∗∗∗ -.00∗∗∗ -.00∗∗∗ -.00∗∗∗
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Const. .50∗∗∗ .57∗∗∗ .67∗∗∗ .67∗∗∗ .46∗∗∗ .60∗∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗ 1.52∗∗∗
(.14) (.14) (.15) (.16) (.16) (.17) (.25) (.28)
C’try Eff’s No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Obs. 3840 3133 3840 3133 3840 3133 3840 3133
Adj. R2 .285 .298 .295 .309 .283 .295 .293 .306
Hansen J .00 .00 .00 .00
APF CMRS 2585 1029.4 9110 627.5
APF RS 2603 1155 9884 567.3
APF RLS 14492 1673.4 27712 692.4
APF TS 94734 58129 167689 28479
Notes: The table presents results from OLS and 2SLS estimations of the change in
Log(Sales) on the change in Log(Capital), the change in Log(No. employess) and other
observables from the firm-level data of the Enterprise Analysis Unit at the World Bank
and on reform data, measured with Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) Indices, as
well as on their interaction with the firm size measured by either Log(No. of employ-
ees) or Log(Value of assets). All estimations include the age of the firm, its legal status,
an indicator of a quality certificate and industry-year effects. Some estimations include
country-year effects. The Hansen J-test and the first-stage Angrist-Pischke F-tests are
given for each of the endogenous variables. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Symbols: ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
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Table 3.6: Reforms and Log(SPW) across Firms of Different Size: Robustness
with More IVs
Size: Log(No. of employees) Size: Log(Value of assets)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Log(SPW)t−1 .71∗∗∗ .96∗∗∗ .62∗∗∗ .66∗∗∗ .71∗∗∗ .04 .62∗∗∗ .78∗∗∗
(.01) (.03) (.01) (.13) (.01) (.11) (.01) (.10)
Log(KPW) .15∗∗∗ .02 .11∗∗∗ .10∗∗ .11∗∗∗ .41∗∗∗ .09∗∗∗ .18∗∗∗
(.01) (.02) (.01) (.04) (.01) (.05) (.01) (.04)
CMR*Size .00∗ -.01 .01 .01 -.00 .01 .00 .05∗∗∗
(.00) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.00) (.01) (.00) (.01)
R*Size -.01 .01 -.01 -.02 -.00 -.02∗ -.02∗∗ -.11∗∗∗
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.03) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.02)
RoL*Size .02∗∗∗ .01∗ -.01∗ -.01 .01∗∗∗ .02∗∗∗ .01∗∗ .02∗∗∗
(.00) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.01)
T*Size -.01∗∗∗ .01∗∗ .01∗∗ .02∗ -.00 .02∗∗∗ .01∗∗∗ .02∗∗∗
(.00) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.01)
Mgr. Exp. .00 -.00 -.00 -.00 .00 .00 -.00 .00
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Firm Age .00 -.00 .00 -.00 .00 -.00 .00 -.00
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Const. .79∗∗∗ -.27 2.45∗∗∗ 2.17∗∗ .85∗∗∗ 4.02∗∗∗ 2.47∗∗∗ 2.48∗∗∗
(.11) (.20) (.13) (1.05) (.11) (.41) (.14) (.36)
C’try Eff’s No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Obs. 16686 14383 16686 14383 16686 3133 16686 3133
Adj. R2 .825 .800 .845 .851 .826 .679 .845 .839
Hansen J .00 .00 .55 .03
APF CMRS 104.0 14.00 451.1 42.40
APF RS 59.84 9.42 162.5 16.05
APF RLS 37.02 56.75 4158 109.1
APF TS 391.3 59.27 342.3 90.40
Notes: The table presents results from OLS and 2SLS estimations of Log(Sales per worker)
on lagged Log(SPW), Log(Capital per worker) and other observables from the firm-level
data of the Enterprise Analysis Unit at the World Bank and reform data, measured with
Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) Indices, as well as on their interaction with
the firm size measured by either Log(No. of employees) or Log(Value of assets). All
estimations include the age of the firm, its legal status, an indicator of a quality certificate
and industry-year effects. Some estimations include country-year effects. The Hansen
J-test and the first-stage Angrist-Pischke F-tests are given for each of the endogenous
variables. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Symbols: ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗
p < .01.
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Table 3.7: Reforms and Log(SPW) across Firms of Different Size: Robustness
for CMR definition
Size: Log(No. of employees) Size: Log(Value of assets)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Log(SPW)t−1 .68∗∗∗ 1.18∗∗∗ .65∗∗∗ .36 .68∗∗∗ .05 .65∗∗∗ .84∗∗∗
(.02) (.06) (.02) (.33) (.02) (.12) (.02) (.10)
Log(KPW) .24∗∗∗ -.06 .19∗∗∗ .32∗∗ .19∗∗∗ .41∗∗∗ .18∗∗∗ .16∗∗∗
(.02) (.04) (.01) (.15) (.02) (.06) (.02) (.04)
CMR*Size -.00 -.03∗∗∗ .00 .00 -.00∗∗∗ .01 -.00 .08∗∗∗
(.00) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.02)
R*Size .03∗∗∗ .07∗∗∗ -.01 -.04∗ .01∗∗∗ -.02∗ .00 -.10∗∗∗
(.00) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.02)
RoL*Size .01∗∗∗ -.01 .01 .00 .00∗∗∗ .02∗∗∗ .01 .01
(.00) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.01)
T*Size -.03∗∗∗ -.01∗∗∗ .01 .04∗∗∗ -.00∗∗∗ .01∗∗∗ -.00 -.01
(.00) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.01)
Mgr. Exp. -.00∗∗∗ -.00∗∗ .00 .00 -.00∗∗ .00 .00 .00
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Firm Age -.00∗∗∗ -.00∗∗ -.00 -.00∗ -.00∗∗∗ -.00 -.00 -.00
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Const. .07 -1.78∗∗∗ 1.41∗∗∗ 2.96 -.01 3.95∗∗∗ 1.57∗∗∗ 2.36∗∗∗
(.12) (.32) (.18) (2.03) (.12) (.42) (.21) (.37)
C’try Eff’s No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Obs. 5309 4600 5309 4600 5309 3069 5309 3069
Adj. R2 .893 .828 .901 .886 .894 .687 .901 .830
Hansen J .00 .13 .28 .03
APF CMRS 687.7 61.10 239.6 33.65
APF RS 394.3 45.85 209.1 3.30
APF RLS 1248 162.5 4571 229.6
APF TS 1144 65.63 551.7 111.2
Notes: The table presents results from OLS and 2SLS estimations of Log(Sales per worker)
on lagged Log(SPW), Log(Capital per worker) and other observables from the firm-level
data of the Enterprise Analysis Unit at the World Bank and reform data, measured with
Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) Indices, as well as on their interaction with
the firm size measured by either Log(No. of employees) or Log(Value of assets). All
estimations include the age of the firm, its legal status, an indicator of a quality certificate
and industry-year effects. Some estimations include country-year effects. The Hansen
J-test and the first-stage Angrist-Pischke F-tests are given for each of the endogenous
variables. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Symbols: ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗
p < .01.
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Table 3.8: Reforms and ∆Log(SPW) across Firms of Different Size: Is the
Great Recession Affecting the Results?
Full Sample Sample Before 2008
Size:Log(L) Size:Log(K) Size:Log(L) Size:Log(K)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
CMR*Size .02∗∗∗ .04∗∗ .01∗ .02 .02∗∗∗ .02 .01∗∗∗ .04∗∗∗
(.01) (.02) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.00) (.01)
RoL*Size .00 .03 .00 .03∗∗ .00 -.01 .01∗ .04∗∗∗
(.01) (.02) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.00) (.01)
T*Size .00 -.01 -.00 -.05∗∗∗ .01 -.02 .00 -.04∗∗∗
(.01) (.01) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.00) (.01)
Mgr. Exp. .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Firm Age .00∗∗ -.00 .00∗ .00 .00 -.00 .00 .00
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Const. .20∗ -.26∗ .21∗ -.19∗ .02 -.46∗∗∗ -.15 -.57∗∗∗
(.11) (.14) (.12) (.11) (.14) (.13) (.17) (.20)
C’try Eff’s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 16686 14383 16686 14383 12705 11458 12705 11458
Adj. R2 .081 .079 .080 .078 .102 .099 .102 .098
Hansen J .00 .00 .00 .00
APF CMRS 15.05 21.26 19.07 27.86
APF RS 9.72 25.46 1.75 32.74
APF RLS 46.47 159.37 54.09 189.07
APF TS 52.92 191.13 43.60 167.45
Notes: The table presents results from OLS and 2SLS estimations of the difference in
Log(Sales per worker) on observables from the firm-level data of the Enterprise Analysis
Unit at the World Bank, and on reform data, measured with The Economic Freedom of
the World (EFW) Indices, as well as on their interaction with the firm size measured by
either Log(No. of employees) or Log(Value of assets). All estimations include the age of
the firm, its legal status, an indicator of a quality certificate, and industry-year effects. All
estimations include country-year effects. The Hansen J-test and the first-stage Angrist-
Pischke F-tests are given for each of the endogenous variables. Robust standard errors are
in parentheses. Symbols: ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 3.9: Reforms and ∆Log(Sales) across Firms of Different Size: Is the
Great Recession Affecting the Results?
Full Sample Sample Before 2008
Size:Log(L) Size:Log(K) Size:Log(L) Size:Log(K)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
∆ Log(L) .37∗∗∗ .36∗∗∗ .38∗∗∗ .36∗∗∗ .35∗∗∗ .35∗∗∗ .36∗∗∗ .35∗∗∗
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
CMR*Size .02∗∗∗ .07∗∗∗ .01∗ .03∗∗∗ .03∗∗∗ .03∗∗ .01∗∗∗ .04∗∗∗
(.01) (.02) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.00) (.01)
R*Size -.04∗∗∗ -.12∗∗∗ -.01∗ -.03 -.05∗∗∗ -.05∗ -.03∗∗∗ -.04∗∗
(.02) (.03) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.03) (.01) (.02)
RoL.*Size .00 .07∗∗∗ .00 .02∗ -.00 .02 .01∗∗ .02∗∗
(.01) (.02) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.00) (.01)
T*Size .01∗ -.02 .00 -.03∗∗∗ .02∗∗∗ -.01 .01∗ -.03∗∗
(.01) (.01) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.00) (.01)
Mgr. Exp. -.00 -.00 -.00 -.00 -.00 -.00 .00 -.00
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Firm Age -.00∗∗∗ -.00∗∗∗ -.00∗∗∗ -.00∗∗∗ -.00∗∗∗ -.00∗∗∗ -.00∗∗∗ -.00∗∗∗
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Const. .08 .09 .23∗∗ .20 -.02 -.05 .04 .49∗∗∗
(.11) (.09) (.12) (.22) (.13) (.10) (.17) (.13)
C’try Eff’s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 16686 14383 16686 14383 12705 11458 12705 11458
Adj. R2 .150 .149 .150 .149 .178 .184 .177 .176
Hansen J .00 .00 .00 .00
APF CMRS 3.70 22.30 38.19 28.97
APF RS 27.19 26.50 29.08 33.50
APF RLS 156.88 16.85 199.09 187.82
APF TS 169.19 19.77 131.85 168.41
Notes: The table presents results from OLS and 2SLS estimations of the change in
Log(Sales) on the change in Log(No. employees) and other observables from the firm-level
data of the Enterprise Analysis Unit at the World Bank, and on reform data, measured
with The Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) Indices, as well as on their interaction
with the firm size measured by either Log(No. of employees) or Log(Value of assets). All
estimations include the age of the firm, its legal status, an indicator of a quality certificate,
and industry-year effects. All estimations include country-year effects. The Hansen J-test
and the first-stage Angrist-Pischke F-tests are given for each of the endogenous variables.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Symbols: ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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